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Introduction 
 
Research has shown that different types of therapy have similar success rates, 
regardless of the theoretical underpinnings (Smith & Glass, 1977). For example, 
short-term psychodynamic psychotherapy and cognitive behaviour therapy are equally 
effective in treating depression (see Leichsenring, 2001 for a review). This has led to 
the suggestion that the therapeutic relationship, which is common to all one-to one 
therapy, maybe an important factor in influencing outcome (Howe, 1999). This 
highlights the need for clinical theory, practice and research to address the issue of the 
therapeutic relationship and how it‟s role in facilitating favourable outcomes can best 
be used. 
 
To provide an in-depth analysis of this issue, this essay will focus on two orientations 
that are based on different theoretical underpinnings, cognitive and psychoanalytic. 
How these two perspectives conceptualise and use the therapeutic relationship will 
first be discussed. Relevant research within this area will then be presented. Following 
this, an analysis of how the two viewpoints differ, and what similarities they share 
will be discussed. Finally, conclusions will be made regarding the role of the 
therapeutic relationship across cognitive and psychodynamic orientations, including 
consideration of implications for clinical practice and research, as well as possible 
directions for the future. 
 
The essay will only be considering one-to one therapy and not group or family 
therapy, as this has been the main focus within the empirical literature. In addition, 
„psychodynamic therapy‟ as the term is used in this essay will denote the range of 
psychological interventions that draw on psychoanalytic theory (Fonagy, 1998). This 
includes psychoanalysis and short term psychodynamic psychotherapy. 
 
The concept of „therapeutic relationship‟ or „alliance‟ has many definitions that 
depend on which theoretical orientation is subscribed to. However, for the purposes of 
this essay, the term „therapeutic relationship‟ and „therapeutic alliance‟ will be used 
interchangeably to denote the collaborative and affective bond between therapist and 
patient, as well as the patient‟s and therapist‟s ability to agree on treatment goals and 
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tasks. This reflects the three main themes of most theoretical definitions of the 
therapeutic alliance (Martin, et al., 2000). 
 
Therapeutic change is viewed differently from cognitive and psychoanalytic 
standpoints. In cognitive behaviour therapy the focus of treatment is to change clients‟ 
maladaptive cognitions and behaviours associated with the presenting problem (Beck, 
et al., 1979). In psychodynamic psychotherapy, the basic aim of treatment is to make 
the unconscious conscious, to create meaning where there is anxiety or confusion 
(Mander, 2000). The overarching premise of these two views is that change 
constitutes an alleviation of the problem(s) the client came to therapy with. Thus for 
the purposes of this essay „change‟ will be defined as a reduction in symptoms.  
 
Psychoanalytic conceptualisation of the therapeutic relationship 
 
The emotional relationship between therapist and client together with interpretation 
and insight are seen as the main vehicles of change within psychodynamic therapy. 
(Bateman & Holmes, 1995). Interpretation is a technique that „links the conscious and 
unconscious determinants of an experience, act or symptom‟ (Bateman, et al., 2000, p. 
74). Through the re-experiencing of disturbing early experiences in the therapeutic 
relationship, or more specifically, in the transference, unconscious motives, anxieties 
and defences are identified and understood (Bateman et al., 2000). This insight is 
considered the hallmark of change in psychodynamic work (Bateman et al., 2000). 
Within the therapeutic relationship the transference and countertransference, two key 
processes that are argued to occur in all human relationships, are used therapeutically 
to enable understanding of the client‟s inner world (Bateman et al., 2000).  
 
Transference 
 
Transference can be defined as „the tendency to repeat, in a current setting, attitudes, 
feelings, impulses, and desires experienced or generated in early life in relation to 
important figures in the individual‟s development‟ (Stone, 1995, p. 110). Breuer and 
Freud (1895/1955) first introduced the concept of transference and initially viewed it 
as a hindrance to treatment. However, Freud later recognised this phenomena could 
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assist the therapy, and described it as treatment‟s „best tool‟ to enable understanding 
of the patient‟s emotional difficulties (Freud, 1917/1973, p. 496).  
 
Since Freud‟s initial ideas on transference there has been many different revisions and 
developments on the topic. Classical viewpoints see transference as being based on 
actual past experiences (Fonagy, 1998). Transference is thus a distortion of reality, or 
the actual relationship, in that a psychic displacement of the past is projected onto a 
present relationship (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). Clients may experience feelings 
towards the therapist as if he/she were a significant figure from the past. This transfer 
of feelings can then be used to investigate the past and gain greater understanding of 
the client‟s difficulties, through interpretation of the transference (Bateman et al., 
2000). By contrast, more contemporary perspectives view transference and the 
therapeutic relationship as mutually evolving (Bateman et al., 2000). For example, 
(Slavin & Kreigman, 1992 as cited in Bateman & Holmes, 1995) argue transference 
represents the use of learned experience in new situations so that a revision of past 
experience can take place, thus transference is an „earlier version‟ rather than a 
distortion of present experience.  
 
Countertransference 
 
Countertransference can be defined as: 
 
the thoughts and feelings experienced by the analyst which are 
relevant to the patient‟s internal world and which may be used by the 
analyst to understand the meaning of his patient‟s communications to 
help rather than hinder treatment (Bateman & Holmes, 1995, p 109-
110).  
 
 
Freud (1910/1957) viewed countertransference reactions as obstacles to therapy and 
advocated personal analysis in order to overcome. Heimann (1950) first argued the 
therapist‟s countertransference reactions could be used to understand the client‟s 
unconscious processes. Winnicott (1949) also added to the changing view of 
countertransference. He emphasised the importance of negative countertransference 
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feelings, such as hate, when working with „disturbed‟ patients and argued that 
recognition of these feelings was an essential part of the treatment (Winnicott, 1949).  
 
In contrast to Freud, who viewed countertransference as the analyst‟s resistance, 
Heimann (1950) used the term to cover all the feelings the therapist experienced 
towards the client. She further developed the concept by arguing countertransference 
is not just part of the therapeutic relationship, but is also the client‟s creation 
(Heimann, 1950). Therefore a therapist‟s feelings in the therapeutic setting are not so 
much a manifestation of their subjective experience, but represent projected aspects of 
the client‟s mind (Jacobs, 1999). These ideas served to make countertransference a 
principal tool in therapy based on the understanding that a relationship existed 
between client and therapist (Hinshelwood, 1999).  
 
A concept that is related to the notion of countertransference is projective 
identification. In her work with children, Klein (1946/1986) initially described 
projective identification as a phantasy in which bad parts of the (infant) self were split 
off and projected into the mother, which resulted in a feeling that the mother had 
become the bad part of the self and was then responded to accordingly. Thus in its 
original form, projective identification was viewed as defensive and not involving the 
participation of the other (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). Further development of the 
concept has recognised that it is a mutual interactive process that impacts on the 
recipient in two ways.  
  
First, the recipient, or therapist, may feel or act in such a way that originates with the 
client, explaining the mechanism of what Heimann (1950) was describing in her 
paper. Second, through interpersonal interaction the recipient is pressured to enact the 
feelings that are being projected into him, or to perform the role of the client‟s 
transference figure (Hinshelwood, 1999). Bion‟s (1962) model of the container and 
the contained is useful here. He emphasised the importance of the recipient of the 
projection being able to „digest‟ or „metabolise‟ the projected parts, and then returning 
them to the recipient in a more acceptable form (Bateman & Holmes, 1995). 
Clinically this implies the therapist must be able to accept the client‟s projections, 
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contain them without acting on the feelings and offer them back to the client through 
the means of interpretation. 
 
In summary, the role of the relationship in psychoanalytic psychotherapy is of utmost 
importance. Transference and countertransference processes that occur within this 
relationship are used as a therapeutic tool as a way of connecting with the client‟s 
inner world and to bring about change.  
 
Cognitive conceptualisation of the therapeutic relationship 
 
The way in which cognitive therapy has viewed the role of the therapeutic relationship 
in producing change has shifted over the years. Traditionally, the therapeutic 
relationship was seen as a by-product of the therapeutic process (Giovazolias, 2004) 
and little attention was paid to it. Beck et al. (1979) argued that a good relationship 
was „sufficient but not necessary‟ for change in clients (p.45). Cognitive change came 
about by applying specific techniques within the context of a „therapeutic 
collaboration‟ (Beck et al., 1979).  
 
Beck et al. (1979) argue that therapist characteristics of warmth, empathy and 
genuiness are important when applying cognitive techniques. Basic trust and rapport 
are seen as essential in providing a collaborative environment in which therapist and 
client became a „team‟. Collaborative empiricism, as this is termed, has important 
implications for clinical practice in that the relationship is reciprocal, with both 
therapist and client working together in an investigative way (Sanders & Wills, 1999). 
 
Traditional cognitive therapy has been criticised for the „mechanistic‟ way in which it 
views the therapeutic relationship (Corrie, 2004). Difficulties in the therapeutic 
relationship were seen as problems to be solved. A criticism of this is that the therapy 
misses vital information regarding the clients difficulties including their ways of 
relating to others, which could be used to promote psychological change (Sanders & 
Wills, 1999). As cognitive therapy has developed there has been an increasing interest 
in the role of therapeutic relationship in producing change. This has been driven in 
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part by the increasing use of cognitive therapy with people who have more complex 
problems. For example, personality disordered clients‟ core difficulties are 
interpersonal relationships (Giovazolias, 2004). Work with such clients led to the 
recognition that the role of the therapeutic relationship was important (Beck, et al., 
1990). It was argued transference reactions could provide further information 
regarding the client‟s underlying beliefs and assumptions, and ignoring these could 
interfere with the collaboration (Beck et al., 1990). 
 
The development of schema therapy within the cognitive domain views the 
therapeutic relationship as a vital component of change. A schema is defined as a 
„broad organising principle for making sense of one‟s life experience‟ (Young, et al., 
2003, p. 7). Schema therapy attempts to help clients identify their schemas, 
understand their origins in childhood and relate them to the problems they are 
experiencing. The therapeutic relationship is central to this and is used in two ways. 
First, to empathise with the client and confront schemas as they are activated in the 
session, a process called empathic confrontation. Second, to allow limited reparenting 
to take place or, to provide the client with a „corrective emotional experience‟ 
(Alexander & French, 1946 as cited in Young, et al., 2003). The therapist acts in a 
consistent way towards the client that offers an „antidote‟ to the clients early deficient 
parenting experience (Young et al., 2003). 
 
Safran (1990a) has further developed cognitive theory by utilising interpersonal 
theory and the concept of the schema. He argues that interpersonal schemas, defined 
as generic representations of self-other relationships, are developed in childhood 
through interactions with care givers and guide the maintenance of interpersonal 
relatedness throughout life (Safran, 1990a). These interpersonal schemas drive 
cognitive-interpersonal cycles, in which maladaptive expectations and dysfunctional 
behaviours become activated and subsequently reinforced. Interpersonal behaviours 
produce an interpersonal „pull‟ in others that allows for schema-consistent responses 
which in turn reinforce the behaviours (Corrie, 2004). Safran (1990b) emphasises 
becoming a „participant observer‟ so to avoid becoming entangled with the client‟s 
dysfunctional cognitive-interpersonal cycle, and using the therapist‟s 
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countertransference reactions to identify problematic behaviours and communications 
that can be explored further. Attending to alliance „ruptures‟ or difficulties in the 
therapeutic relationship is seen as essential, as these can lead to valuable information 
regarding the client‟s interpersonal schemas and cognitive-interpersonal cycles 
(Safran & Segal, 1990). 
 
Therefore most contemporary cognitive orientated therapists would argue, to varying 
degrees, the therapeutic relationship is important in effecting change with clients. 
However, a new type of computer based treatment has emerged that challenges this 
view. Computer-based cognitive behavioural therapy (CCBT) packages have been 
developed to treat problems such as depression, anxiety, phobias and panic. A review 
of sixteen research studies concluded although some evidence exists that CCBT may 
be as effective as therapist-led cognitive behaviour therapy, but the evidence was not 
conclusive (Kaltenthaler, et al., 2004). A National Institute of Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) final appraisal determination came to similar conclusions, highlighting CCBT 
may be of value but as yet the evidence base is insufficient to recommend general 
introduction into the NHS (NICE, 2004b).  
 
In summary, apart from schema therapy, cognitive therapy has typically viewed the 
therapeutic relationship as important, but has not used it as a mechanism for change. 
Developments in theory are now taking the interpersonal aspects of the relationship 
into account, which has produced a resurgence of interest in the relationship as a 
possible means for facilitating change. 
 
Research into the therapeutic relationship 
 
Horvath and Symonds (1991) conducted a meta-analysis of 24 studies carried out over 
an 11-year period that looked at the relationship between alliance and outcome. Their 
inclusion criteria included studies that had a quantifiable measure of the relationship 
between the alliance and assessment of outcome, studies that had five or more 
participants, and only studies that investigated individual treatment. They found a 
„moderate but reliable‟ overall effect size of .26 between quality of alliance and 
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outcome (Horvath & Symonds, 1991, p.2). The results also showed no significant 
difference in the relationship between alliance and outcome for individual types of 
treatments. However, only two studies utilised cognitive therapy, the majority used 
psychodynamic and „eclectic‟. It was not made explicit which types of therapeutic 
orientations were drawn upon within the eclectic group, or which type of problems 
clients included in the studies had. 
 
Martin et al. (2000) using Horvath and Symonds' (1991) inclusion criteria found 60 
additional studies and conducted a further meta-analysis. They found a „moderate but 
consistent‟ overall effect size of .22 between positive outcome and good alliance, and 
replicated the finding that this relationship is not affected by type of treatment, which 
in this meta analysis was behavioural, cognitive or psychodynamic (Martin et al., 
2000, p.2). Whether type of diagnosis had an impact on the alliance-outcome 
relationship was not investigated. 
 
A factor to consider when interpreting the results of these meta-analyses is that the 
alliance measures that were used may be based on different definitions of the alliance 
itself (Catty, 2004). Horvath and Luborsky (1993) conducted a review of the research 
literature and found that overlap does exist between measures, indicating each 
measure is assessing a similar process. However, each measure reflected different 
underlying theoretical conceptualisations of the alliance. For example, The Penn 
Scales are derived from the psychodynamic conceptualisation of the alliance, The 
Vanderbilt scales are based on dynamic and integrative theories (Horvath & 
Luborsky, 1993). It is also argued that researchers tend to choose the alliance measure 
that best represents the theoretical orientation of the treatment upon which the study is 
based (Horvath, 2000). 
 
Andrusyna et al. (2001) conducted an interesting study looking at the specific factor 
structure of the therapeutic alliance. Using data from a previous study (Jacobson, et 
al., 1996) the shortened, observer rating version of the Working Alliance Inventory 
(Tichenor & Hill, 1989; as cited in Andrusyna, et al., 2001) was completed for 
audiotapes of the second sessions of cognitive behaviour therapy for 70 participants. 
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Factor analysis found that the alliance had a factor structure consisting of two 
independent factors, agreement/confidence and relationship. This suggests that the 
therapeutic relationship may be independent of the client‟s agreement with and 
confidence in the therapist and cognitive behaviour therapy. An important implication 
of this is previous studies may have been mistaken in using a measure that assumes a 
general alliance factor rather than two distinct factors.  
 
In light of the difficulties with alliance measures and the methodological limitations of 
the research that uses them, caution must be taken when interpreting the results. 
Nevertheless, the research has been taken as evidence that the relationship could be 
curative in itself, and that there are elements of the therapeutic relationship that are 
common to most, if not all, therapies (Howe, 1999). However, although a relationship 
has been found between alliance and outcome, no cause or effect can attributed. In 
addition, this relationship has been moderate not strong. It could be argued that if in 
fact the therapeutic relationship was curative in itself, regardless of therapeutic 
orientation, a stronger relationship would be observed.  
 
The research presented so far assumes the therapists‟ techniques within specific 
treatment types are similar, if not the same. This may be true if the treatments were 
being read out of a manual, but therapy involves a complex interpersonal interaction 
between therapist and client under an umbrella of specific treatment type. This has led 
researchers to generate more complex research questions, and is now examining the 
nature of this relationship. For example, it is possible that certain variables have either 
a mediating or a moderating effect on the alliance-outcome relationship. A moderator 
is defined as a variable that „affects the direction and/or strength of the relation 
between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable‟ 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 3). A mediator is defined as a variable that „accounts for 
the relation between the predictor and the criterion‟ (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p.7). 
These variables can be divided into client, therapist or treatment-specific. 
 
Trepka et al. (2004) examined whether therapist competence could influence the 
alliance-outcome relationship. Thirty NHS patients received between 12 and 20 
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sessions of cognitive therapy. Choosing one audiotaped session for each client at 
random, therapist competence and therapeutic alliance was assessed. The results 
showed the expected alliance-outcome relationship but interestingly revealed that 
therapist competency was also associated with outcome. However, this association 
was no longer significant when alliance was added to the analysis. Trepka et al. 
(2004) argue this finding reflects the modest power of the study, highlighting that this 
association was only slightly weakened when alliance was taken into account. The 
limitation of the study that both outcome and alliance were measured from the client‟s 
perspective, and competency was only measured from one independent rater may 
have contributed to these results. Trepka et al. (2004) propose therapist competence 
could be a variable that is independent of and additive to that of the therapeutic 
alliance.  
 
Research has examined the role of client-specific factors in affecting the alliance-
outcome relationship. Horvath (1991; as cited in Horvath, 1993) reviewed 11 studies 
investigating the impact of client-therapist characteristics and found that clients who 
had difficulty in maintaining social relationships, or who had poor relationships with 
their families were less likely to develop strong alliances. Hardy et al. (2001) treated 
24 clients with at least 12 sessions of cognitive therapy. They found an under-
involved interpersonal style predicted outcome and was mediated through the 
therapeutic alliance. Thus evidence shows that certain client characteristics can 
influence a client‟s ability to develop an alliance and hence affect outcome. 
 
However, some evidence exists that contradicts these findings. Klein et al. (2003) 
treated 455 depressed patients with either cognitive behavioural analysis system of 
psychotherapy (CBASP) or CBASP and Nefazodone. CBASP as described by the 
authors represents a form of cognitive behavioural therapy for depression 
incorporating „situational analysis‟ techniques. They found no relationship between 
alliance and the patient characteristics of symptom severity, co-morbid anxiety, 
substance use, personality disorders, level of social functioning over the past five 
years and history of childhood abuse and neglect. Alliance was a robust predictor of 
outcome, even after controlling for these factors. However, there are several 
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methodological limitations to this study that may account for the apparent discrepancy 
in the research literature. Patients who had a prior history of „failing‟ two different 
courses of psychotherapy within the past three years were excluded, as well as 
patients with a main diagnosis of antisocial, schizotypal or borderline personality 
disorder. Thus it could be argued the study excluded people who had difficulty in 
developing good quality alliances.  In addition, advertisements were used to recruit 
participants; therefore people who replied to these adverts may have been more 
motivated to develop good alliances with their therapist.  
 
Another factor that may have an impact on alliance and outcome is the therapist‟s, as 
well as the client‟s interpersonal history. Hilliard et al. (2000) assessed the 
interpersonal process of psychodynamic psychotherapy, as well as therapists‟ and 
clients‟ assessment of their relationship with both parents. The results showed clients‟ 
early parental relationships were related to outcome directly and indirectly through the 
mediating effect of the therapeutic process. Therapists‟ early parental relationships 
were related to the therapeutic process, which in turn had a direct effect on outcome.  
 
Finally, research has begun to examine how client factors that are specific to the 
treatment interact with the alliance-outcome relationship. Cloitre et al. (2004) treated 
patients who had childhood abuse-related post traumatic stress disorder with exposure 
therapy aimed at the development of interpersonal and emotion regulation skills. An 
effect size of .47 was obtained for the relationship between therapeutic alliance and 
outcome, larger than previous research. They also found that an improved capacity to 
regulate negative mood during the exposure phase of the treatment mediated this 
relationship.  
 
In summary, the complex nature of the therapeutic relationship is reflected in the 
developing complexity of the research that is now investigating it. This research 
shows that therapist-specific factors such as competency may have a moderating 
effect on the alliance-outcome relationship. Therapists‟ interpersonal history has also 
been shown to have an effect on the therapeutic process, which in turn has an impact 
on outcome. Skills acquired during treatment, such as the ability to regulate mood 
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have been shown to act as a mediator between alliance and outcome. Finally, the 
therapeutic alliance itself may have a mediating effect on the relationship between 
certain client factors such as interpersonal style, and outcome.  
 
Comparison of cognitive and psychodynamic conceptualisations of the 
therapeutic relationship 
 
Both orientations emphasise the importance of the therapeutic relationship in 
producing change, in particular the need to develop the alliance or collaborative aspect 
of the relationship to allow the work of therapy to be done. This is supported by the 
research that has found a better therapeutic relationship leads to better outcome, 
irrespective of type of treatment. Attachment theory can offer some explanation of 
this. Howe (1999) posits that a relationship between therapist and client mirrors that 
of a developmentally sound parent-child relationship. The therapist provides a secure 
base from which the clients can explore themselves and their problems, and thus the 
client experiences a relationship that is qualitatively different from early childhood 
relationships that may have led to the problem (Henry & Strupp, 1994; as cited in 
Howe, 1999). Therefore regardless of type of therapy or techniques employed, 
ultimately the therapeutic relationship may offer the necessary environment and 
interpersonal contact that is necessary for change. 
 
The key difference between cognitive and psychodynamic perspectives is how the 
interpersonal contact is used. Psychodynamic therapists are more focused on the 
processes within the relationship, the transference and countertransference, whereas 
traditional cognitive therapy focuses on the mastery of cognitive techniques, to allow 
the client to „be their own therapist‟. As cognitive therapy has developed, more 
attention has been paid to the relationship. But arguably only modified forms of 
cognitive therapy, such as schema therapy and cognitive therapy for personality 
disorders, use the relationship explicitly to bring about change.  
 
Cognitive and psychodynamic therapy both gave little attention to the transference 
and countertransference early on. As each therapy has developed, these concepts have 
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increasingly become important aspects for attention both theoretically and clinically. 
Currently transference is used to varying degrees within the two orientations. 
Psychodynamic therapists view transference and its understanding a central task in the 
therapy (O‟Brien & Houston, 2000). Cognitive therapists, on the other hand, 
acknowledge its existence and recognise it provides rich material regarding clients‟ 
beliefs (Beck, et al., 1990), but do not view it as the main technique to be used in 
eliciting such beliefs.  
 
One of the main therapeutic tools used in psychodynamic psychotherapy is reflecting 
on the countertransference. Within specialised forms of cognitive therapy, 
countertransference is important, but again does not play such a central role as it does 
in psychodynamic therapy. For example, Young et al. (2003) recommends therapists 
be aware of their own schemas, coping styles and reactions to the patient, as they can 
be used as a resource for information regarding clients‟ schemas. Safran (1990a, 
1990b) argues therapist reactions can be used to identify „interpersonal markers‟ to 
highlight avenues of further exploration. In addition, Safran‟s (1990a, 1990b) theory 
of interpersonal schemas inviting an interpersonal „pull‟ is not dissimilar to the 
concept of projective identification. Therefore psychodynamic perspectives view the 
relationship as the actual vehicle for change, and in this way see the use of the 
relationship as having a direct effect on outcome. Traditional cognitive viewpoints, by 
contrast, seem to argue the therapeutic relationship acts as a moderator that influences 
the link between specific techniques and outcome. 
 
Another clinical issue that arises is whether exploring the transference and 
countertransference is in fact needed and/or appropriate when treating people with 
mild problems with cognitive therapy. For example, CCBT is a promising form of 
treatment for mild problems in which there is no role for the therapeutic relationship. 
This may be beneficial for some clients, but not others, for example it may benefit a 
client who is agoraphobic and cannot leave the house. Following from Safran (1990a, 
1990b), perhaps an exploration of transference/countertransference should be 
undertaken when treating milder problems only when difficulties in the relationship 
occur.  
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Conclusion 
 
To summarise, the therapeutic relationship is important in both cognitive and 
psychodynamic therapy. Each use the relationship differently, but the trend in 
cognitive therapy of using transference and countertransference processes to 
understand complex problems and ruptures in the alliance, suggests the two 
orientations are converging on some levels. Within the research, various client, 
therapist and treatment-specific factors have been implicated in the role of the 
relationship in effecting change, but the function of these is complex and not easily 
delineated. 
 
As the research shows a good therapeutic alliance is associated with good outcome, it 
can be concluded that the therapeutic relationship may play an important role in 
effecting change in clients. This is supported by both theoretical standpoints, although 
psychodynamic theory would place more importance on the role of the relationship 
than traditional cognitive therapy. However, the precise nature of the therapeutic 
relationship‟s role is still unknown, and as a consequence, no firm conclusions can be 
made. For example, it is unclear whether the relationship between client and therapist 
acts as a mediator between certain client and/or therapist characteristics and outcome, 
or if those same factors are the mediators or possibly moderators affecting the 
alliance-outcome link.  
 
Clinically this suggests that therapists should pay attention to the development and the 
maintenance of the therapeutic relationship if specific techniques are to have any 
influence. Furthermore, therapists throughout their careers, but perhaps particularly at 
the beginning, should have training in relationship skills, such as communication of 
empathy. Research suggesting that therapists‟ early parental relationships can affect 
the therapeutic process (Hilliard, et al., 2000) highlights that having a good awareness 
of personal beliefs, schemas and attitudes, as well as the impact of these upon the 
therapeutic relationship and process should be considered important. However, 
clinical psychology training courses do not make personal therapy a component of the 
course. Milton (2001) comments that without personal analysis, „most people are ill-
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equipped to make sustained clinical use of their countertransference rather than 
enacting it‟ (p. 442). The absence of compulsory personal therapy highlights the 
importance of supervision as a means of exploring the transferential and 
countertransferential aspects of the therapeutic relationship to inform clinical work. 
 
Although there have been significant developments in the research, questions still 
remain regarding the exact role of the therapeutic relationship in producing change. 
Future research could focus on gaining a clearer understanding of the different 
components that make up the therapeutic alliance in other types of therapy. For 
example, mutual liking and trust were found to be less important than agreement of 
goals and tasks and confidence in the therapist‟s ability for cognitive behaviour 
therapy (Andrusyna, et al., 2001). This is consistent with the cognitive theory, but 
maybe different for other forms of therapy that emphasise the role of the relationship 
in producing change, such as psychodynamic therapy. In addition, more research is 
needed to investigate computerised forms of therapy; in particular the possible long-
term effects of this treatment compared with other traditional forms of treatment. 
Linked to this is the question of whether exploring transferential/countertransferential 
processes are needed to the same extent when working with people with mild to 
moderate problems, as compared to work with complex problems. In light of working 
with complex problems, more emphasis on these processes and the relationship as a 
whole within cognitive therapy has occurred. This supports the view that the 
therapeutic relationship might be more important in working with more complex 
problems. Research could further investigate this issue by looking at whether using 
the therapeutic relationship differently would affect outcome. For example, by 
emphasising the mastery of techniques to clients versus exploring transference 
reactions within the therapy, with a variety of problems and differing levels of 
severity. 
 
In conclusion, recent NICE guidelines (2004a) recommending that antidepressants 
should not be used for initial treatment of mild depression, will inevitably increase the 
number of referrals for psychological therapy. In this context, it becomes important to 
try and gain a better understanding of the exact nature of role the therapeutic 
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relationship in effecting change. In particular, clearly identifying factors that influence 
the role of the relationship in producing change will allow therapists to be more aware 
of possible future difficulties in the treatment. This could enable more favourable 
outcomes for clients, and less re-referrals to services in the long term. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The ways in which childhood „psychopathology‟ is conceptualised, researched and 
treated is a topic that has been debated throughout the history of medicine and science 
(Richters & Cicchetti, 1993). Psychopathology can be defined as „an abnormal 
psychological condition‟ (Higgleton et al., 1998, p. 1329). A particularly contentious 
issue in this area is how to define and conceptualise „abnormal‟ behaviour in children. 
This is argued to have changed dramatically over the last 150 years, from „decrying‟ 
the existence of mental disorder in children to reporting that as many as one in seven 
children suffer from a mental illness (Silk et al., 2000, p. 729).  
 
Currently, childhood psychopathology is defined and classified according to two main 
systems: ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) and DSM-IV (APA, 1994). These systems adopt a 
categorical approach to classification, in that normal differs from the pathological in 
kind rather than degree (Sonuga-Barke, 1998). Mental disorder is defined by the 
current edition of DSM, DSM-IV, as:  
 
…a manifestation of behavioural, psychological, or biological 
dysfunction in the individual…Neither deviant behaviour (e.g. 
political, religious or sexual) nor conflicts between the individual 
and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is 
a symptoms of a dysfunction in the individual (APA, 1994). 
 
It is claimed that the DSM is atheoretical in that it makes no assumptions about the 
aetiology of mental disorders (Morrison, 1995). However, Sonuga-Barke (1998) 
points out that in fact DSM does follow a medical model of illness, the assumption of 
which is that disorders are seen as characteristics of the individual and not as a result 
of an interaction between the individual and the environment. Thus a childhood 
mental disorder, according to DSM, is endogenous and situated within the child. For a 
classification system such as the DSM to fulfil it‟s overarching function of offering 
clinical utility, it must be both a reliable and a valid method of classifying mental 
disorders (Bentall, 2003). Reliability of a diagnostic system refers to the degree of 
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agreement between clinicians on the same diagnoses when independently assessing 
individuals (Kirk & Kutchins, 2006). Validity refers to the degree to which the 
classification system can distinguish between children who differ in clinically 
significant ways (Sonuga-Barke, 1998). 
 
To provide an in-depth analysis of the ways in which „abnormal‟ and therefore 
disordered behaviour is constructed in children and adolescents, one particular 
diagnostic category will be focused upon: Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder 
(ADHD). ADHD is currently conceptualised as a cluster of symptoms: inattention, 
hyperactivity and impulsivity (APA, 1994).  ADHD is arguably one of the most 
controversial health conditions of the last fifteen years (Kendall et al., 2003). The 
controversy centres around how to construct ADHD, with two main discourses 
dominating the debate: whether ADHD is an actual psychiatric disorder or a social 
construction of modern times, with the more extremist of these positions claiming 
ADHD is a „myth‟ (Shrag & Divoky, 1975).  This debate continues within the public 
and professional domain, amongst a background of increasing numbers of children 
being diagnosed and prescribed medication (NICE, 2006).  
 
Therefore this essay will examine the construction of psychopathology in children and 
adolescents, using ADHD as an example, through an evaluation of the assumption that 
it exists as a mental disorder. Following this, an alternative view will be discussed, 
corresponding to the social constructionist discourse of ADHD. In addition, the 
construction of ADHD from the viewpoint of the children diagnosed with it and their 
families will be explored. Finally, conclusions will be made regarding the most useful 
way to construct child psychopathology, including consideration of the implications of 
this for children and their families and services, as well as recommendations for future 
research. 
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2. Evaluating the assumption that ADHD is a disorder 
 
2.1 Examining the assumption that ADHD is a reliable and valid diagnostic category 
 
DSM-IV is argued to allow for the most reliable and valid diagnosis of ADHD due to 
the inclusion of subtypes (McBurnett et al., 2006). However, the reliability of the 
ADHD diagnosis has been criticised with claims that the diagnostic process is highly 
subjective and influenced by the raters‟ cultural beliefs about particular behaviours 
(Timimi, 2002).  In addition, it is reported that in community based samples, a 
proportion of individuals who meet the criteria for a diagnosis appear to also be 
functioning normally (Mota & Schachar, 2000). However, data regarding the 
reliability of structured interviews to aid diagnosis is reported to be fair to good (Woo 
& Rey, 2005). In a review of all the DSM-IV based rating scales, it was concluded 
that these scales could „reliably, validity and efficiently measure DSM-IV ADHD 
based symptoms‟ (Collet et al., 2003, p.1015). However, it has been noted that with 
regards to the test-retest reliability of these scales, it is generally good when the same 
type of informant is used (for example, a parent) but significantly decreases when 
different types of informants are used (e.g. parental and teacher) (Woo & Rey, 2005). 
 
Despite psychometrically sound ratings scales and interviews, prevalence rates of 
ADHD vary considerably, and have in general increased over time (Searight & 
McLaren, 1998). For example, studies have estimated the prevalence to range from 
4% to 26% (Radcliffe & Timimi, 2004). Sex and age differences in prevalence is a 
common finding (Barkley, 2003), with boys outnumbering girls (BPS, 2000). 
Different assessment methods, nature of populations the samples are drawn from and 
differing criteria used to define ADHD are cited as reasons for the difference 
(Barkley, 2003). Some research demonstrates different rates of ADHD cross-
culturally, despite using standardised criteria. For example, higher prevalence rates 
have been found in northern Europe compared with southern Europe (Searight & 
McLaren, 1998). In addition, research shows rates of diagnosis vary considerably 
cross-nationally, for example, Rappley et al. (1995) found diagnosis rates varied by a 
factor of ten across counties within the same US state.  
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The psychometric properties of the DSM-IV diagnosis have been examined in various 
studies. For example, the predictive validity of DSM-IV ADHD was examined by 
Lahey et al. (2004) who found 4-6 year olds who met full criteria for ADHD initially, 
did so three years later in addition to displaying marked functional impairment. In a 
large scale study, Graetz et al. (2001) found evidence for the discriminant validity of 
DSM-IV ADHD subtypes, in that differences were found between children who met 
the criteria for ADHD and normal controls on various measures of functioning. 
However, in a review of the literature, Woo and Rey (2005) concluded that data 
supporting the validity of the inattentive and hyperactive-impulsive subtypes of 
ADHD is scarce, in particular „it remains to be demonstrated that hyperactive-
impulsive children who are not inattentive have the same condition‟ (p. 344). 
  
Comorbidity is a direct threat to the validity of a diagnostic category and a 
classification system as a whole, as failure to distinguish between two disorders may 
make that system clinically unworkable (Sonuga-Barke, 1998). In a review of the 
literature, Gillberg et al. (2004) presented evidence of ADHD being comorbid with 
nine other psychiatric disorders. They concluded that two in three of all individuals 
with ADHD in the general population meet criteria for at least two additional 
diagnoses (Gillberg et al., 2004). This is echoed by Brasset-Harknett and Butler 
(2005) who posit that it is more common to find a child with ADHD and another 
disorder, than to find a child with ADHD alone. Because ADHD cannot be reliably 
distinguished from other disorders, its validity as a distinct diagnostic category is 
highly questionable (Radcliffe & Timimi, 2004; Timimi et al., 2004). However, some 
have pointed out it is also rare to find „pure‟ forms of other childhood disorders 
(Brasset-Harknett & Butler, 2005; Barkley et al., 2004),  
 
2.2 ADHD as a biological dysfunction within the child 
 
The construction of ADHD as an internal biological dysfunction and therefore 
endogenous to the child is consistent with the medical model of disorders. First, it is 
claimed that evidence from family, twin and adoption studies point to a substantial 
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genetic component in the aetiology of ADHD (Brassett-Harknett & Butler, 2005; 
Bradley & Golden, 2001; Daley, 2005; Kuntsi & Stevenson, 2000). In family studies, 
around 10-35% of family members have also been found to have ADHD (Bradley & 
Golden, 2001). However, the aggregation of a particular condition in families can be 
consistent with a genetic or an environmental aetiology (Joseph, 2000). Based on 
numerous studies of twins, which all varied in methodology and definitions of ADHD, 
Biederman (2005) found the mean heritability to be .77. 
 
Advances in molecular genetic research over the past 10 years have meant that 
specific genes can be tested for an association or linkage with any given disorder. 
Genes underlying the dopaminergic systems have been most widely researched as 
candidate genes for ADHD (Kuntis & Stevenson, 2000). This is due to the evidence 
from the efficacy of stimulant medication in the treatment of ADHD, which serves to 
regulate dopamine levels in the brain in the treatment of ADHD (Daley, 2006).  In a 
recent review, Waldman & Gizer (2006) found that for each candidate gene studied 
(approximately 14), there is a mixed picture of positive and negative results, but point 
out that this is true for all other psychiatric disorders. Overall, the strongest evidence 
comes from meta-analyses that have demonstrated consistent and significant 
associations between dopamine receptor D4 and D5 and ADHD (Waldman & Gizer, 
2006).  
 
Neuro-imaging research is a second area that is argued as evidence for a biological 
dysfunction in ADHD. A recent review of the studies that have used magnetic 
resonance imaging found that the evidence implicates several brain structures 
involved in ADHD. Specifically, studies have consistently found that compared to age 
and sex matched typically-developing controls, children with ADHD exhibit 
decreased brain volumes, particularly in the frontal lobe region and the cerebellum 
(Krain & Castellanos, 2006). However, neuro-imaging studies suffer from various 
limitations such as low sample seizes and associated low statistical power (Krain & 
Castellanos, 2006). Furthermore, studies most often include children who are taking 
or have taken medication in the past, thus the observed brain differences could be due 
to the effects of the medication (Timimi et al., 2004). However, research has found 
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that unmedicated children with ADHD also show decreased brain volumes compared 
to age and sex matched controls (Castellanos et al., 2002). Brasset-Harknett & Butler 
(2005) argue that the neuroimaging research has produced a „bewildering‟ array of 
findings and that due to the complex nature of ADHD, the search for a single 
neurological cause may be too simplistic (p. 6). 
 
Several biological factors have been implicated in ADHD including lead 
contamination, cigarette and alcohol exposure, low birth weight and maternal smoking 
during pregnancy (Biederman, 2005). Food additives are also cited as being a 
contributory factor in ADHD (Biederman, 2005), however, the evidence for this tends 
to be based on older studies, with newer research indicating that children with a high 
level of hyperactivity were no more vulnerable to the adverse effect of food 
colourings than children identified as having low levels of hyperactivity (Daley, 
2006). Research investigating the role of neuropsychological deficits in ADHD 
continues to grow. A consistent finding is deficits in executive functions, particularly 
response suppression and visual working memory (Nigg, 2005). A meta-analysis of 83 
studies, Willcutt et al. (2005) found consistent weaknesses on executive function tests, 
with effect sizes for all measures falling within the medium range. However, Nigg 
(2005) points out that it still remains to be demonstrated that the observed deficits are 
a causal factor in ADHD. 
 
 
2.3 ADHD as an interaction of internal and external factors 
 
The medical model view of ADHD has been criticised for not considering the context 
in which behaviour occurs (Brown, 2004). Jensen et al. (1993) highlighted that this 
was reflected in the small number of research studies investigating psychosocial 
factors, and they recommended the examination of a broader range of etiologic 
mechanisms. Difficulties in isolating family contextual factors specific to ADHD due 
to the co-occurrence of aggression and conduct problems has been suggested as a 
reason for the dearth of literature (Jester et al., 2005). 
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Woodward et al. (1998) compared children with hyperactivity to controls in a 
community sample and found that they were more often exposed to parenting 
behaviours that are aggressive and less proactive. Similarly, Lange et al. (2005) 
compared various family factors in children with ADHD, children with emotional 
disorders and normal controls. The results showed similar profiles between the two 
clinical groups, such as high stress, lack of support, low parental quality of life, 
greater reported problems in family functioning. The only significant difference 
between the two clinical groups were higher levels of authoritarian parenting in the 
ADHD group. In contrast to these findings, Rey et al. (2000) found no association 
between the quality of the family environment and adolescents with ADHD. However, 
diagnosis and ratings on the measures used to assess family environment were made 
by reviewing participant‟s medical file rather than ratings made by either the children 
themselves or their parents. 
 
The correlational nature of these studies limits the conclusions that can be made with 
regards to the causal influence of family or parenting factors, in addition to the cross-
sectional nature of the research. In the first study of it‟s kind in the area of ADHD, 
Jester et al. (2005) followed over 300 children from school entry through to 
adolescence to examine the developmental trajectories of inattention/hyperactivity. A 
methodological strength of this study was the isolation of inattention/hyperactivity 
from overlapping aggression to enable an examination of the development of 
inattention/hyperactivity without the confounding effect of aggression. The results 
showed lower parental emotional support and intellectual stimulation in early 
childhood predicted membership in the inattention/hyperactivity group. Conversely, 
conflict and lack of cohesiveness in the family environment predicted membership in 
the aggressive behaviour group. 
 
Attachment theory is argued to provide a coherent framework for an explanation of 
the development of ADHD (Erdman, 1998). For example, Stiefel (1997) presented 
three cases to demonstrate that early parent-child relationship stress, such as lack in 
family support, a fragile or absent relationship with the child‟s father, difficult infant 
temperament, sets up a „demand-dissatisfaction cycle‟. This cycle is characterised by a 
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difficulty between infant and caregiver in establishing a routine, and if prolonged may 
lead to a disruption in the attachment relationship. The anxious-resistant type of 
relating to attachment figures is argued to be particularly relevant in ADHD (Golding, 
2004). Children with this type of attachment style will most likely have experienced 
inconsistent care and as a result exaggerate displays of negative affect in order to 
regulate parental attention. Monitoring availability of the caregiver is common, 
leading to restricted ability to explore the world. This pattern of behaviour is argued to 
explain the ADHD child‟s difficulties in attention and concentration (Stiefel, 1997; 
Golding, 2004). Support for this hypothesis comes from research that has shown 
ADHD is associated with insecure attachment (Clarke et al., 2002)  
 
In summary, this discourse constructs ADHD as a distinct psychiatric category. Thus 
excessive activity in children is seen as abnormal and a manifestation of dysfunction 
in the child. From the research presented it can be seen that these assumptions can be 
challenged on several levels, and as such problems with the reliability and validity of 
ADHD as a „mental disorder‟ remain alongside the evidence that emphasises the 
important of context when considering children‟s behaviours. 
 
 
3. ADHD as a social and cultural construct 
 
The ways in which childhood is constructed in Western culture is argued to have 
changed dramatically over the years (Silk et al., 2000). During the 20
th
 century ADHD 
has had various names including minimal brain damage and hyperkinesis (Raflovich, 
2001). This has been interpreted by some as the progress of clinical practice (Barkley, 
1990), but by others as a form of unwarranted „child control‟ (Breggin, 1998). For 
example, Rafalovich (2001) argues that the history of the „symptoms‟ of ADHD 
represents an increasing drive to medicalize unconventional childhood behaviour. 
Indeed, this can be seen in the increase of the number of mental disorders in the DSM. 
In it‟s first edition in 1952, it contained 112, in 1994, it contained 374. Some argue 
this points to society being less tolerant of difference (Malacrida, 2004). 
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The ways in which „abnormal‟ versus „normal‟ behaviour in childhood is constructed 
not only varies within the history of a culture, but between cultures at any given time. 
As Timimi (2005) has argued, the assessment and diagnostic process for ADHD is 
highly subjective and influenced by the cultural beliefs held by the clinician, which is 
reflected in the varying prevalence rates cross-culturally. Indeed, research has shown 
that different cultures do construct ADHD in varying ways. For example, Norvilitis 
and Fang (2005) examined the perceptions of ADHD in college students in the United 
States and China via a self-report questionnaire. Results revealed that the Chinese 
students were more likely to endorse items that ADHD reflects poorly o the family 
and on the children‟s effort level, than the American students. Similarly, Bussing et al. 
(1998) interviewed White and African-American parents about their knowledge of 
ADHD. It was found that compared with the White parents, the African-American 
parents had significantly less knowledge of ADHD. The authors concluded that this 
result possibly reflects the fact that African American parents construct ADHD 
behaviours as normal or something that the child will outgrow. 
 
The changes observed in the construction of abnormal behaviour in childhood perhaps 
reflects societal shifts in the value placed on certain behaviours. In their evolutionary 
account of ADHD, Jensen et al. (1997) describe how ancestral environments consisted 
of various threats with scarce resources. They argue that the „response-ready‟ 
individual would most likely be advantaged in this environment, as survival depended 
on being hypervigilant, and being motorically „hyperactive‟, i.e. foraging for food and 
the ability to quickly pounce or flee (Jensen et al., 1997). Thus the behaviours seen 
now as „abnormal‟ may have actually been adaptive in ancestral environments. Some 
argue modern society has become hyperactive, with an ever increasing materialistic 
culture impinging on chdilren at an increasingly young age (House, 2002). The 
current culture also highly values academic achievement, so the ability to sit still in 
school lessons and to be able to concentrate on tasks becomes very important. The 
behaviours described by the ADHD diagnosis do not fit into that value system. 
Kindlon and Thompson (1999, cited in Singh, 2002) also highlight the competitive 
academic environment within today‟s culture, and argue that medication for ADHD is 
a way of creating „better boys‟ or boys who can achieve academically. 
 36 
NICE guidelines recommend medication as a front line treatment to be followed by 
psychosocial intervention, if necessary (NICE, 2006). The guidelines were heavily 
influenced by the results of one large American study which found medication to be 
superior to behaviour management and routine community care (MTA, 1999). 
However, this study has been criticised as the behaviour treatment could never be 
replicated clinically. Timimi (2002) also argues that in fact, all groups showed 
sizeable reductions in symptoms. For Timimi (2002), the conclusions made by the 
MTA group reflects the interests and agendas of some of the researchers, who, funded 
by the drug industry, have a vested interest in highlighting results that enhance 
product sales. The pharmaceutical industry has also been argued to have actively 
promoted the idea of ADHD, particularly through financially supporting CHADD, a 
16,000 strong organisation set up by parents in 1987, which advertises ADHD as a 
biological based disorder (Moncrieff, 2003).  
 
Considering all the above issues, Timimi (2002) proposes that ADHD is best 
understood as a „cultural defence mechanism‟. That is, the notion of ADHD has been 
constructed as a cultural way of dealing with anxiety about childhood development 
(Timimi, 2002; 2005). This anxiety has arisen due to various cultural, social and 
political changes in Western society, such as an increase in violence, poverty and 
breakdown of the family unit, which has had the effect of changing the meaning and 
significance given to certain behaviours. He proposes within this context, where 
parents, teachers and professionals are looking for way to deal with these anxieties, 
the medical model exerts incredible cultural power. This together with „profit-
dependent pharmaceutical industry and a high status profession looking for new roles‟ 
(Timimi, 2004, p. 8), makes the ideal conditions for the rise of ADHD as a medical 
disorder. Similarly, Kendall et al. (2003) argues ADHD is a „post-modern illness‟, or 
an illness that reflects the changing experience of human affliction that is shaped by 
cultural context. They argue the hallmark of a post modern illness is controversy over 
it‟s legitimacy as a „real‟ illness. These accounts of ADHD have been criticised as 
being „scientifically flimsy‟ (p. 68), with no evidence to support the hypotheses 
(Barkley et al., 2004). These critics argue for hypotheses about ADHD to be useful, 
they must be testable and therefore stand up to scientific scrutiny.  
 37 
In summary, this discourse rejects ADHD as a valid mental disorder, instead viewing 
the behaviours of inattention, hyperactivity and impulsivity as being socially and 
culturally constructed. A theme that seems to emerge from this discourse is that 
constructing certain behaviours as „abnormal‟ and as a psychiatric condition that 
needs to be treated, is a way of promoting socially desirable behaviours across 
cultures. 
 
 
Children & their parents’ constructions of ADHD  
 
The voices of children and their families who experience ADHD in their lives are 
argued to be important (Brady, 2004), but rarely ever heard (Kendall et al., 2003). It is 
argued here that in order to provide a balanced discussion of the differing 
constructions of childhood psychopathology, the experience and meaning of 
psychopathology for the children themselves should be explored.  Exley (2005) 
interviewed two boys with ADHD and found that both boys constructed their ADHD 
behaviours as deviant. The analysis showed that they drew on medicalised discourses 
to provide suggestions for managing their behaviour, such as giving medication. 
Notably, one of the boys understood ADHD as a „disease‟ that could be caught. In a 
study investigating how seven children‟s lives were affected by ADHD, Brady (2004) 
found that some children internalised the notion that they were in some way damaged, 
and that only medication could „fix‟ them. 
 
Kendall et al. (2003) interviewed 39 children and adolescents about their experiences 
of ADHD. The data revealed that they saw themselves as different from their peers. 
Again, medication was a common theme, with both positive “I‟m real hyper, but I can 
control it with a pill” (p.123), and negative aspects “I don‟t want anyone to know I 
take pills…because they would laugh at me” (p.123). Similar to Brady‟s (2004) study, 
an important finding to emerge was that the children discussed ADHD in terms of 
who they were, rather than the symptoms they experienced, pointing to an over 
identification with the diagnosis of ADHD (Kendall et al., 2003).  
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Harbourne et al. (2004) conducted an in depth interview with the mothers and one 
father of nine boys diagnosed with ADHD. Using grounded theory analysis, they 
found that parents experienced a discrepancy between the way they conceptualised 
ADHD and they way others viewed the disorder. Specifically, parents felt their child‟s 
ADHD was a result of an innate biological condition, where as they felt others viewed 
it as poor parenting. This often resulted in parents feeling blamed and experiencing 
„battles‟ with others, including professionals, particularly around diagnostic issues. 
The theme of experiencing emotional distress also emerged, and parents tended to 
attribute this to the battles they experienced in gaining recognition and to the 
perceptions that they were blamed by others for the difficulties experienced by their 
children. 
 
The experience of battles with professionals is also echoed in Malacrida's (2004) 
study that explored the perceptions of Canadian and British mothers of educators‟ 
roles in the medicalisation of their children's behaviour. It was found that British 
educators exhibited a strong antipathy toward medicalising children's behaviour 
problems, whereas the opposite was true in Canada. British educators were described 
as being firmly unconvinced of the medicalised status of ADHD. Malacrida (2004) 
attributes this difference to the differing degrees of medicalisaiton in each culture at 
the time of the study, which for the British data collection was the year 2000. 
Similarly, in their analysis of newspaper articles, Norris and Lloyd (2000) found that a 
strong voice to emerge was that of the parents, with the recurring theme of a struggle 
to gain a diagnosis of ADHD. They found the debate and, the most frequently quoted 
group of professionals firmly located ADHD within a biological framework. 
 
In summary, research suggests that children tend to take up the medical discourse of 
ADHD viewing it as an internal dysfunction, which also appears to have a profound 
impact on the way children construct their identities. Parents also seem to take up the 
medical discourse, however, this is not reflected in their perceptions of how others 
construct ADHD, and as a result report experiencing continual battles against their 
support system, including services. 
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Conclusions 
 
In summary, this essay has presented some of the ways in which childhood 
„psychopathology‟ can be constructed, using the example of ADHD. As a starting 
point, the dominant medical discourse was examined, which classifies certain 
behaviours as „abnormal‟ and therefore as an internal dysfunction. In fact what has 
emerged is that the reliability and validity of such diagnoses is highly questionable, in 
addition to the assumption that abnormality is entirely located within the child. 
Childhood „psychopathology‟ was then discussed within the context of the social 
constructionist discourse. Within this discourse, what behaviours are defined as 
„abnormal‟ in children is contingent on the prevailing view of childhood itself and the 
cultural context. What emerged from this discussion is the possibility that the 
medicalisation of children‟s behaviours may act as a form of social control, to ensure 
that socially desirable behaviours are promoted and social order maintained. Finally, 
the ways in which children and their parents construct the „psychopathology‟ they are 
diagnosed with was explored. This discussion revealed the negative implications of 
such diagnoses for these children, and the difficulties inherent in being a parent of 
such a child in the context of debates surrounding the „realness‟ of psychopathology in 
children. 
 
The dominance of the medical discourse is reflected in the way this essay has 
approached the subject of different constructions of childhood „psychopathology‟, and 
it could be argued this was a necessary starting point given the psychiatric dominance 
in mental health services in today‟s society. Treatment is based on an assessment of 
clinical need, and clinical need is, in part, determined through the categorical 
approach to classifying psychopathology. This raises the issue of whether questioning 
the „realness‟ or the „truth‟ of mental disorders in children is useful, when there is an 
argument that doing so could be impractical or irrelevant given biological psychiatry‟s 
continued dominance (Kirschner, 2001). Indeed, research shows the effect of such 
debate on families, particularly parents. Mental health services also operate within this 
context. Within these services different health professionals work together in teams 
and will carry with them different perceptions and views of child psychopathology. 
These differences will most likely be underpinned by the differing philosophies of the 
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professions concerned, which can lead to interdisciplinary tensions and conflict (BPS, 
2000).  
 
Most of the research presented purports to the medical model view of childhood 
psychopathology. Within this literature, a dearth of research exists that investigates 
the possible psychosocial factors involved in childhood „psychopathology‟. Future 
research should aim to correct this imbalance. However, within a constructionist 
framework, it becomes very important to examine the experience of the „symptoms‟ 
that are constructed by the medical discourse as pathological, rather than the 
particulars of a given diagnosis, which has been the focus of most research into child 
„psychopathology‟ do far. Thus future research should also aim to better examine the 
perceptions of children who are labelled as a having a mental disorder, and the impact 
this has on how they construct their identities. As parents are also part of the labelling 
process, in that they present their children to services, their experiences should also be 
examined in more depth. 
 
As this essay has shown, there are alternatives to viewing certain behaviours in 
children as abnormal and therefore pathological. Although pathologising behaviour 
could be viewed as a form of social control, not conceptualising behaviour as either 
„normal‟ and „abnormal‟ behaviour has implications for society. For example, social 
order is argued to require certain boundaries and limitations (Kirschner, 2001). It 
could be argued that without these boundaries social order would collapse. If, as in 
Bussing et al‟s (1998) study, society was to adopt the African-American viewpoint 
that behaviours thought to be indicative of psychopathology were in fact „normal‟ and 
not in need of treatment, this would potentially have a number of implications. For 
example, taking an extreme view, it may mean that mental health services would no 
longer be viable, as they would no longer be  needed.  Currently, services are 
organised in such a way as to promote the „internal dysfunction‟ view of children‟s 
behaviour, children get referred to services because there is something „wrong‟ with 
them. However, in light of the constructionist views on psychopathology, an 
alternative model may be supporting these children more in schools, perhaps through 
educational psychologists rather than mental health professionals. Taking a less 
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extreme view, clinical psychologists are ideally placed to promote alternative 
constructions of psychopathology, due to their training in various models whilst being 
able to consider the merits of the medical model (Cobner, 2004). Thus within 
multidisciplinary teams, where a medical discourse typically dominates, it may be 
important for clinical psychologists to help teams think about the assumptions they 
make about children‟s behaviour. 
 
It can be concluded that the issue of the ways in which child psychopathology is 
constructed is inherently tied up in not only the psychological, psychiatric and 
sociological domains, but also the philosophical. For this reason, negotiating this 
terrain is a challenge. What is clear is that in today‟s society, some childhood 
behaviours are constructed as „abnormal‟. As has been shown, this may not be the 
most valid or even appropriate way of viewing such behaviours. For professionals 
who work within the system that classifies normal and abnormal behaviour in 
children, it is perhaps important not to adopt one position inflexibly, but to be open 
minded to every construction and possibility. 
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Abstract 
 
This study examined General Practitioners‟ (GPs‟) views of a psychology service via 
postal survey. A questionnaire was developed that investigated GPs‟ satisfaction of 
various aspects of the service as well as potential areas for improvement. 
Questionnaires were sent to 134 GPs in 28 practices. 57 questionnaires were returned. 
Results showed that over half of GPs surveyed were dissatisfied with the service, with 
the majority indicating that reducing the waiting lists was the main area needing 
improvement. The majority of GPs held a positive view about the treatment received 
by patients referred to the service. Methodological difficulties are highlighted and 
implications of the survey results discussed, particularly in light of the redesign of 
services that was taking place within the Trust. Finally, recommendations for future 
research are highlighted. 
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1. Introduction 
The last sixteen years has represented a period of change for mental health services in 
the NHS. With the recognition that mental health problems are implicated in as many 
as one in four primary care consultations (Department of Health; DH, 2003), and most 
mental health problems are managed in primary care (DH, 2000), this change has been 
particularly within primary care. The publication of a series of national documents and 
policies since the 1990s set out the objectives for the modernisation of primary care 
mental health services, and has been at the forefront of the drive to improve the 
quality and access to effective mental health services.  
 
In 1999 the National Service Framework (NSF) for Mental Health was published that 
was designed to provide consistent clinical standards of care in England (DH, 1999). 
Seven standards represented a different facet of mental health care. Standard two 
described that service users with a mental health problem who contact their primary 
care health team should: “have their mental health needs identified and assessed; be 
offered effective treatments, including referral to specialist service for further 
assessment, treatment and care if they require it” (p. 12, DH, 2004). The publication 
of the NHS Plan (DH, 2000) outlined the major changes to the way mental health 
services were delivered. For the first time funding was to be identified for the creation 
of new posts specifically designed for primary care mental health services (Sainsbury 
Centre for Mental Health; SCMH, 2002). Graduate primary care mental health 
workers were employed to help GPs manage and treat common mental health 
problems with brief therapy techniques (DH, 2000). Communication and integration 
of primary and secondary care services was seen as key in implementing these 
changes, and it was proposed that link workers facilitate this process (DH, 2001).  
 
Traditionally, primary care mental health services in the local Trust were comprised of 
counsellors within GP surgeries, and the Psychology service, described as „a resource 
for primary care at the interface with secondary care mental health services‟. In 
response to the national guidelines, the Trust was in the process of redesigning these 
services. This would entail the introduction of a link worker who would enable better 
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integration of primary and secondary care services, for example, by advising GPs 
about care of patients with mental health problem and assessing patients where there 
was doubt about the most effective management plan. Secondly, a graduate mental 
health worker would also be appointed. 
 
The Psychology service was set up in 1982 in response to a need for GPs to directly 
refer patients whose mental health problems could not be managed in primary care but 
who did not require secondary care services, the so-called „neglected majority‟ 
(SCMH, 2005). Since 1982 it had retained a separate identity as a unique service for 
GP referrals, offering assessment and psychological treatment. The service was 
staffed by one A grade and six B grade clinical psychologists. A recent audit of GP 
referrals to the service revealed an annual referral rate of approximately 600 referrals 
per year, with an upwards trend. As a result of this, the waiting time for an assessment 
had risen to seven months, with an additional wait of up to eleven months for 
treatment. 
 
With the increasing importance placed on strengthening primary care services to more 
effectively deal with mental health problems, surprisingly little research has been 
conducted investigating GPs views of mental health services (Double, 1999). A 
survey undertaken in Sheffield indicated on average GPs felt the quality of mental 
health services was good, but they wanted more of it (Double, 1999). Corney (1996) 
found that GP satisfaction rates increased when there were direct links with mental 
health professionals, with half the GPs surveyed citing waiting lists as a problem. 
 
Many studies have evaluated satisfaction with clinical psychology services from a 
service user perspective, which is typically the focus of quality improvement practices 
(British Psychological Society, 1998). However, few studies have focused on referrer 
satisfaction, particularly within clinical psychology, which is argued to be equally 
important particularly when there are direct links with referrers, such as GPs (Murray 
et al, 1999). Research has investigated referrer satisfaction of various services 
including a voluntary sector drop in centre (Milne & Gibson, 1994), a mood and 
anxiety disorders unit (Lewis et al, 2004), a community team for people with learning 
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disabilities (Dagnan et al, 1993) and a forensic mental health service (Papanstassiou et 
al, 2003). Murray et al (1999) evaluated GP satisfaction with a clinical psychology 
service in Scotland. A postal questionnaire found that the majority of GPs were 
relatively positive about the service, with areas of dissatisfaction relating to the lack of 
availability of services. 
 
Aims of the survey 
It was identified that no formal evaluation of GPs‟ views of the Psychology service 
had taken place in the 24 years it had been operating. As the service was set up 
primarily for GPs, it was deemed necessary to explore whether the service was 
meeting their needs, and to identify the areas GPs felt could be improved. 
Traditionally „satisfaction‟ with the service has been implicitly implied by the increase 
of GP referrals to the service. In light of the current national context of the move 
towards better integration of primary and secondary care services, and the redesign of 
mental health services in the Trust, the survey would thus serve the important function 
of assessing the value of the service from the perspective of the health care 
professionals who used it most frequently.  
 
A postal satisfaction survey was chosen as a relatively quick and simple method of 
assessing a large number of GPs‟ views of the service. The project therefore aimed to 
answer the following questions: 
 
1. What is the level of GP satisfaction with different aspects of the service, for 
example, waiting times, feedback about referred patients, treatment received by 
patients? 
 
2. Do GPs perceive the service to be of value, for example, in terms of reducing 
their psychotropic prescription rates, length of consultations, referrals to 
secondary mental health services and personal work load? 
 
3. What are GPs‟ perceptions of how the service could improve? 
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2. Method 
 
2.1 Design 
 
A postal questionnaire survey of all GPs in the Trust‟s geographical area was 
undertaken. 
 
2.2 Ethical considerations 
 
The Trust‟s Audit team in addition to the R&D department were consulted on the 
issue of ethics. The project was classed as service evaluation and as such ethical 
approval from the Local Research Ethics Committee was not considered necessary. 
 
2.3 Participants 
A total of 28 GP surgeries operated within the Trust‟s geographical area. These 
surgeries consisted of 134 GPs, each of whom was sent a questionnaire. 
 
2.4 Measures 
Following a review of published (Murray et al, 1999) and unpublished surveys of this 
kind (Ashurst & Ward, 1983; Mathews, 1998), it was felt that previous surveys did 
not contain the specific issues pertinent to the Psychology service. In consultation 
with the service manager, it was decided that a questionnaire should be developed. 
After consideration of the specific issues relating to the Psychology service and based 
on guidelines of questionnaire development (Barker et al, 1994), a first draft was 
developed. This was presented to the department at the bi-monthly meeting. The 
feedback received regarding appropriateness of the questions, wording of questions 
and the general lay out of the questionnaire were taken into consideration and a 
second draft was prepared. To assess the questionnaire‟s face and content validity, the 
second draft was presented to two local GPs who provided feedback on whether the 
questionnaire was easily understood and whether all pertinent issues were included. 
Any suggested changes were incorporated into the third draft, which was presented a 
second time to the service manager, who gave agreement on the final version of the 
questionnaire (appendix 1). 
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2.5 Procedure 
As previous research of this kind typically shows a low response rate (McAvoy & 
Kaner, 1996) surgeries were contacted by telephone to inform them that the survey 
was taking place, to establish the names of the GPs in each surgery, and to inquire as 
to whether the practice manager of each surgery could oversee GPs receiving the 
questionnaire and returning them. All but two agreed, with the remaining practice 
managers stating it was more convenient for the questionnaires to be sent directly to 
the GPs. Each GP received one questionnaire with an explanatory letter asking for 
questionnaires to be returned as soon as possible and no later than 3 weeks from the 
date they were sent out (appendix 2). Stamped addressed envelopes were provided for 
return of the questionnaire. A covering letter explaining the survey and the 
instructions for distribution were included for the practice managers (appendix 2). 
Reminder letters were sent to all GPs two weeks later (appendix 4). 
 
 
3. Results 
 
A total of 57 questionnaires were returned, giving a response rate of 43%, slightly 
higher than other surveys assessing GP satisfaction with psychology services (Murray 
et al, 1999), but lower than other GP surveys (Burton & Ramsden, 1994; Milne & 
Gibson, 1994; Double, 1999; Corney, 1996). 
 
3.1 Analysis 
 
The results for each question were collated and presented in terms of the percentage of 
GPs who had chosen each category in the rating scale. The results for each question 
are presented overleaf. The results are presented in full in appendix 3. 
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1. Overall, how satisfied are you with the Psychology service? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
very 
dissatisfied
9%
dissatisfied
45%neither 
dissatisfied on 
satisfied
20%
satisfied
22%
very satisfied
4%
 
 
 
Figure 1. GP responses to question 1  (N = 55). 
 
 
Responses indicated that 26% of GPs were either satisfied or very satisfied with the 
service overall, whereas 54% were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Two GPs 
added to their response for this question “Only due to waiting times” and “Because of 
the wait”. 
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2. How well informed do you feel about what constitutes an appropriate referral 
to the Psychology service, compared with services such as psychiatry, CMHTs 
and clinical psychology based within the CMHTs? 
 
 
 
inadequately 
informed
36%
well informed
36%
neither well 
informed nor 
inadequatley 
informed
21%
very well 
informed
2%
very inadequately 
informed
5%
 
Figure 2. GP responses to question 2 (N = 56). 
 
 
Overall, 38% of GPs felt they were either very well informed or well informed. 
However, 41% of GPs thought they were either inadequately informed or very 
inadequately informed. 
 60 
 
 
3. a) Do you have access to a counsellor in your practice? 
 
 
 
yes
88%
no
12%
 
Figure 3. GP responses to question 3a (N = 57). 
 
 
As can be seen above, 88% of GPs reported they had access to a counsellor in their 
practice, whereas 12% reported they did not. 
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3. b) If yes, please estimate the percentage of patient referred to the 
Psychology Service who have previously seen a counsellor in your practice? 
 
 
Responses to question 3b  Number of GPs who endorsed the 
response (N = 43) 
“Don‟t know” 6 
10% 6 
“few” 4 
5% 4 
>5% 4 
>10% 3 
“Low” 3 
0 3 
70-90% 3 
1% 2 
0-2% 2 
5-10% 1 
30% 1 
“not applicable” 1 
Table 1. Table to show GP responses to question 3b 
 
From the table above it can be seen that the majority of GPs either indicated they did 
not know the percentage of patients previously seen a counsellor, or indicated that 
10% of patients had previously seen a counsellor. Overall, it appears the majority of 
GPs felt that between 0 and 10% of referred patients had seen a counsellor previously. 
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4. How long do you think the waiting time is for an assessment in the Psychology 
service? 
 
 
 
 
under 1 month
7%
1-3 months
31%
4-6 months
25%
7-9 months
16%
10 months and 
over
21%
 
 
Figure 4. GP responses to question 4 (N = 56). 
 
 
 
Responses indicated that the majority of GPs estimated the waiting time for an 
assessment at 1-3 months. The actual waiting time for an assessment was 7 months at 
the time of the survey. 25% of GPs estimated the waiting time for assessment at 4-6 
months, with 21% estimating ten months and over. 
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5. How long do you think the waiting time is for treatment in the Psychology 
service? 
 
 
 
 
1-3 months
2%
4-6 months
22%
7-9 months
15%
under 1 month
4%
10 months
 and over
57%
 
Figure 5. GP responses to question 5 (N = 54). 
 
 
 
Results showed that the majority of GPs estimated the waiting time for treatment at 10 
months and over. The actual waiting time for treatment at the time of the survey was 
between 7 and 11 months.  
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6. What do you feel is an acceptable waiting time for a non-urgent assessment?  
 
 
 
under 1 month
9%
4-6 months
4%
1-3 months
87%
 
Figure 6. GP responses to question 6 (N = 57). 
 
 
From the above, it can be seen that 87% of GPs felt that patients should only wait 
between one and three months for a non-urgent assessment. 9% felt patients should be 
seen for a non-urgent assessment within one month of being referred. 
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7. How satisfied are you with the feedback received after assessment? 
 
 
 
dissatisfied
4%
neither 
dissatisfied or 
satisfied
24%
satsified
54%
very satisfied
18%
 
Figure 7. GP responses to question 7 (N = 55). 
 
 
 
As can be seen, 72% of GPs were either very satisfied or satisfied with the feedback 
they received following assessment, with 4 % dissatisfied. 
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8. How satisfied are you with the feedback received about ongoing treatment? 
 
 
 
 
dissatisfied
15%
neither 
dissatisfied or 
satisfied
35%
satsified
41%
very satisfied
9%
 
Figure 8. GP responses to question 8 (N = 55). 
 
 
 
As the pie chart above indicates, 50% of GPs were either satisfied or very satisfied 
with the feedback received about ongoing treatment, with 35% neither dissatisfied or 
satisfied and 15% dissatisfied. 
 
 
 
 
 67 
9. How satisfied are you with the amount of contact and opportunity to 
liase/consult with the Psychology service about patients: 
a) Generally 
 
 
 
satisfied
18%
neither 
dissatisfied or 
satisfied
44%
dissatisfied
29%
very satisfied
5%
very 
dissatisfied
4%
 
       Figure 9. GP responses to question 9a (N = 56). 
 
 
As can be seen above, 33% of GPs were either very dissatisfied or dissatisfied with 
the amount of contact and opportunity to liase with the service generally. 23% of GPs 
were either satisfied or very satisfied, with 44% of GPs reporting they were neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied. 
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9. How satisfied are you with the amount of contact and opportunity to 
liase/consult with the Psychology service about patients: 
b) With regards to the management of risk 
 
 
 
 
satisfied
29%
very 
dissatisfied
5%very satisfied
7%
dissatisfied
9%
neither 
dissatisfied or 
satisfied
50%
 
    Figure 10. GP responses to question 9b (N = 56). 
 
 
 
The results show that 36% of GPs were either very satisfied or satisfied with the 
amount of contact and opportunity to liase with the service with regards to the 
management of risk. 14% were either very dissatisfied or dissatisfied, with half 
neither dissatisfied or satisfied. 
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10. How satisfied are you with the treatment received by patients you have 
referred to the Psychology service? 
 
 
 
 
satisfied
65%
very dissatisfied
4%
very satisfied
11%
dissatisfied
4%
neither 
dissatisfied or 
satisfied
16%
 
 
     Figure 11. GP responses to question 10 (N = 55). 
 
 
 
Overall, 76% of GPs were either very satisfied or satisfied with the treatment received 
by patients from the service. Only 8% were either very dissatisfied or dissatisfied, and 
16% indicated they were neither dissatisfied or satisfied. 
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11. Please estimate how the following issues have been affected as a result of 
psychological treatment from the Psychology service for the majority of your 
referred patients: 
a)  Psychotropic medication rates 
 
 
 
 
reduced
33%
stayed about 
the same
63%
increased
2%
markedly 
reduced
2%
 
     Figure 12. GP responses to question 11a (N = 43). 
 
 
It was found that 63% of GPs indicated that their psychotropic medication rates had 
stayed the same as a result of treatment for the majority of their referred patients. 
However, 35% reported prescription rates had reduced or markedly reduced. 2% 
reported their prescription rates had increased as a result. 
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11. Please estimate how the following issues have been affected as a result of 
psychological treatment from the Psychology Service for the majority of your 
referred patients: 
b) Number of GP consultations 
 
 
 
reduced
51%
markedly reduced
7%
stayed about the 
same
40%
increased
2%
   Figure 13. GP responses to question 11b  (N = 43). 
 
 
The results indicated that 58% of the GPs found that the number of consultations for 
the majority of their referred patients had markedly reduced or reduced. 40% reported 
the number had stayed the same, while 2% had found that consultations had increased. 
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11. Please estimate how the following issues have been affected as a result of 
psychological treatment from the Psychology Service for the majority of your 
referred patients: 
c) Personal workload 
 
 
 
reduced
39%
stayed about the 
same
54%
markedly 
reduced
5%
increased
2%
 
Figure 14. GP responses to question 11c  (N = 44). 
 
 
As the pie chart above indicates, 54% of GPs reported their workload had stayed the 
same as a result of psychological treatment from the service, whereas 44% felt their 
workload had either markedly reduced or reduced.  
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11. Please estimate how the following issues have been affected as a result of 
psychological treatment from the Psychology Service for the majority of your 
referred patients: 
d) Rates of referral to secondary mental health services 
 
 
 
increased
7%
stayed about the 
same
35%
reduced
53%
markedly 
reduced
5%
 
 
         Figure 15. GP responses to question 11d  (N = 43). 
 
 
 
It was found that 58% of GPs felt that rates of referral to secondary mental health 
services had either markedly reduced or reduced as a result of their patients receiving 
treatment from the service. 35% reported this had stayed the same, while 7% reported 
an increase in secondary mental health referrals. 
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12. How do you think the Psychology Service could be improved? 
 
The comments given by each GP for this question are included in appendix 5 and 
shown in summary in the table below. 
 
 
Area of improvement identified by GPs Frequency of GP endorsement (total N 
= 43) 
Shorter wait/reduce waiting list/faster 
access 
34 
More resources/psychologists 6 
Better liaison/communication regarding 
waiting times, treatment and services 
available 
6 
Less paperwork for patients 2 
GP education/information regarding CBT 2 
 
Table 2. GP responses to question 12.  
 
 
As can be seen above, the area of improvement most frequently endorsed by GPs was 
reducing the waiting list, or enabling quicker access to the service. Increasing 
resources and better communication were the next most frequently endorsed areas of 
improvement. Less paperwork for patients and GP education regarding CBT were also 
identified as areas of improvement for the service. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
 
13. Please add any other comments you may have 
 
The comments given by each GP for this question are included in appendix 6 and 
shown in summary in the table below. 
 
GPs comment Frequency of GP endorsement (total N 
= 19) 
Length of waiting lists prevented/stopped 
GP referring to service 
4 
Unaware of/little known about service 3 
Clearer referral guidelines/pathways 3 
Reduce waiting lists/increase resources 2 
More CBT 2 
Improve communication/ more reports 2 
Department is understaffed /under 
resourced 
2 
Useful service 1 
 
Table 2. GP responses to question 13. 
 
 
From the table above it can be seen that the most frequently endorsed comment was 
that lengthy waiting lists had either prevented or stopped GPs referring to the service. 
The second most frequently endorsed comments were that GPs were either unaware or 
knew little about the service, and that the service should provide clear referral 
guidelines/pathways. Other comments included improvement of communication, more 
CBT, and the recognition that the department was under resourced. One GP 
commented that the service was useful. 
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4. Discussion 
4.1 Summary of results 
The survey indicated that over half of the GPs surveyed were either very dissatisfied 
or dissatisfied with the psychology service overall. However, three quarters of GPs 
were satisfied with the treatment received by patients. It appears a particular area of 
dissatisfaction was accessing the service; the majority of GPs cited reducing the 
waiting lists as the main area for improvement. Interestingly, only 16% of GPs 
correctly estimated the waiting time for an assessment, whereas the majority of GPs 
correctly estimated the waiting time for treatment. Over three quarters of GPs felt that 
an acceptable waiting time for a non-urgent assessment should be 1-3 months, a figure 
in direct contrast to the actual waiting time. These findings are reflected in other 
studies that show high levels of GP satisfaction with the quality of psychology 
services, but perceived poor accessibility to psychology services (Telford et al, 2002). 
Access to services has been found to be an important consideration when making 
referral decisions, as many GPs are deterred by lengthy waiting lists (Sigel & Leiper, 
2004), a view endorsed by several GPs in this survey.  
 
Almost three quarters of GPs were satisfied with the feedback they received following 
an assessment, and half indicated they were satisfied with the feedback received about 
ongoing treatment. Generally, just under half of GPs were neither satisfied or 
dissatisfied with the amount of contact and opportunity to liase/consult with the 
psychology service about patients, a finding similar to Murray et al‟s (1999) survey, 
which found the majority of GPs rated ease of contact with a clinical psychologist as 
variable. However, more GPs were dissatisfied than satisfied with this aspect of the 
service. GPs were equally ambivalent about their opportunity to liase with the 
psychology service with regards to the management of risk, with over a quarter 
satisfied. These findings are important as it has been shown that GPs‟ views of 
psychological problems, treatments, and the ways in which they make referral 
decisions, are influenced by their professional interactions with psychologists (Sigel & 
Leiper, 2004). Thus GPs‟ views about the lack of opportunity to consult with the 
service may have a negative impact on their referral decisions, for example, decreased 
referral rates. This is particularly important in light of the research that shows poor 
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detection of mental health problems by GPs (Sigel & Leiper, 2004). These issues have 
implications for all mental health services particularly within the context of recent 
government policy emphasising the role of primary care in assessing and treating 
mental health problems (DH, 2000). 
 
Over one quarter of GPs surveyed reported that they did not feel adequately informed 
about what constituted an appropriate referral to the Psychology service. Ross and 
Hardy (1999) argue that without explicit referral guidelines, GPs are unlikely to be 
well informed about criteria for referrals, which may be a possible reason for these 
findings. Most GPs reported that between 0 and 10% of patients had seen a counsellor 
prior to being referred to the Psychology service. Previous research has found 
similarities between GP referred cases of counsellors and clinical psychologists, with 
clinical psychologists treating more severe and chronic cases compared with 
counsellors (Cape & Parham, 2001), which may account for the overlap in referred 
patients reported in this survey. 
 
Finally, number of GP consultations, personal workload and rates of referrals to 
secondary mental health services were all reported to have reduced as a result of 
treatment from the service. This is a positive result in light of research that shows GP 
consultations typically increase in number and length when patients have 
psychological problems (Zantinge et al, 2005). The majority of GPs reported that 
psychotropic medication rates had stayed the same as a result of psychological 
treatment, although over a quarter reported a reduction. Similar to the literature, some 
studies report a reduction in prescribing rates as a result of psychotherapeutic 
interventions (Ashworth et al, 2000), whereas other reports have found no significant 
differences (Baker et al, 1998). 
 
4.2 Methodological issues and limitations 
57% of the questionnaires were not returned, a figure substantially higher than the 
non-response rate of 39% found in a review of published GP studies (Sibbald et al, 
1994). This has implications for the validity of the survey in that any conclusions 
drawn from the findings cannot be extrapolated to the GPs who did not choose to 
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share their views. Therefore any conclusions made should be interpreted with caution, 
and cannot be generalised to other Psychology services either locally or nationally. 
The response rate may have been increased by sending out more than one reminder 
letter, as research has shown that at least three reminders increases the cumulative 
response rate (Barclay et al, 2002). 
 
The survey‟s face and content validity was investigated to a limited extent, but due to 
time and resource limitations, the survey‟s psychometric properties were not fully 
investigated. A larger sample of GPs could have been randomly chosen to provide 
judgements of the face and content validity.  Using a different measurement of GPs 
views, such as qualitative interviews, to compare with the survey results of the same 
GPs, would have enabled an assessment of the questionnaire‟s validity, and may have 
also provided a richer and more in depth analysis of GPs‟ views of the service, in 
particular the areas of dissatisfaction and neutral responses. The reliability of the 
questionnaire could have been assessed by administering it to a sample of GPs on two 
different occasions, for example separated by a period of one month. Alternatively, 
equivalent items to those in the survey, but worded differently, could have been 
devised and used in parallel to the original survey. Administering both forms to the 
same sample of GPs and correlating the scores on the two administrations could have 
given an estimate of reliability. However, this would have significantly increased the 
length of the survey.  
 
On reflection, the survey could have been improved. It is of note that only two 
questions obtained a full item response rate, with the highest item non-response rate 
occurring for the four questions that asked GPs to estimate the effect the service had 
on prescription & consultation rates, GP workload and referrals to secondary services. 
Closer inspection of these items revealed that GPs either did not respond, indicated 
the items were “not applicable” or wrote “don‟t know”. This may reflect the 
ambiguity and difficulty of the question, or could indicate the numbers of referrals 
those GPs made were too small to generalise. It could be argued that the placement of 
the first question, which asks about overall satisfaction of the service, may have 
unduly influenced the way in which the remaining questions were answered. Placing it 
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at the end may have enabled the respondents to think through the relevant issues prior 
to making a final decision about their overall satisfaction of the service. However, it is 
recommended that general questions should precede specific questions in survey 
design (Robson, 1993). Finally, question 3b could have been constructed 
quantitatively rather that qualitatively, as the exact percentage of referred patients who 
received treatment from practice counsellors was not clear in this survey. In addition, 
it is not known why patients who saw a counsellor were referred for more 
psychological treatment, or how many sessions they saw the counsellor for etc. An 
audit of these referrals could be undertaken to explore these issues. 
 
 
4.3 Implications for the service and further research 
The survey has highlighted the importance of clearly defining referral pathways and 
criteria for all psychology services within the Trust, and it was recommended to the 
department that guidelines be drafted and circulated to all referrers. In addition, the 
survey highlighted that some GPs did not know about the service, indicating that the 
service was not as accessible as perhaps originally thought. This could be resolved by 
advertising the service, and a pamphlet outlining the service‟s purpose, philosophy 
and rationale was recommended and discussed with the department. Some concerns 
were raised about the possible effect of increasing the referral rate, but research could 
be conducted to investigate the impact of such advertising by comparing referral rates 
before and after such a pamphlet was distributed.  
 
The results of the survey were presented to the Psychology service, but in hindsight 
the results could have been better disseminated to relevant parties. GPs could have 
been given the opportunity to indicate whether they would have liked feedback of the 
results. Alternatively, GPs and managers of the Trust could have been invited to a 
meeting in which the findings were presented. Better communication with the service 
was also flagged up by GPs as an area of dissatisfaction. From this survey the specific 
issues regarding communication are not known, and it is recommended that this could 
be a potential area to follow up with GPs in the future. 
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The survey has implications for the redesign of services within the Trust. The finding 
that the majority of GPs who filled out the survey were dissatisfied with the service 
would suggest that the service is failing to meet its original remit. Waiting times were 
viewed by GPs as unacceptable and were cited by the majority of GPs as the main 
area for improvement. This finding was perhaps not unexpected, and could provide an 
argument in favour of increasing the service‟s resources, a view that was endorsed by 
several GPs in the survey. Equally, however, the results could also lend evidence to 
the view that the service as it stands is not supporting the „neglected majority‟ as it 
needs to. Introducing multidisciplinary „intermediate care teams‟ has been suggested 
as a possible solution to effectively meeting the needs of this group of service users 
(SCMH, 2005), a solution that perhaps becomes more attractive in light of the more 
negative results of the survey. 
 
It is recommended that the service repeat the survey annually to enable continued 
quality monitoring. Other possible avenues of assessing satisfaction could also be 
explored, for example, through a service user satisfaction survey. This would enable a 
useful comparison of views between referrers and service users. Future research could 
assess the impact the service has on GPs and the mental health of their patients by 
matching referred patients who received treatment from the service to those who did 
not, and comparing number of GP consultations, prescriptions rates etc. In addition, 
future research could also explore the potential effects of the area GPs were most 
dissatisfied with on their referral decisions and general views of psychological 
problems and therapy. Finally, at the time of the survey, various models for reducing 
the waiting lists were being explored. Repeating the survey following any changes to 
service delivery would enable a valuable insight into GPs views. 
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Appendix 1. Questionnaire 
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Appendix 2. Covering letters to GPs and practice managers 
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15
th
 July 2005 
 
 
 
 
Dear Dr  
 
 
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist on placement at the XXXX Psychology service, 
based at the XXXXX, XXXXX. In order to improve the service we provide, we are 
conducting an audit into GPs‟ views of our service, and would be very grateful if you 
could fill in the questionnaire provided and send it back in the stamped addressed 
envelope by the 8
th
 August 2005. 
 
You may be aware that we have had a high, and we would say appropriate, demand on 
our service which, with the current resources available has led to a waiting list 
problem. 
 
The information you provide us will play an important part in service planning, and 
will help us to tailor our service specifically to your needs, and your patients‟ needs.  
 
If you have any queries, please don‟t hesitate to contact me at the address above, or 
email me at: XXXXX 
 
 
Yours Sincerely,  
 
 
 
 
XXXXXX 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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GP address 
 
 
15
th
 July 2005 
 
 
Dear  
 
 
Re: audit into GPs’ views of the XXXXX Psychology Service, XXXXX 
 
 
Further to our telephone conversation, please find enclosed individual packs 
containing covering letters, questionnaires and stamped addressed envelopes for the 
audit we are conducting into GPs‟ views of the XXXX Psychology Service in 
XXXXX. 
 
As previously discussed, I would very much appreciate it if you could oversee the 
doctors receiving each pack and indeed returning their response by the 8
th
 August 
2005. 
 
If you have any queries, please don‟t hesitate to contact me at the address above, or 
email me at: XXXXX. 
 
 
Thank you for your help regarding this matter. 
 
 
Yours Sincerely,  
 
 
 
 
XXXXX 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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Appendix 3. Full results of the survey 
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Appendix 4. Reminder letter 
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August 2005 
 
 
Dear GP 
 
 
Re: Audit into GPs’ views of the XXXX Psychology Service, XXXX 
 
 
A few weeks ago I sent you a questionnaire asking for your views about the XXXX 
Psychology Service based at the XXXXX, XXXXX. You may have already returned 
the questionnaire, in which case please ignore this letter. 
 
If you have not already returned your questionnaire, I would very much appreciate if 
you could spare a few minutes in fill it out and send it back to us in the stamped 
addressed envelope that was provided. We must have all completed questionnaires 
back by the 7
th
 September 2005. 
 
Your opinions of our service are very important to us, particularly as the feedback 
received will help tailor our service to better meet your needs. 
 
Thank you for your time. 
 
 
Yours Sincerely,  
 
 
 
 
XXXXX 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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Appendix 5. GP comments in full for question 12. ‘How do you think the 
Psychology Service could be improved?’ 
 
 
“Mainly by improving waiting lists. Also consideration of continuity of treatment. I 
have several patients whose treatment has been interrupted or prematurely terminated 
because their therapist was only on a short placement or left.”. 
 
“Better liaison with (interested) GPs; less cumbersome patient forms; reduce wait time 
to treatment; GP education e.g. cognitive behaviour therapy”. 
 
“Regular updates on staff. Areas of expertise advertised. Regular updates of waiting 
lists”. 
 
“Shorter wait”. 
 
“Better access times. I tend not to refer as waiting times unacceptable. I have referred 
to psychologists at XXXX and also to counsellor/therapists.” 
 
“Shorter waiting time for treatment.” 
 
“Information about appropriate referrals/waiting times. Information about CBT.” 
 
“You people need to go out into the real world where GPs work and look after 
patients.” 
 
“More Manpower!” 
 
“Access access access.” 
 
“Better and faster access.” 
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“Shorter waiting times. Greater resource input from Trust.” 
 
“Less waiting – urgent 1 month, non urgent 3 months.” 
 
“Shorter waiting lists (pie in the sky). More info about the type of Rx proposed and 
likely length of Rx at onset of Rx” 
 
“See them quicker!” 
 
“Less wait.” 
 
“More psychologists and a shorter waiting time.” 
 
“Faster assessment and treatment. More anger /anxiety management groups.” 
 
“More psychologists. Quicker appointments especially for urgent cases.” 
 
“Shorter waiting times!” 
 
“More communication regarding services available & which patients would most 
benefit from these.” 
 
“Lower waiting times.” 
 
“More sessions for patients.” 
 
“Waiting list is the main problem! Understandable as demand will always exceed 
supply but so bad that often not worth referring to.” 
 
“Better liaison with feedback about when patient will be seen, treatment and outcome. 
Mainly about speeding up when patients are offered treatment.” 
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“Shorter waiting times for treatment.” 
 
“Principally by cutting waiting times for assessment and treatment. One year or longer 
is not a service!” 
 
“Not aware of XXXX service.” 
 
“Shorter waiting times.” 
 
“Time to appointment.” 
 
“Shorter wait and less paperwork asking patients if they still want treatment!” 
 
“Very long waiting times – need to improve.” 
 
“Shorter waiting times.” 
 
“Less waiting time & an Urdu speaking psychologist” 
 
“Shorter waiting  times for treatment – perhaps more psychologists!!” 
 
“Shorter waiting times (It‟s excellent when the patients get to you).” 
 
“Clearer guidelines and much faster treatment.” 
 
“More resources!” 
 
“Shorter waits.” 
 
“Faster access. Better info re service.” 
 
“Shorter waiting times for assessment and treatment.” 
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“More rapid response: When patients are seen they get good service – the problem is 
the waiting time.” 
 
“From the patients I have seen that have had treatment via the XXXX the quality of 
treatment is good, but unfortunately cannot respond to help for people in times of 
crisis lower ebb as often patients had antidepressants and are improving by the time 
they are seen.” 
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Appendix 6. GP response in full to question 13. Please add any other comments 
that you may have 
 
“To liase better with psychiatry services re referrals between services. We have 
indications re referral indications for CMHT, psychiatry and clinical psychology in 
CMHTs!! Pathways would be useful.” 
 
“Useful service and generally responsive to urgent referrals.” 
 
“Waiting times so bad prevents me from referring.” 
 
“Shorter waiting time for treatment.” 
 
“I would refer patients but have been put off by apparent long waiting times, patients 
have sought private options.” 
 
“I don‟t really know very much about the service, does it offer CBT, I would like to 
know more as I would probably like to refer more.” 
 
“Interim reports on patients undergoing long periods of treatment would be helpful.” 
 
“See them quicker.” 
 
“Poor service due to understaffing.” 
 
“Communication generally.” 
 
“Given up referring. Wait is too long!” 
 
“Unfortunately the referral rate is very low amongst all of my colleagues as well as 
myself because of the unacceptable waiting list. Most patients see our counsellor, are 
referred to psychiatry or pay for private counselling.” 
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“Some referral guidelines would be helpful as quite often not sure which service is 
most appropriate.” 
 
“Simple referral guidelines about who to refer to – psychology – CMHT – acute 
psychiatry” 
 
“Didn‟t know of its existence.” 
 
“Essential for GPs to have access to this form of therapy – I would prefer „more‟ (i.e. 
behavioural modification etc).” 
 
“Patients end up on drugs simply because of the wait. Much more CBT would be 
invaluable.” 
 
“I imagine the department is under-resourced.” 
 
“I have not referred patients to this service as I was not aware of its existence. I 
obviously missed previous publicity about it.” 
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Introduction 
During the past decade, the understanding and treatment of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD) has become more cognitive than behavioural in emphasis (Clark, 
2005). This review will provide a summary of the literature concerning the role of 
cognition in the development and maintenance of OCD. First, a brief description of 
OCD will be given, followed by a discussion of the cognitive appraisal models of 
OCD including recent theoretical and empirical developments in the field. Difficulties 
with these models in explaining the initial development and maintenance of OCD will 
be highlighted, and it will be argued that the self-concept and attachment experiences 
can provide greater understanding of these issues. Finally, areas for future research 
will be discussed. 
 
Description of OCD 
OCD is argued to be one of the most devastating and complex emotional disorders 
(Abramowitz & Deacon, 2005). OCD is characterised by obsessions, compulsions or 
both. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) defines obsessions as recurrent thoughts, impulses or 
images that are experienced as intrusive, unreasonable and distressing. Compulsions 
are repetitive behaviours (such as checking) or mental acts (such as counting) that are 
used to relieve anxiety provoked by the obsessions (APA, 1994). The most common 
obsessions include contamination, the need for symmetry and order, obsessions with 
sexual, aggressive and somatic themes, and the most common compulsions include 
checking, cleaning and counting (Rasmussen & Eisen, 1992). OCD is co-morbid with 
many other disorders including depression, anxiety, alcohol or substance misuse and 
eating disorders (Heyman et al., 2006). Prevalence rates are similar cross-nationally 
and internationally, with lifetime rates ranging from 1.9% to 2.5% (Weissman et al., 
1994). Recent NICE guidelines recommend cognitive-behaviour therapy (CBT) as an 
initial treatment for OCD (NICE, 2005), highlighting the need for greater 
understanding of OCD from a cognitive-behavioural perspective. 
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Cognitive appraisal models of OCD 
Appraisal models of OCD are based on Beck‟s (1976) model of emotional disorders. 
Beck‟s (1976) model posits that underlying different types of psychopathology are 
various „dysfunctional‟ beliefs. For example, social phobia is proposed to arise from 
particular beliefs emphasising ridicule or rejection by others, whereas depression 
arises from beliefs about loss and failure (Beck, 1976; Beck & Emery, 1985). Several 
cognitive appraisal models of OCD exist, with all emphasising different belief 
domains in the pathogenesis of OCD. However, they share two fundamental 
principles.  First, that obsessional problems occur as a result of faulty appraisals or 
interpretations of „normal‟ intrusive thoughts as highly significant and representing 
some kind of threat (Shafran, 2005). These faulty appraisals then lead to an attempt to 
control the thought or neutralise the distress associated with it (Wells, 1997). Second, 
that underlying these faulty misinterpretations are predisposing, enduring beliefs that 
become „activated‟ when an unwanted mental intrusion occurs (Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group; OCCWG, 2003).   
 
Although the shift to a more cognitive emphasis in the understanding of OCD was 
largely seen as positive, this also led to inconsistencies in the definition and 
assessment of cognition in OCD (OCCWG, 2003). In addressing this, an international 
group of researchers distinguished between appraisals and beliefs, defining appraisals 
as: „ways in which meaning is given to a specific event such as the occurrence of an 
intrusion‟ and assumptions or beliefs as „relatively enduring assumptions that are held 
by an individual and that are pan-situational rather than specific to a particular event‟ 
(OCCWG, 1997, p. 670). Two measures were also developed, the Obsessive Beliefs 
Questionnaire (OBQ) and the Interpretation of Intrusions Inventory (III). Finally, they 
identified six belief domains thought to be most relevant to OCD. These belief 
domains and their corresponding models will be considered in turn. 
 
Overestimation of threat 
Overestimation of threat is defined as „an exaggeration of the probability or severity 
of harm‟ (OCCWG, 1997, p. 678). Examples include „I believe the world is a 
dangerous place‟ (OCCWG, 2001). In one of the earliest cognitive accounts of OCD, 
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Carr (1974) proposed that obsessional states are characterised by abnormally high 
estimates of the probability that unfavourable outcomes will occur. Indeed, research 
has shown that people with OCD avoid risks (Steketee & Frost, 1994). Based on 
Carr‟s (1974) theory, McFall and Wollersheim (1979) suggested that in OCD threat is 
generated by a faulty primary appraisal in which the danger of an event is 
overestimated, and a secondary appraisal occurs in which individuals underestimate 
their ability to cope with the perceived threat.   
 
Jones and Menzies (1997, 1998a, 1998b) tested this „threat-based‟ model of OCD in a 
series of studies.  Consistent with this account, the first study found danger 
expectancies the most likely mediator of washing-related behaviour in  patients with 
OCD (Jones & Menzies, 1997). An experimental study in which the perceived level of 
danger was manipulated found that those in the high danger condition elicited greater 
anxiety and urge to wash than those in the low danger condition (Jones & Menzies, 
1998a). Subsequently, Jones and Menzies (1998b) developed a treatment package for 
washers that targets danger-related cognitions. They found significant differences 
between a treatment group and a wait-list control from baseline to after treatment, but 
not from post-treatment to follow up. Govender et al. (2006) reported on the 
application of DIRT in the UK with one OCD patient, and found substantial reduction 
in symptom severity, which was maintained to six months post-treatment. 
 
However, overestimations of threat are believed to be central to other emotional 
disorders, and for this reason this particular belief domain is thought to be relevant but 
not necessarily specific to OCD (OCCWG, 2003). For example, cognitive theory of 
panic disorder posits that bodily sensations are interpreted in a catastrophic fashion 
(Clark, 1997). Similarly, overestimating the threat of negative evaluation is argued to 
be common in social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995). Consistent with this, research has 
shown that people with OCD did not differ in levels of threat estimation compared 
with anxious controls (OCCWG, 2003).  
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Inflated responsibility 
Inflated responsibility is defined as the belief that „one has the power which is pivotal 
to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial negative outcomes‟ (OCCWG, 1997, p. 
677). Examples include  „failing to prevent a disaster is as bad as causing it to happen‟ 
(OCCWG, 2001). In the first comprehensive cognitive-behavioural model of OCD 
Salkovskis (1985) argued that people with OCD interpret otherwise „normal‟ intrusive 
thoughts as an indication that they may be, or have been responsible for harm or its 
prevention. This is supported by research that has found the experience of unwanted 
intrusions is a common experience in the general population (Rachman & de Silva, 
1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). Interpreting intrusive thoughts in this way is 
argued to increase discomfort, increase attention to further intrusions and their 
environmental triggers, increase accessibility to the original intrusion and lead to 
various behavioural responses which aim to escape or reduce the sense of 
responsibility, such as, neutralisation, compulsions, avoidance, reassurance seeking 
and thought suppression (Salkovksis, 1985, 1999, Salkovksis & McGuire, 2003). 
This, in turn, prevents the extinction of anxiety and disconfirmation of appraisal of the 
intrusion, leading to further preoccupation with and increase in the intrusions 
(Salkovskis et al., 1998). 
 
There is empirical support for the relationship between inflated responsibility and 
obsessive-compulsive phenomena. Research shows that self-report measures of 
responsibility appraisals and beliefs correlate with measures of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms across clinical and non-clinical samples (OCCWG, 2001; 2003; Salkovskis 
et al., 2000; Wilson & Chambless, 1999). Furthermore, studies have found that 
individuals with OCD score higher on measures of responsibility than non-clinical 
controls and individuals with other anxiety disorders (OCCWG, 2001, 2003; 
Salkovskis et al. 2000). Nonetheless, as association does not imply causation, it is 
possible that inflated responsibility could be a consequence of OCD itself (Salkovskis 
& McGuire, 2003). However, experimental studies in which the level of perceived 
responsibility is manipulated generally support the contention that increasing 
responsibility appraisals increases discomfort and neutralising behaviour in non-
clinical samples (Ladouceur et al., 1995), and that for OCD patients, decreases in 
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responsibility lead to decreases in discomfort, neutralising behaviour and checking 
urges (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995). Furthermore, Arntz et al. (in press) demonstrated 
that checking behaviour was significantly higher in people with OCD in a high 
responsibility condition compared with OCD patients, non-OCD anxious and non-
clinical group. However, these experimental studies have several limitations. For 
example, Menzies et al. (2000) argues that manipulating responsibility also leads to 
changes in danger ratings, thus confounding the conclusions of the causal role of 
responsibility in OCD. Additionally, these studies only induced checking behaviour, 
and not other forms of OCD behaviour.  
 
Other aspects of Salkovskis‟ model are problematic. Rachman et al. (1995) contends 
that responsibility is situation-specific, and some research supports this view. For 
example, although higher responsibility ratings in an OCD group for low-risk 
hypothetical situations compared with a socially phobic and anxious control group 
was found, consistent with the model, no differences in levels of responsibility for 
high-risk hypothetical situations were evident (Foa et al., 2001). Furthermore, there is 
evidence that responsibility may not be a central feature of all OCD subtypes. People 
who experience contamination/dirt obsessions were found to rate responsibility 
appraisals significantly higher than for aggressive or sexual intrusions (Lee & Kwon, 
2003). In a replication of Foa et al.‟s (2001) study, responsibility was found to be 
elevated in checkers and not in non-checking OCD patients (Foa et al., 2002). 
However, contrary to these findings, Cougle et al. (2006) found no evidence of this, 
suggesting that Foa et al.‟s (2002) results were due to „criterion contamination‟, as the 
measure used included scenarios related to checkers‟ concerns (p. 2). 
 
Finally, some research directly contradicts Salkovskis‟ model. Sica et al. (2004) 
compared different belief domains in an Italian sample that contained individuals 
diagnosed with OCD, generalised anxiety disorder and non-clinical controls. They 
found that responsibility appraisals and beliefs had the lowest discriminant power 
across the three groups. Similarly, Tolin et al. (2006) found that an OCD group and 
anxious-control group differed from each other on measures of all belief domains 
except responsibility. In his review of the literature, Clark (2004) concludes that 
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although inflated responsibility has been shown to be apparent in obsessional 
symptoms, „it‟s significance may be overstated in Salkovskis‟ formulation‟ (p. 100).   
 
Perfectionism 
Perfectionism is defined as the tendency to „believe there is a perfect solution to every 
problem, that doing something perfectly (i.e. mistake free) is not only possible, but 
also necessary, and that even minor mistakes will have serious consequences‟ 
(OCCWG, 1997, p. 678). For example, „if I can‟t do something perfectly, I may as 
well not do it‟ (OCCWG, 2001). McFall and Wollersheim (1979) suggested that 
beliefs about being „perfectly competent‟ and that failing to live up to these 
perfectionist standards results in a heightened tendency to overestimate threat (p.335).  
Rasmussen & Eisen (1992) described OCD as being characterised by the core feature 
of incompleteness, which is the result of an inner sense of imperfection.  
 
A number of studies have found a link between perfectionism and OCD. Using a non-
clinical sample, Rheaume et al. (1995) found that perfectionism was moderately 
correlated with obsessive-compulsive symptoms after controlling for responsibility. 
Frost and Steketee (1997) found OCD patients scored higher in perfectionism than 
controls, however, patients diagnosed with panic or agoraphobia did not differ from 
OCD patients on overall perfectionism when compared with controls. Coles et al. 
(2003, 2005) have reported on the phenomenon of „not just right experiences‟ (NJRE), 
or uncomfortable sensations of things not being just right hypothesised to lead to 
compulsions in order to achieve a sense of perfection. Using student samples they 
found that NJREs were more strongly correlated with features of OCD compared with 
other domains of psychopathology such as social phobia and depression (Coles et al., 
2003; 2005). 
 
Similar to other belief domains, perfectionism is not specific to OCD. For example, 
OCD patients have been found not to differ from anxious controls on levels of 
perfectionism (OCCWG, 2001; 2003; 2005). Antony et al. (1998) compared different 
domains of perfectionism across anxiety disorders and found that the OCD group had 
significantly higher scores on „doubts about actions‟, relative to the nonanxious 
controls, panic disorder and specific phobia groups. Social phobia was associated with 
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higher scores relative to nonanxious controls on the greater concern over mistakes, 
doubts about actions and parental criticism. In addition, panic disorder was also 
associated with concern over mistakes and doubts about actions, compared to controls.  
Perfectionism also overlaps with other belief domains. Bouchard et al. (1999) 
manipulated levels of responsibility in an experimental study. They found that people 
with high perfectionism reported more influence over and responsibility for negative 
outcomes when performing a task in the high responsibility condition than people 
with moderate perfectionism. Recently, Pleva and Wade (2006) found that 
perfectionism and responsibility was a significant predictor of obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms in a non-clinical sample, although responsibility emerged as the strongest 
predictor. Similarly, Yorulmaz et al. (2006) found that responsibility mediated the 
relationships between self-orientated and socially prescribed perfectionism and 
checking symptoms, and the relationship between socially prescribed perfectionism 
and cleaning symptoms in a non-clinical sample. Thus the contribution of 
perfectionism to OCD may operate through it‟s influence on responsibility (Frost et 
al., 2002).  
 
Intolerance of uncertainty 
Intolerance of uncertainty is defined as beliefs about „the necessity for being certain, 
that one has a poor capacity to cope with unpredictable change, and that it is difficult 
to function adequately in ambiguous situations‟ (OCCWG, 1997, p. 678). For 
example, „if something unexpected happens, I will not cope‟ (OCCWG, 2001). 
Rachman (2002a; 2002b) proposed that needing to achieve absolute certainty that a 
perceived threat has been adequately reduced or eliminated is crucial in producing 
checking symptoms. Sookman et al. (1994; 2001) suggested inflexibility with respect 
to uncertainty, newness or change represents a specific vulnerability schema 
underlying vulnerability to OCD.  
 
Consistent with these hypotheses, research has found an association between 
intolerance of uncertainty and OCD symptoms. For example, Steketee et al. (1998) 
found that beliefs about certainty predicted symptoms after controlling for mood and 
worry, above all other belief domains measured, leading them to the conclusion that 
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intolerance of uncertainty may be central to OCD. In the OCCWG research it was 
found that the intolerance of uncertainty subscale of the OBQ was strongly correlated 
with other OCD measures (OCCWG, 2001). However, in a further study the subscale 
was found not to distinguish anxious controls from the OCD group (OCCWG, 2003), 
suggesting this particular belief domain may not be specific to OCD. 
 
Intolerance of uncertainty has been argued to be a feature of other disorders, such as 
generalised anxiety disorder (Dugas et al., 2004). In support of this, Holaway et al. 
(2006) found that compared to controls, people with OCD and generalised anxiety 
disorder showed higher levels of intolerance of uncertainty but the clinical groups did 
not differ significantly from each other. Doubting and checking symptoms were most 
related to intolerance of uncertainty, consistent with Rachman‟s (2002a; 2002b) 
theory. In a replication of these findings, Tolin, Abramowitz et al. (2003) found that 
OCD patients with checking compulsions showed greater intolerance of uncertainty 
than non-checkers and controls. However, the OCD group overall did not show 
greater intolerance of uncertainty compared with controls. 
 
Importance of controlling one’s thoughts  
This belief domain is defined as the „overvaluation of the importance of exerting 
complete control over intrusive thoughts, images, and impulses, and the belief that this 
is both possible and desirable (OCCWG, 1997, p. 678). Examples include „having 
intrusive thoughts means I am out of control‟ (OCCWG, 2001, p. 1003). In their 
model of OCD, Clark and Purdon (1993; Purdon & Clark, 2002) argue that these 
beliefs result in preoccupation with unwanted thoughts, which results in efforts to 
control such thoughts. This model is based on research that has shown suppression of 
neutral thoughts (for example, „white bears‟) paradoxically increases their frequency 
(Wegner et al., 1987). This has subsequently been found to be a robust phenomena 
(Rassin et al., 2000). Thus because control over thoughts is seldom ever reached, this 
is likely to cause significant distress in individuals who hold beliefs about the 
importance of controlling thoughts (Purdon & Clark, 1999, 2002). Efforts to control 
thoughts usually take the form of compulsive acts that serve to reduce anxiety (Purdon 
& Clark, 2002).  
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In support for this model, research has found a strong association between beliefs 
about the importance of controlling thoughts and obsessive-compulsive symptoms, 
showing that this belief domain is endorsed more by people with OCD than anxious 
controls (Tolin et al., in press; OCCWG, 2001, 2003, 2005). Research has also found 
that people with OCD appraise negative intrusions as less controllable, more 
distressing and less acceptable than non-clinical controls (Calamari & Janeck, 1998), 
and that people with OCD are more likely to attribute failure to suppress a neutral 
thought to internal factors (e.g. I am mentally weak) than non-anxious controls (Tolin, 
Abramowitz, Hamlin et al., 2002). Research investigating whether attempts to control 
thoughts in OCD produces paradoxical effects is equivocal (Shafran, 2005). 
Consistent with the model, Tolin, Abramowitz, Prezworski et al. (2002) found 
evidence for an increase in neutral thoughts during suppression attempts in people 
with OCD compared with non-clinical and anxious controls. However, other research 
has found no evidence of an increase in obsessional thoughts as a result of thought 
suppression in non-clinical individuals (Purdon & Clark, 2001) and people with OCD 
(Janeck & Calamari, 1999, Purdon et al., 2005).  
 
Over-importance of thoughts 
Over-importance of thoughts is defined as the belief that „the mere presence of a 
thought indicates it is important‟ (OCCWG, 1997, p. 678). For example, „having bad 
thoughts means I am likely to act on it‟ (OCCWG, 2001). One of the main cognitive 
models of OCD is Rachman‟s (1993, 1997, 1998) theory of obsessions. He proposed 
that obsessions were caused by „catastrophic misinterpretations of the significance of 
one‟s intrusive thoughts/images/impulses‟ (Rachman, 1997, p. 793). Rachman (1998) 
argued that people with OCD attach excessive importance to the content of their 
intrusive thoughts, and that intrusions only become obsessions if the content of the 
intrusion contradicts the person‟s system of values. For example, if it is important to 
someone to be consistently kind and helpful, the experience of unwanted violent 
thoughts towards others would generate obsessional thinking if the intrusion is 
interpreted as signifying that the person really is potentially dangerous or evil 
(Rachman, 1998).  
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Rachman (1993) proposed that a factor involved in exaggerating the importance of 
thoughts was the metacognitive belief equating thought with action or thought-action 
fusion (TAF). Research has shown an association between TAF and obsessional 
symptoms, particularly likelihood TAF, which refers to the belief that thoughts can 
increase the likelihood of bad events occurring (see Shafran, 2005 for a review). 
However, in their review of the literature, Berle and Starcevic (2005) concluded that 
TAF also has a „modest to moderate‟ relationship with other anxiety disorders and 
depression (p.280). For example, Rassin et al. (2001) found similar pre and post 
treatment scores on a TAF measure across anxiety disorders such as panic disorder, 
PTSD and social phobia. 
 
 
In developing the meta-cognitive factors in OCD, Wells (1997) proposed a cognitive 
model of OCD. Based on the Self-Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model, 
obsessional thoughts are experienced as threatening due to metacognitive beliefs 
about the meaning of thoughts in general (Wells & Matthews, 1994). Beliefs 
concerning the importance or meaning and power of thoughts and beliefs regarding 
the need to control thoughts are emphasised in this model. These metacognitive 
processes then activate specific strategies for coping, in which the strategy selected 
will depend on the nature of the appraisal evoked by the intrusion. Finally, Wells 
(1997) argues that people with OCD tend to monitor their thought processes, or have 
heightened „cognitive self-consciousness‟, which increases the detection of unwanted 
thoughts and can trigger intrusions. Indeed, research has found that OCD patients can 
be reliably differentiated from non-anxious controls on cognitive self-consciousness 
measures (Janeck et al., 2003). 
 
In a direct test of this model, Gwilliam et al. (2004) found that metacognitive beliefs 
were associated with measures of obsessional symptoms in a non-clinical sample, 
even after responsibility was controlled for. The authors concluded that the findings 
did not support the argument that responsibility is of central importance in OCD, as 
the association between OCD symptoms and responsibility statistically depended on 
meta-cognition (Gwilliam et al., 2004). These findings were replicated in a later study 
in which it was concluded that „the concept of responsibility may be too general as a 
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basis for understanding cognitive factors in obsessive-compulsive symptoms‟ (Myers 
& Wells, 2005, p.815). However, limitations of these studies were that only one 
measure of responsibility was used and the sample consisted of non-clinical 
participants. 
 
Difficulties with cognitive appraisal models of OCD  
Although cognitive appraisal models of OCD are argued to be the most promising 
theoretical explanations of OCD (Taylor et al., 2006), various difficulties exist. First, 
the belief domains are highly correlated, which suggests that each domain may not be 
a distinct cognitive construct as currently theorised (Clark, 2004). For example, the 
OCCWG (2001, 2003) found belief domains measured by the first version of the 
OBQ, the OBQ-87, highly correlated with each other. The OCCWG (2005) later 
performed an exploratory factor analysis on the OBQ-87 in which three factors 
emerged: responsibility/threat estimation, perfectionism/intolerance of uncertainty and 
importance/control of thoughts. However, the three subscales were still moderately 
correlated in an OCD sample and had higher correlations in a combined anxious, 
community and student control sample (OCCWG, 2005). In contrast to this, Faull et 
al. (2004) conducted a principal components analysis on the OBQ-87 and found 
evidence for a single factor solution, leading to the conclusion that far from distinct, 
the belief domains may be manifestations of a more fundamental dysfunctional 
schema.  
 
Second, the causal role of dysfunctional beliefs in producing symptoms has been 
questioned. If this relationship exists there must be evidence that OCD patients 
endorse these beliefs more strongly than patients with other anxiety disorders (Tolin et 
al., in press). As reviewed above, empirical evidence for this is mixed, with many of 
the belief domains being found to be a feature of other anxiety disorders. Moreover, 
research into belief domains in OCD has mostly been cross-sectional in nature, thus 
faulty appraisals may be a consequence not a cause of OCD (Clark, 2004). To address 
this, Abramowitz et al. (2006) and Abramowitz et al. (in press) conducted a 
naturalistic longitudinal study that allowed an assessment of directional relationship 
hypothesised by cognitive models of OCD. Using the OBQ, levels of beliefs were 
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measured in (non-clinical) first time expecting parents pre and post-delivery. They 
found that negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts occurring one month following 
birth mediated the relationship between pre-birth obsessive beliefs and postpartum 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms. Although this study is limited by the use of a non-
clinical sample, it provides evidence that dysfunctional beliefs have a causal role in 
the development of symptoms. 
 
Third, there is evidence to suggest that certain beliefs are only evident in particular 
symptom subtypes of OCD, although some have argued this is premature given the 
observed high associations of different belief domains (Faull et al., 2004). This is 
consistent with the growing evidence that OCD is not a unitary syndrome, but rather a 
heterogeneous disorder (for a review see Taylor et al., 2005). For example, Tolin, 
Woods et al. (2003) found that threat estimation was associated with checking, 
hoarding, neutralizing, obsessing and washing symptoms, overimportance of thoughts 
was associated with neutralizing, control of thoughts with obsessions and 
perfectionism with ordering symptoms. Calamari et al. (2006) found symmetry 
symptoms to be associated with perfectionism/certainty belief domains. 
 
Fourth, there is also evidence to suggest that for some OCD patients, dysfunctional 
beliefs play a limited role in the aetiology and maintenance of symptoms. Taylor et al. 
(2006) conducted a cluster analysis on the OBQ collected from a clinical sample and 
found two cognitive subtypes. One subtype was characterised by relatively high 
scores compared to the control group on measures of beliefs domains, whereas the 
other subtype showed approximately normal levels of dysfunctional beliefs. These 
results were subsequently replicated by Calamari et al. (in press) who concluded that 
these findings highlight the importance of developing an idiographic profile of belief 
domains most relevant to patients‟ symptoms in order to maximise the efficacy of 
interventions. 
 
Fifth, the cognitive appraisal model of OCD asserts that modifying faulty appraisals 
and beliefs will lead to a reduction in symptoms (Clark, 2005). However, in a 
systematic review of 17 randomised controlled trials it was concluded that whilst there 
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is evidence that the behaviour therapy is an effective treatment for OCD, no evidence 
was found that cognitive therapy is more or less effective than behaviour therapy 
alone (NICE, 2005). In addition, when standardised methodology for defining clinical 
significant change was applied to the data sets of five outcome studies, behaviour 
therapy emerged as the most effective treatment compared with cognitive therapy, 
with an improvement rate of 75% compared with 53% for cognitive therapy (Fisher & 
Wells, 2005). Thus despite the theoretical developments in the cognitive factors 
involved in OCD, it is still unclear why treatments based on behaviour change are 
more effective than interventions focused on cognitive change. 
 
Finally, there is little understanding of the initial development of these beliefs 
domains, perhaps because of the prevailing view that it is most useful to concentrate 
on the maintaining factors of OCD, as this invariably is the target of treatment 
(Shafran, 2005). Salkovskis et al. (1999) suggested several developmental origins that 
may serve to inflate responsibility. For example, a childhood characterised by strict 
and rigid codes of conduct and duty, or experiences in which an early developed and 
broad sense for responsibility is either deliberately or implicitly promoted. However, 
as yet these hypotheses have not been tested empirically. Rachman (1997) 
hypothesised that individuals who learn (or are taught) that value-laden thoughts are 
significant are vulnerable to developing obsessions. Similarly, Shafran and Mansell 
(2001) suggest that overly critical and demanding parents, excessive parental 
expectations and indirect criticism, experiences where parental approval is either 
absent, inconsistent or conditional may contribute to the development of 
perfectionism. 
 
Conclusions and suggestions for future research 
As reviewed, many difficulties are apparent with the cognitive appraisal model of 
OCD. Belief domains have been shown to be inter-correlated and not distinct 
constructs. Clinically this implies people with OCD hold several different beliefs 
rather than one single belief. Current cognitive appraisal theories cannot explain this, 
as most emphasise only one belief domain. This lack of distinctiveness is also 
problematic for the argument that each belief domain develops from particular early 
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experiences. It is possible that this overlap points to a more generic cognitive system, 
for example, an underlying dysfunctional schema (Faull et al., 2004). Alternatively, 
the methods used to measure such beliefs may lack construct validity. Indeed, 
introspective self-report questionnaires are argued to be highly flawed in revealing the 
cognitive causes of behaviour, which are argued to be most likely out of awareness 
(McNally, 2001). Clearly further research is needed to further investigate the 
specificity of these belief domains. 
 
It is argued that the cognitive appraisal model of OCD is problematic as it does not 
explain why people who endorse such beliefs are motivated to engage in compulsive 
behaviours (O‟Kearney, 1998). In response to this, Salkovskis & Freeston (2001) 
argue that perception of threat is the central issue in OCD (as in other anxiety 
disorders). They argue that people in general are highly motivated to avoid threat, and 
in OCD, the person is motivated to avert the threat of being personally responsible for 
some harm (p.6). However, as Bhar (2004) points out, the reasons behind the 
motivation to avoid threat is not clear from this account, for example, „why would it 
matter to the person if they are irresponsible?‟ (p.87). 
 
It has been suggested that people with OCD are motivated to avoid threat that 
contradicts a person‟s value system and how they view themselves (Rachman, 1998; 
Purdon & Clark, 1999). Thus, it would only matter to a person if they experienced an 
intrusion that implied irresponsibility if it was important to them to be responsible. 
Rowa et al. (2005) found that obsessions rated as more upsetting were evaluated as 
more meaningful and more contradictory of valued aspects of the self than less 
upsetting ones. The role of the self-concept in OCD was first introduced by Guidano 
and Liotti (1983). Drawing on attachment theory, they argued that OCD emerges from 
an early experience of attachment relationships that supply the child with two 
opposing interpretations of self and reality, leading to a dichotomous self-concept 
(Guidano & Liotti, 1983). This causes extreme anxiety and leads to a need for a non-
contradictory image of self, perfectionism and compulsive behaviours emerge as a 
means to resolve these feelings of ambivalence (Guidano & Liotti, 1983). Clark 
(2004) proposed that people vulnerable to developing OCD have a pre-existing 
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ambivalent or uncertain self-view, thus unwanted intrusive thoughts that are 
completely contrary to core elements of this ambivalent self are more likely to be 
interpreted as highly significant and threatening. The empirical support for these 
hypotheses is very limited. Only one study has investigated attachment in OCD, and 
found that people with OCD reported more insecure attachments than a control group 
(Myhr et al., 2004). One study also found that people with OCD show higher self-
ambivalent self-concepts than non-clinical controls (Bhar, 2004). Clinically this 
implies that interventions aimed at increasing coherence or certainty of the self-
concept may have the effect of reducing the significance placed on unwanted intrusive 
thoughts. Given the limited evidence base for purely cognitive interventions for OCD, 
this could prove to be an important area for future research. 
 
In conclusion, the cognitive appraisal model of OCD has greatly developed the 
understanding of OCD. However, aspects of the theory are problematic, and this is 
reflected in the research literature. This review has identified that current knowledge 
of the developmental precursors to the beliefs though to underlie OCD is limited, and 
represents an area for further research. As discussed, the role of the self-concept in the 
pathogenesis of OCD is a promising area for the development of theory and empirical 
knowledge, which may have implications for the treatment. Further research is needed 
to determine whether people with OCD have a particular self-concept structure that is 
characterised by uncertainty and ambivalence, and whether this is indeed linked to a 
particular attachment experience as hypothesised. Finally, the hypothesised 
relationship between attachment experiences, self-concept, obsessive-compulsive 
symptoms and beliefs has not been tested empirically and could be addressed by 
future research.  
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Appendix 1  Search strategy procedure 
 
Search process 
Initial ideas and broad search 
The search process began with an initial interest in OCD from a cognitive perspective, 
based on previous experience of using the cognitive model therapeutically. At this 
stage key textbooks were read to gain background information on the topic. This 
enabled more information to be gained on the cognitive models of OCD mainly from 
a theoretical point of view. From this reading, key authors and their original 
theoretical papers/books were identified and read. Ideas for a potential focus of the 
literature review were then discussed with supervisors.  
 
Focus of ideas and systematic search 
Following this, the search became more focussed and electronic databases were 
systematically searched (see below). In addition, website, citation and reference 
searches were conducted (see below). This enabled identification of relevant research 
and theoretical developments since the original papers had been published. Through 
this process, gaps in both the empirical and theoretical literature were identified.  
 
Ensuring correct gaps in the knowledge base existed 
As some time had passed since the first search, and to check the gaps in knowledge 
that had been identified still existed, a second systematic search as described above 
took place by restricting the search to the previous year. In addition, the „articles in 
press‟ sections of key journals (for example, Journal of Anxiety Disorders, Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, Cognitive Therapy and Research) were also searched. 
 
Database search 
Below is a list of all the databases used for the literature search: 
 PsycINFO 
 Pubmed 
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 National Research Register (a register for current and recently published 
research in the National Health Service. Several researchers conducting research 
relevant to the literature search were identified and contacted). 
 Cinahl (Cumulative Index to Nursing & Allied Health Literature) 
 Cochrane Library. 
 Zetoc (provides access to the British Library‟s table of contents. An email 
„alert‟ was set up to ensure that new articles and papers were identified). 
 SIGLE (System for Information on Grey Literature). 
 
Search terms  
Below is a list of the search terms used, grouped into categories for description 
purposes. 
 Obsessive compulsive disorder, OCD, obsessions, compulsions, obsessive 
neurosis 
 Cognitive models of OCD, cognition, cognition in OCD, cognitive appraisal 
model, beliefs, beliefs in OCD, belief domains, intrusive thoughts, intrusions, 
appraisals, thoughts, schema 
 OCD subtypes, heterogeneity of OCD, epidemiology of OCD 
 Inflated responsibility, responsibility in/and OCD 
 Threat, overestimation of threat, threat-based models of OCD, danger 
estimates 
 Intolerance of uncertainty, tolerance of uncertainty, uncertainty 
 Control of thoughts, thought control, thought suppression 
 Perfectionism, perfectionistic, perfectionistic beliefs 
 Overimportance of thoughts, importance of thoughts, importance of beliefs, 
thought-action fusion, TAF 
 Obsessive beliefs questionnaire, OBQ 
 Development of OCD, aetiology of OCD, early experience 
 Attachment, attachment style, attachment security 
 Self, self concept, self concept clarity, self concept certainty, self esteem, self-
view, ambivalent self  
 128 
 Cognitive therapy, CT, cognitive behaviour therapy, CBT, treatment of OCD, 
OCD interventions, therapy 
 
Specific searching procedures  
As a number of databases were used, each search term was entered into the databases 
in turn. In all searches a combination of free text (i.e. the actual search term) and 
MeSH terminology were used. MeSH terminology allowed identification of 
references that used different terminology for the same concept. To exclude irrelevant 
references limits were used, such as limiting references to English journals, and the  
Boolean AND as well as NOT operators were used. To ensure all relevant references 
were included, the truncation technique (i.e. putting an asterisk at the end of the word) 
was used to include different forms of each search term, such as the plural of the 
word, in addition, the Boolean OR operator was used to broaden the search. 
 
Website searches 
The Internet was utilised and search engines used including Google 
(www.google.com) and Google Scholar (www.scholar.google.com). Service user 
websites were also searched (for example, www.ocdaction.org.uk, www.ocduk.org). 
Finally, the Department of Health‟s website (www.doh.gov.uk) was searched and 
enabled current guidelines concerning OCD to be found.  
 
Author relevant searches 
The names of most relevant authors were searched within the above databases. In 
addition, their names were searched on the Internet as above, which enabled some 
personal web pages to be found (for example, within academic institutions) that 
showed publication lists. These publication lists were cross-referenced with the 
literature already obtained to ensure that no key references were missing. 
 
Reference searches 
Using the reference lists of the obtained articles proved useful in identifying further 
relevant papers. Reference lists were also checked in the latter stages of the search to 
ensure all relevant literature had been obtained. 
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Citation searches 
Web of Science ISI Citation Indexes were used to find all publications by key authors 
and enabled the identification of other journal articles and authors that had cited the 
literature already obtained. The citation search was particularly useful in the checking 
stage of the search to ensure all relevant literature had been found. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Cognitive models of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) suggest that an ambivalent 
self-concept and dysfunctional beliefs play an important role in the pathogenesis of 
OCD. Early attachment experience is argued to be the main process through which 
such ambivalent self-representations develop. The current study investigated self-
concept clarity, a broader construct than ambivalence, attachment security, obsessive-
compulsive (OC)-relevant beliefs and their relation to OC symptoms. Forty four 
people who reported experiencing OC symptoms were compared to 34 individuals 
who reported no mental health difficulties. People who experienced OC symptoms 
exhibited significantly less self-concept clarity, less attachment security and higher 
levels of OC-related beliefs. Once levels of depression were controlled for, no 
significant relationship between attachment security and self-concept clarity was 
found in the OCD group. OC symptoms were not significantly correlated with self-
concept clarity in the OCD group, although significant negative relationships were 
found between self-concept clarity and specific OC symptoms. Evidence was found to 
support the notion that OC-relevant beliefs mediate the relationship between self-
concept clarity and OC symptoms, in addition to mediating the relationship between 
attachment anxiety and OC symptoms. Implications for attachment theory and 
cognitive models of OCD are discussed, along with clinical and research implications. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
 
1.1.1 Definition and phenomenology  
 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterised by obsessions and/or 
compulsions. Obsessions can be defined as „persistent ideas, thoughts, impulses or 
images that are experienced as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked 
anxiety or distress‟ (American Psychiatric Association; APA, 1994, p.418). 
Compulsions can be defined as „repetitive behaviours (e.g., hand washing, ordering, 
checking) or mental acts (e.g., praying, counting, repeating words silently) the goal of 
which is to prevent or reduce anxiety or distress‟ (APA, 1994, p.418). The diverse 
nature of the clinical presentation of OCD is frequently discussed in the literature 
(Clark, 2005). The most commonly reported symptoms include contamination 
concerns with compulsive cleaning or washing, obsessive doubt and checking rituals, 
concerns about symmetry, orderliness and obsessions concerned with numbers, and 
hoarding or collecting rituals (Lochner & Stein, 2003). 
 
As well as variability in symptoms, OCD also varies with respect to patterns of 
comorbid conditions, gender, insight, age of onset and course (Lochner & Stein, 
2003). For example, there is no typical mode of onset associated with OCD, and 
symptoms can be experienced gradually, acutely or in response to particular life 
events (Clark, 2004). Furthermore, although men and women are equally affected by 
OCD, women are more likely to experience contamination fears and washing/cleaning 
rituals (Tallis, 1995). This observed heterogeneity of OCD has led researchers to 
subtype OCD patients according to different criteria such as different symptom types. 
Subtyping in this way assumes that each subtype is a separate disorder, with differing 
phenomenology, causes and treatment (Mataix-Cols, 2006).  
 
Across studies, the contamination/washing subtype has emerged most reliably 
whereas less consistency has been observed for hoarding, harming/checking and 
symmetry subtypes (Clark, 2005). However, others advocate a multidimensional 
approach instead which views OCD as a spectrum of multiple, potentially overlapping 
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syndromes that are continuous with „normal‟ obsessive-compulsive (OC) phenomena 
(Mataix-Cols et al., 2005; Mataix-Cols, 2006). Consequently, researchers are 
increasingly investigating the processes that may underlie symptom differences such 
as faulty appraisals and OC-related beliefs (Calamari et al., 2006).  
 
1.1.2 Overview of the cognitive models of OCD 
 
1.1.2.1 Behavioural conceptualisations 
Interest in the cognitive model of OCD emerged from an attempt to address the 
limitations of the behavioural approach, the prevailing method of understanding and 
treating OCD until only relatively recently (Clark, 2004). The behavioural model of 
OCD is based on Mowrer‟s (1939, 1960) two-stage theory of fear acquisition and 
maintenance. In the first stage, obsessional fears develop due to a neutral event 
becoming associated with fear by immediately becoming paired with an anxiety-
provoking stimulus. In the second stage any actions that relieve the obsessive fear or 
discomfort are negatively reinforced, as these stop the unpleasant event and are thus 
likely to be repeated in the future (Steketee, 1993). Following this model, treatment 
involves exposing the individual to the feared situation and preventing any 
compulsive rituals or behaviour that alleviates the discomfort, or, exposure/response 
prevention (ERP) (Steketee, 1993). Although studies support the effectiveness of ERP 
(Steketee & Frost, 1998), problems with this type of treatment remain.  For example, 
drop out rates are typically high which is possibly due to the distressing nature of the 
exposure tasks (Abramowitz et al., 2005).  
 
1.1.2.2 Cognitive conceptualisations 
Cognitive models of OCD can be broadly divided into appraisal and deficit models.  
The appraisal model dominates theory, research and practice and emphasises thought 
content in producing symptoms (Clark, 2004). In contrast, the deficit model broadly 
emphasises abnormalities in cognitive processing.  
 
1.1.2.2.1 Cognitive deficit approaches 
Many cognitive deficit accounts of OCD exist. For example, researchers have 
investigated whether people with OCD exhibit impairments in memory or deficits in 
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their ability to dismiss or attend to extraneous mental stimuli (Abramowitz, 2006). In 
a review of the literature, Muller and Roberts (2005) concluded that the evidence for 
an overall memory deficit was inconclusive, but that there was strong evidence for a 
lack of confidence in memory in OCD.  In addition, there is some limited evidence for 
reduced cognitive inhibition and attentional biases to threatening information (Muller 
& Roberts, 2005). Cognitive deficit accounts have been criticised for their inability to 
account for the heterogeneity of OCD and the apparent effectiveness of ERP 
(Abramowitz, 2006). It is perhaps because of these limitations that cognitive appraisal 
accounts have had a greater impact on the treatment of OCD (Clark, 2004).  
 
1.1.2.2.2 Cognitive appraisal approaches 
The central premise of the appraisal model of OCD is that obsessions and 
compulsions originate from „normal‟ experiences. Indeed, research has found that a 
high proportion of the general population report unwanted, intrusive thoughts 
(Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis & Harrison, 1984). This finding also extends 
to ritualistic behaviour, and research has shown that over 50% of the population 
exhibit ritualistic behaviour although this tends to be less intense, frequent and 
associated with less negative affect (Muris et al., 1997).  
 
The cognitive appraisal model proposes that people who experience OCD develop 
symptoms because they interpret their unwanted, intrusive thoughts as highly 
significant or threatening. This is based on Beck‟s (1976) model of emotional 
disorders which posits that psychopathology results from maladaptive beliefs 
concerning the self, the environmental context and the future. Appraising such 
thoughts in this way leads to attempts to control the thought or neutralise the distress 
associated with it (Wells, 1997). It is thought that underlying these faulty 
misinterpretations are predisposing, enduring beliefs that become „activated‟ when an 
unwanted mental intrusion occurs (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions Working 
Group; OCCWG, 2003). The OCCWG (1997) has described six categories of OC-
related, dysfunctional beliefs: inflated responsibility, overimportance of thoughts, 
overestimations of threat, perfectionism, intolerance of uncertainty and importance of 
controlling one‟s thoughts. They also developed the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire 
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(OBQ) that enables the measurement of these beliefs (OCCWG, 2001). Currently, 
several cognitive appraisal models of OCD exist, and each emphasises different belief 
domains in the pathogenesis of OCD. 
 
In a literature review, May (2006) highlighted several difficulties with the cognitive 
appraisal models of OCD. Firstly, little is known about what predisposes an individual 
to misinterpret their intrusive thoughts as threatening or what the developmental 
precursors are to the formation of the underlying dysfunctional beliefs. Secondly, the 
motivational factors underlying compulsive behaviours are unclear within the 
cognitive appraisal account. It has been suggested that people are motivated to engage 
in compulsions because the intrusion contradicts perceived valued aspects of 
themselves (Rachman, 1998; Purdon & Clark, 1999). This has lead some to explore 
the role of the self-concept in the pathogenesis of OCD, and have linked this to the 
role of attachment processes in producing a particular self-structure characterised by 
ambivalence and uncertainty (Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Clark, 2004). However, as very 
few empirical studies have been conducted, this has been identified as an area for 
further research (Doron et al., 2006).  
 
1.1.3 Rationale for the study 
There is a need to further the understanding of the role of the self-concept and 
attachment in OCD, which this study will attempt to do. First, relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature regarding the self-concept will be discussed. Following this the 
attachment literature will be considered, with a particular emphasis on the link with 
mental health. Theoretical approaches that draw on attachment and self-concept 
theory to explain the development of OCD will then be examined. Finally, the aims of 
the current study will be presented.  
 
1.2 The self-concept  
1.2.1 Definition and theoretical issues 
There is no universally accepted definition of the term „self-concept‟ (Byrne, 1996). A 
further difficulty is that some self terms are used interchangeably to refer to the same 
underlying construct, whereas others are used to refer to significantly different 
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constructs (Bhar, 2004). For example, some of the terms which have been used 
interchangeably with the term „self-concept‟ include self-image, self-representation, 
self-schema, and self-identity. For the purposes of this study, the term „self-concept‟ 
will be used to denote the attitudes, feelings and beliefs one has about oneself 
(McReynolds et al., 2000). 
 
Self-concept research and theory has undergone a significant shift in the last two 
decades (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Traditionally, the self-concept was understood as a 
unitary, monolithic entity and research often focused on the evaluative component of 
the self concept - self-esteem (Campbell et al., 2000). However, current 
conceptualisations of the self-concept consider it both multidimensional and dynamic 
in nature (Markus & Wurf, 1987). It is argued that the self-concept is dynamic in the 
sense that it provides the means for interpreting and organising self-relevant actions 
and experiences, provides the rules and scripts for behaviour and adjusts in response 
to the social environment (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Typically, theorists and researchers 
view the self-concept as cognitive in nature, consisting of a set or collection of 
images, thoughts, attitudes, schemas or theories (Markus & Wurf, 1987). Across 
theoretical traditions, it is generally agreed that during the course of development, a 
concept of the self is established in memory and is constructed through interactions 
with the social environment (Stein & Markus, 1994; Demo, 1992).  
 
A distinction can be made between the structure and contents of the self-concept. The 
contents of the self-concept generally refer to beliefs about the self and self-
evaluations, such as beliefs about physical attributes and abilities. The structure of the 
self-concept refers to how these beliefs are organised (Campbell et al., 2003). The 
organisational properties of the self-concept are increasingly being recognised as an 
important focus for clinical theory and research, as cognitive structure is argued to 
shape emotional and behavioural responses to events (Stein & Markus, 1994; Rafaeli-
Mor & Steinberg, 2002).  
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1.2.2 Structure of the self-concept and its relationship to mental health 
Structural aspects of the self-concept have been implicated in various theories of 
psychopathology. In particular, the question of whether having a coherent, unified and 
integrated self-concept or a differentiated self-concept, with multiple self-aspects 
enhances psychological well-being (Stein & Markus, 1994; Campbell et al., 2003).  
Several types of self-concept structure have been proposed that either emphasise 
differentiation such as self-complexity, or integration, such as self-discrepancies and 
self-concept clarity. 
 
1.2.2.1 Differentiation of the self-concept 
Differentiation of the self-concept refers to „the degree of pluralism in the structure, 
the number of different facets or dimensions an individual spontaneously uses in 
thinking about the self‟ (Campbell et al., 2000, p.68). Linville (1985) argues that the 
complexity of self-representations is important in maintaining mental health. Greater 
self-complexity refers to the organisation of self-knowledge into a number of aspects 
in addition to maintaining greater distinctions among self-aspects (Linville, 1985). 
Linville (1985) argues that greater self-complexity buffers against the effects of stress 
by preventing negative events from „spilling over‟ into the unaffected other aspects or 
representations of the self. For example, a university student fails an exam and has a 
simple self-representation in which academic aspects of the self are closely linked in 
memory to social and family aspects. The negative affect and self-appraisals 
associated with the failure will be widespread, resulting in negative feelings about 
other areas of the self. With a more complex self-structure where distinctions among 
the self-aspects are maintained, the academic failure is less likely to affect the other 
aspects of the self. Some studies have found support for this hypothesis (Linville, 
1987, 1985). However, other studies have found limited support (Rafaeli-Mor & 
Steinberg, 2002). 
 
1.2.2.2 Integration of the self-concept 
In contrast to differentiation, the integration of the self-concept refers to the „degree of 
unity in the structure‟ (Campbell et al., 2000, p.68), and it is this aspect of the self-
concept that has been implicated in the development of OCD. Developing a coherent 
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and unified self-concept has been highlighted as an important task of cognitive and 
emotional development (Harter, 1990). Indeed, some theories of psychopathology 
have emphasised the role of conflicting or discrepant beliefs about the self in 
producing negative affect and psychopathology (Bhar, 2004). For example, Kernberg 
(1984) argues that personality disorders are characterised by an inconsistent and 
thereby incoherent personality structure, resulting in multiple, contradictory 
representations of self. Similarly, Kohut (1971, cited in Mollon, 2001) views 
psychosis as repression to the developmental stage of the fragmented self. 
 
Research has found that non-clinical individuals who exhibited poor self-concept 
integration had higher scores on measures of depression and anxiety (Donahue et al., 
1993). Similarly, Higgins (1987; 1989) argues that a self-concept characterised by 
discrepant self-beliefs is associated with negative emotional states. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, Strauman and Higgins (1988) found that a discrepancy between an 
individual‟s perception of their actual attributes and their ideal attributes was 
associated with depression. In contrast, a discrepancy between an individual‟s 
perception of their actual attributes and the attributes that they perceived others would 
believe they should possess was associated with anxiety. 
 
1.2.2.2.1 Self-concept clarity 
The structural construct that is most relevant to current theories that propose OCD 
may involve an ambivalent or uncertain self-concept is self-concept clarity. Campbell 
et al. (1996) defined self-concept clarity as the extent to which the contents of the 
self-concept are „clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent and temporally 
stable‟ (p.141). Therefore an individual who has low self-concept clarity will have 
self-beliefs that are uncertain, unstable and inconsistent (Campbell et al., 1996). 
Campbell et al. (1996) describe self-concept clarity as overlapping with other self-
concept constructs but as being theoretically independent of the contents of the self-
concept, such as self-esteem. This overlapping of the self-concept clarity construct is 
reflected in the OCD literature. For example, the terms „ambivalent self-concept‟ 
(Guidano & Liotti, 1983) or „self-ambivalence‟ (Bhar, 2004) are also used. However, 
clarity is argued to be a broader construct than ambivalence as ambivalence is more 
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concerned with the notion of an individual having both positive and negative self-
beliefs (Riketta & Zigler, 2006).  This relates to the self-concept encompassing only a 
specific facet of clarity, that is, inconsistency (Riketta & Ziegler, 2006). Indeed, across 
two factor analytic studies a measure of self-concept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996) 
was found to tap into broader constructs than a measure of self-ambivalence (Riketta 
& Ziegler, 2006). 
 
There is evidence that greater self-concept clarity is associated with psychological 
well-being. In a series of studies using undergraduate students, Campbell (1990) 
found that individuals with low self-esteem showed less confidence in self-ratings on  
pairs of opposite trait adjectives. They also demonstrated more change in their self-
descriptions over a two month period, and less consistency in their responses to 
whether or not pairs of opposite trait adjectives were true of them. Baumgardner 
(1990) found that students who exhibited low self-esteem were less certain about 
possessing various personality traits, and that it was increases in certainty rather than 
accuracy that led to increases in positive self-affect. Baumgardner (1990) suggested 
that perceptions of self-certainty may contribute to a sense of control, particularly over 
future outcomes.   
 
A criticism of research that asks respondents to rate themselves on various traits is 
that some or all may not be relevant to their self-concepts (Story, 2004). Campbell et 
al. (1996) developed a self-report measure of self-concept clarity (Self-Concept 
Clarity Scale, SCCS) and replicated previous research that demonstrated the self-
esteem-clarity association. This study also showed that low self-concept clarity was 
associated with high neuroticism, low conscientiousness, low agreeableness and 
chronic self-analysis, after controlling for self-esteem. These findings have been 
replicated in an Estonian sample, indicating the self-concept clarity construct is 
generalisable across different Western cultures and languages (Matto & Realo, 2001). 
Smith et al. (1996) found that students with higher self-concept clarity demonstrated 
lower levels of depression, anxiety, perceived stress, higher self-esteem and engaged 
in more active coping styles than those with lower scores. Stucke and Sporer (2002)  
established a link between clarity and anger. They found that individuals who scored 
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high on a narcissism measure and who had low self-concept clarity, experienced the 
most anger following experimentally induced failure. Similarly, Lawrence (2006) 
found that students with lower levels of self-concept clarity were more likely to report 
high levels of aggression in response to situations where a lack of control was 
experienced compared with situations where they were provoked by others. 
 
Only two studies have explored self-concept clarity in clinical samples. Bigler et al. 
(2001) investigated self-concept clarity in 31 in-patients diagnosed with schizophrenia 
and found that low self-concept clarity was associated with higher levels of depression 
and anxiety. In two experimental studies, Wilson and Rapee (2006) compared self-
concept certainty in people diagnosed with social phobia with non-psychiatric 
controls. The first study found that after controlling for depression, people with social 
phobia had significantly higher ratings for negative attributes (for example, boring, 
selfish, lazy) and lower ratings for positive attributes (for example, attractive, honest, 
kind). Their confidence in whether they possessed various positive and negative 
attributes was lower than the confidence ratings of the control group. To control for 
the possibility that this result was not due to low levels of confidence in making 
decisions generally, a second study used the difference in reaction times for deciding 
whether particular trait adjectives were descriptive of them, or whether the traits were 
generally a positive attribute, as a measure of self-concept certainty. It was found that 
individuals with social phobia exhibited greater reaction times for making yes/no 
decisions about whether particular attributes were self-descriptive, relative to reaction 
times for making general decisions about trait adjectives, thus indicating less self-
concept certainty than controls. These findings are consistent with models of social 
phobia that propose social phobia is characterised by instability of self-schema 
(Wilson & Rapee, 2006).  
 
1.3 Attachment  
1.3.1 Attachment theory  
1.3.1.1 Origins of Attachment theory 
The central thesis of attachment theory is that human beings form close emotional 
bonds in the interest of survival, and that from infancy, an attachment-behavioural 
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system operates in order to regulate proximity to the caregiver (Bowlby, 1969). 
Bowlby (1973) proposed that individuals develop internal working models, or internal 
representations, of the self and others through interactions with caregivers. Internal 
working models contain emotional, behavioural and information-processing 
components, allowing for the prediction of others‟ behaviour and planning of 
behavioural responses to these predictions (Zimmerman, 1999). Internal working 
models are also thought to contain memories of attachment-related experiences and 
attachment related goals and needs (Collins & Read, 1994). The content of an 
individual‟s internal working models are hypothesised to be largely determined by the 
caregiver‟s emotional availability and responsiveness to the child.  
 
Bowlby (1973) proposed that internal working models of the self contain the notion of 
„how acceptable or unacceptable he himself is in the eyes of his attachment figures‟, 
and that internal working models of the world or others contain the notion of  „who his 
attachment figures are, where they may be found, and how they may be expected to 
respond‟ (p.236). Therefore children with attentive, attuned and consistently 
responsive caregivers should develop models of themselves as loveable and others as 
responsive and trustworthy, whereas children with unresponsive or unpredictably 
responsive and inconsistent parents are predicted to develop models of self as 
unworthy (of care/love) and models of the others as unpredictable (Collins & Read, 
1994).   
 
Ainsworth et al. (1978) operationalised Bowlby‟s (1969, 1973) theory by developing 
the Strange Situation, a laboratory procedure involving separations and reunions 
between the caregiver and the infant. Ainsworth et al. (1978) categorised three main 
attachment patterns using this method. Securely attached infants displayed some 
distress when separated from their mothers and greeted her eagerly on her return. 
Avoidant infants were minimally distressed by their mothers‟ departure and appeared 
to ignore her when she returned. Ambivalent or resistant infants became extremely 
distressed by their mother‟s departure and although they sought contact on her return, 
they had difficulty settling down and appeared to still be distressed. Main and 
Solomon (1986, 1990) later reviewed a large number of infants that appeared 
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unclassifiable and developed criteria for identifying a fourth attachment pattern, 
disorganised/disorientated. This attachment style is characterised by conflicted and 
chaotic behaviour in the Strange Situation, indicating these children do not have a 
coherently organised strategy of managing arousal in the context of attachment 
relationships (Shorey & Snyder, 2006). 
 
 
1.3.1.2 Adult attachment 
Bowlby considered attachment to be a life-long construct (Bowlby, 1977). The 1980s 
heralded a move towards understanding and measuring attachment within adult 
relationships. Hazan and Shaver (1987) were the first to apply attachment theory to 
the understanding of how early attachment histories may influence a person‟s later 
close relationships. They argued that the functions and dynamics of the attachment 
behavioural system were virtually the same across the life span. In addition, Hazan 
and Shaver (1987, 1994) argued that individual differences in adult attachment 
relationships are a reflection of the beliefs and expectations that individuals have 
formed about themselves and their close relationships on the basis of their attachment 
histories. They hypothesised that the major patterns of attachment observed by 
Ainsworth et al. (1978) corresponded to three distinct types of romantic attachment 
and developed a self-report measure that enabled measurement of adult attachment 
styles. Indeed, Hazan and Shaver (1987) found that individuals classified as insecure 
reported more negative experiences and beliefs about love, a history of shorter 
romantic relationships and less favourable descriptions of their childhood 
relationships with parents than securely attached individuals.  
 
Hazan and Shaver‟s (1987) three category model was criticised for conflating two 
theoretically distinct forms of avoidance (Fraley & Shaver, 2000). Bartholomew 
(1990) argued that two types of avoidance existed: fearful avoidance in which close 
attachment to another is desired but avoided through fear of intimacy, and dismissing 
avoidance in which a defensive sense of self-reliance and independence is maintained.  
This led Bartholomew (1990; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) to propose the four-
category model of individual differences in adult attachment (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Four-category model of adult attachment (Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994) 
 
Bartholomew (1990; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) organised patterns of adult 
attachment in terms of the intersection of models of self and other, thus each model 
defines one of four attachment styles. According to this, secure attachment is  
characterised by a positive model of self and a positive model of other. In contrast, a 
positive model of other and negative model of self characterise a preoccupied 
attachment style. This style is thought to arise from persistent experience of 
inconsistent and insensitive parenting, leading the child to explain this inconsistency 
as indicative of their unworthiness and a desire to constantly seek approval from 
others (Bartholomew, 1990; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994). Individuals with this 
attachment style may have a less certain view of themselves, and may interpret many 
situations as a threat to their sense of self (Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000).  
 
The bottom two cells of the model contain the attachment styles hypothesised to result 
from psychologically unavailable or rejecting early attachment figures. These two 
styles share a negative model of others, thus have a low expectation of others to be 
available or supportive. However, fearful individuals hold a negative self model, 
leading to dependency on others for validation of their self-worth. Due to their 
negative expectations of others, they actively avoid intimacy to avoid the pain of 
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potential loss or rejection. Dismissing individuals also avoid closeness due to their 
negative expectations of others, but defensively deny the value of close relationships 
and stress the importance of independence, thus maintaining a positive self-image 
(Bartholomew, 1990; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994). 
 
Several limitations of the categorical measurement of adult attachment have been 
highlighted in the literature. For example, the categorical approach has been criticised 
for assuming that variation between individuals within a particular category is 
unimportant or does not exist (Crowell et al., 1999; Shemmings, 2004). In a large 
study, Fraley and Waller (1998) used taxometric analyses to examine whether 
attachment data best fitted latent types or latent dimensions. They found that the data 
was more consistent with a dimensional model of attachment. In order to identify the 
optimal dimensional system, Brennan et al. (1998) conducted a large factor analytic 
study of all existing self-report measures of adult romantic attachment. They found 
that individual differences in attachment could be organised into a two dimensional 
space: attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance, and could be measured using the 
Experiences in Close Relationships (ECR). Attachment anxiety corresponded to 
anxiety and vigilance concerning rejection and abandonment by others, and avoidance 
corresponded to discomfort with closeness and dependency or a reluctance to be 
intimate with others. Empirically, these dimensions map onto the model of self and 
other respectively, as in Bartholomew‟s (1990) model (see Figure 2) (Brennan et al., 
1998).  
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Figure 2. Two dimensions of anxiety and avoidance underlying self-report measures 
of attachment (Fraley & Shaver, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
1.3.2 Attachment and its relationship to mental health 
Bowlby (1977) suggested that the development of negative internal working models 
of self or others as a result of early attachment experiences can make individuals 
vulnerable to later psychopathology. He argued that from infancy individuals have 
several developmental pathways open to them. Using the analogy of railway lines, he 
argued personality development starts at a single main route which leaves a central 
point in a particular direction, but which forks into several different directions or 
pathways (Bowlby, 1973). He argued that the particular developmental pathway an 
individual takes depends on the interaction between internal factors such as 
temperament and the external environment. Bowlby (1973, 1980) argued that a 
disruption in attachment during the years of infancy, childhood and adolescence, such 
as separation, loss or threats of abandonment leads to the development of particular 
internal working models, which directs development onto a maladaptive pathway. The 
longer a maladaptive pathway is followed, the greater the possibility for developing 
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psychopathology later on in life (Sroufe et al., 1999). Therefore a pattern of anxious 
attachment in infancy may initiate a process whereby a maladaptive pathway is taken, 
but this will only lead to later psychopathology if the external environment sustains 
and reinforces the continued development along that pathway, or in other words, the 
continued development of a negative model of self or others (Sroufe et al., 1999).  
 
1.3.2.1 Stability and continuity of internal working models 
A central issue in attachment theory and research is the degree of stability and 
continuity of internal working models from childhood to adulthood. Bowlby (1977) 
argued that internal working models remain relatively stable across the life span. Thus 
the degree of attachment security an individual experiences in their adult relationships 
is likely to be a partial reflection of their attachment experiences in early childhood 
(Fraley, 2004). However, internal working models are also dynamic in that they can 
be updated as life circumstances change (Bowlby, 1973; Marrone, 1998). Such 
change, however, is likely to be difficult in adulthood when internal working models 
have become more firmly established and only occur when the lack of fit between 
reality and the model is extreme (Bolen, 2000).  
 
Cassidy (2000) proposed a model of continuity from childhood to adulthood 
attachments (Figure 3). The model posits that representational models based on 
experiences with childhood attachment figures (path A), guides cognitive-affective 
processes (path B), which in turn guides behaviour (path C). This behaviour may 
guide the treatment received from others (path D), which, in turn, contributes and 
reinforces the original representational model (Cassidy, 2000). Longitudinal studies 
have shown between 51 and 77% correspondence between attachment classifications 
in childhood and classifications in adulthood (Waters et al., 2000; Hamilton, 2000; 
Weinfield et al., 2000).  
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Figure 3. Model of attachment continuity (Cassidy, 2000) 
 
 
1.3.2.2 Structure and organisation of internal working models 
The quality of the early caregiving relationship not only influences the content of 
internal working models, but also their organisation and structure (Harter, 1999). For 
example, Bowlby (1973) suggested that emotional disturbance may be characterised 
by the existence of multiple, incompatible internal working models. Developing this 
notion, Crittenden (1990) proposed different types of internal working model meta-
structure. One type is characterised by different relationships in an individual‟s life 
being organised into multiple, unrelated internal representations, with each being 
encoded into a different memory system. Although this type of organisational 
structure acknowledges the uniqueness of each relationship, it may also prevent the 
individual from developing a sense of coherency of the self across relationships 
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(Crittenden, 1990). For example, it was found marginally maltreated mothers had a 
variety of internal working models of different relationships but were unable to 
predict anything in general about relationships (Crittenden, 1990). Indeed, coherent 
organisation of internal working models is argued to play an important role in the 
creation of attachment security in adulthood (Main, 1991 cited in Collins and Read, 
1990; Bretherton, 1993).  
 
Reincke and Rogers (2001) argue that attachment theory can inform cognitive theories 
of psychopathology, as the assumption in attachment theory that negative working 
models of self and other develop from disturbances in early attachment relationships 
is entirely consistent with cognitive models that emphasise early experience leads to 
negative schemas of self, world and other, which in turn leads to dysfunctional beliefs 
and attitudes that cause psychological problems. It has been suggested that working 
models form the foundation for such schemas and beliefs (Gotlib & Hammen, 1992). 
In this way, attachment security is hypothesised to be associated with 
psychopathology through the mediating effect of cognition (Roberts et al., 1996). 
 
1.3.2.3 Attachment and self-concept  
Beliefs about the self in relation to others, or internal working models of self, are 
central components of a person‟s self-concept (Collins & Read, 1994). Personality and 
development are argued to be inextricably related constructs (Lopez & Brennan, 
2000). Thus it should follow that the quality of attachment experiences also influences 
the wider self-system. Indeed, Fonagy and Target (1997) argue that an ability to 
mentalise is an important determinant of self-organisation. Mentalisation evolves in 
the context of early attachment experiences, and involves the capacity to envision 
mental states in self and others, or theory of mind. This is important for the 
development of affect regulation and impulse control, abilities which are argued to be 
the „building blocks of the organisation of the self‟ (Fonagy & Target, 1997, p.680).   
 
There is some evidence to show that the structural aspects of the self-concept differ 
across adult secure-insecure attachment dimensions. In a series of studies, Mikulincer 
(1995) found that securely attached students exhibited self-concepts that were high in 
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complexity and were integrated, with low discrepancies between their own and others‟ 
self-perceptions. By contrast, anxious-ambivalent students‟ self-concepts showed low 
integration and less complexity as well as high discrepancies between own and other‟s 
perceptions of self. Those classified with an avoidant attachment style showed low 
integration and high discrepancies, but also showed high self-complexity. Mikulincer 
(1995) interpreted this finding as a reflection of the avoidant use of repression in 
which information that is not accepted as part of the self is dissociated from other 
positive self-aspects.  
 
Lopez et al. (2002) found that attachment anxiety and avoidance were associated with 
less coherent and less authentic self-structures. Furthermore, measures of self-splitting 
and self-concealment mediated the relationship between attachment anxiety and 
distress. They concluded that this provides evidence that attachment anxiety 
influences affect regulation and information processing in ways that negatively impact 
on adaptive self-organisation (Lopez et al., 2002). Similarly, Kim (2005) found that 
more secure attachment was associated with a greater degree of authentic self, which 
in turn, was associated with lower levels of self-concept fragmentation. Together these 
studies show that the way in which the self-concept is organised is influenced by a 
person‟s attachment style, and this in turn impacts on psychological functioning. 
However, the generalisability of the findings to clinical populations is limited, as all 
the studies used student samples.  
 
1.3.2.4 Evidence for the link between adult attachment and psychopathology 
Attachment style has been found to be associated with psychological distress and 
mental health problems. Research in this area can be broadly divided into studies that 
have used clinical and non-clinical samples, with most using self-report methods.  
 
1.3.2.4.1 Research with non-clinical samples 
Using the ECR (Brennan et al., 1998), research has shown that attachment anxiety is 
associated with levels of depression and anxiety, and that attachment avoidance is 
related to depression in a student sample (Picardi et al., 2005). Watt et al. (2005) 
found that students who reported a fearful or preoccupied attachment style scored 
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significantly higher on measures of anxiety sensitivity and anxiety than preoccupied 
or secure attachment styles. Muller et al. (2000) found that non-patients with a 
childhood history of abuse had higher self-reported levels of post traumatic stress 
symptoms if they were classified as having a fearful or preoccupied rather than 
dismissing attachment style. These results have been replicated in a sample of people 
at risk of experiencing critical incidents at their place of work (Declercq & 
Willemsen, 2006). Insecure attachment has also been shown to be associated with 
non-clinical psychotic phenomena such as paranoia and hallucinations (Berry et al., 
2006). 
 
1.3.2.4.2 Research with clinical samples 
Research with clinical samples has yielded similar results. In the first controlled study, 
Fonagy et al. (1996) used the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George et al., 1985, 
cited in Fonagy et al., 1996), which assesses attachment based on the discussion of 
childhood relationships with their parents, to compare the attachment pattern of 
psychiatric inpatients and individuals in a matched control group. They found that the 
psychiatric group differed significantly from the control group on mean AAI scales. 
Specifically, the psychiatric group reported less positive experiences (that is, the 
experience of loving relationships with parents), greater experience of rejecting, 
neglectful parents and lower coherence of mind. Mason et al. (2005) investigated 
attachment styles and maladaptive schemas in a clinical sample. With 81% of their 
sample classified as having an insecure attachment style, they found that the fearful 
group exhibited the greatest degree of maladaptive schemas, followed by the 
preoccupied group.  
 
1.3.2.4.3 Possible mediating variables 
Research in this area is increasingly investigating variables that may mediate the 
relationship between attachment and psychopathology. Research has found significant 
mediators to include intimacy in current romantic relationships (Pielage et al., 2005), 
problem coping styles (Lopez et al., 2001), self–splitting and self-concealment (Lopez 
et al., 2002) and affect regulation (Wei et al., 2005). Possible cognitive variables have 
also been investigated. Roberts et al. (1996) found that dysfunctional attitudes 
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partially mediated the relationship between attachment insecurity and depressive 
symptoms. The authors concluded that their data supported the view that adult 
attachment styles „appear to exert little or no direct influence on depression and 
instead operate indirectly through negative thinking about the self‟ (p.316). These 
findings have been replicated in student (Hankin et al., 2005) and clinically depressed 
samples (Reinecke & Rogers, 2001). Similarly, Williams and Riskind (2004) explored 
the way in which individuals interpreted past or future events in a sample of 291 
students. Using the ECR, they found that students with higher levels of attachment 
insecurity reported higher levels of psychological symptoms. Importantly, they found 
that the relationship between both attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance and 
symptoms of anxiety was partially mediated by the degree in which individuals 
appraised threat as rapidly increasing in risk. Similarly, the relationship between 
attachment avoidance and anxiety symptoms was partially mediated by the degree of 
pessimistic explanatory style.  
 
1.4 Vulnerability to OCD: Theoretical approaches 
1.4.1 Guidano and Liotti’s (1983) model of OCD 
Guidano and Liotti (1983) propose a model of OCD that draws on attachment and 
cognitive theories to emphasise the structural elements of the self in producing 
symptoms. Guidano and Liotti (1983) view early attachment relationships as the 
„medium‟ through which an infant‟s developing self-knowledge is constructed. They 
describe that parents act as a „mirror‟ and through their interactions provides 
information that allows children to „recognise attributes that define them as 
individuals to others and consequently to themselves‟ (Guidano & Liotti, 1983, 
p.103). Similar to Bowlby‟s (1973) internal working models concept, they argue that 
cognitive structures are hierarchically organised, and that early interactions with 
caregivers form a „nucleus‟ of tacit self-knowledge (Guidano & Liotti, 1983, p.104).  
 
Guidano (1987) argues that individuals with OCD have experienced an early home 
environment in which the parents have emphasised strong moral and ethical values as 
well as demanding excessive maturity and a sense of responsibility in the child. 
Alongside this, individuals who develop OCD may have experienced a particular kind 
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of attachment environment that produces two distinctly opposite, and equally 
plausible, interpretations of self and reality (Guidano & Liotti, 1983, 1985). For 
example, a situation in which „a parent is attentive, thoughtful, and totally dedicated to 
the child‟s moral and social education, without expressing his or her love with a caress 
or other affective display‟ (Guidano & Liotti, 1983, p.112). If prolonged, this 
experience has the effect of producing a split in the emerging self-identity. This split 
is characterised by an attitude towards reality and the self that simultaneously has 
opposite valences, termed self-ambivalence. Thus in order to have a reliable and 
coherent sense of self, Guidano (1987) argues that an obsessive-prone individual is 
forced to choose between two polarities. Either she is lovable and acceptable or 
neither is true. In this way, a constant effort for perfection and control emerges in an 
attempt to maintain that „only one of the two opposites is „true‟, or must at least 
become true…‟ (Guidano & Liotti, 1983,  p.202).  
 
Guidano and Liotti (1983) emphasise that self-knowledge is the central aspect of 
cognitive organisation, which leads to other cognitive structures such as beliefs and 
assumptions. Thus self-ambivalence is viewed as a higher-order construct which 
provides the motivation for beliefs about being perfect, and/or moral. Similar to the 
beliefs defined by the OCCWG (1997), examples include „the idea that there 
invariably is a right, precise and perfect solution to human problems‟ and the belief 
that „one should be thoroughly competent, adequate and achieving in all possible 
aspects if one is to consider oneself worthwhile‟ (Guidano & Liotti, 1983 p.203). 
According to Guidano and Liotti (1983), such beliefs serve to protect the individual 
against loss of self-esteem and further self-concept confusion and guide behaviour in 
such a way that leads to the accomplishment of perfection and control. In this way, 
self-ambivalence in OCD is theorised not to lead directly to OC symptoms, but 
enables the development of certain maladaptive beliefs, which in turn leads to 
symptoms.  
 
1.4.2 Clark’s (2004) cognitive control theory of obsessions 
In a new addition to the field, Clark (2004) proposes that vulnerability to the 
development and maintenance of obsessions occurs at three different conceptual 
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levels; at a vulnerability level, a primary appraisal level and a secondary appraisal 
level (see Figure 3). Clark (2004) argues for the presence of three personality factors 
that place individuals at risk of misinterpreting unwanted mental intrusions as 
threatening. The first is „negative affectivity‟ which constitutes a personality 
disposition that increases susceptibility to experience worry, anxiety and depression. 
The second factor involves pre-existing metacognitive beliefs concerning the 
importance of intrusive thoughts and their control. Third, Clark (2004) places an 
ambivalent and uncertain self-concept as a central vulnerability factor for OCD. 
Specifically, Clark (2004; Purdon & Clark, 1999) argues that an uncertain, ambivalent 
self-concept may lead to a propensity to misinterpret unwanted intrusive thoughts as a 
„threat to core personal values and ideals‟ (Clark, 2004, p.139). This is in line with 
Rachman (1998) who noted that intrusive thoughts that are most likely to be 
misinterpreted as significant and threatening are those which are contrary to or 
threaten the person‟s system of values.  
 
A central feature of obsessions that distinguishes them from other anxious thoughts is 
their ego-dystonic nature (Purdon & Clark, 1999). Indeed, research has shown that 
people with OCD often evaluate their most upsetting obsessions as more meaningful 
and contradicting valued aspects of the self to a greater degree than less upsetting ones 
(Rowa et al., 2005). Clark (2004) argues that the ego-dystonic nature of intrusions and 
a pre-existing uncertain and fragile self view leads to a primary appraisal of the 
unwanted intrusion as threatening. For example, if an individual‟s sense of self is 
characterised by doubt and uncertainty it is more likely that they would interpret an 
intrusion about harming a child as highly significant. This could be because the 
intrusion introduces the possibility that the individual is capable of committing such 
an act (because of beliefs about the importance of thoughts), which may also be 
contrary to the individual‟s view of themselves as a person that does not harm 
children. A person who experiences the same thought and has both a stable sense of 
themselves as not being the kind of person capable of harming children, and does not 
hold beliefs about the importance of thoughts, is most likely to discount the meaning 
of the thought and appraise it as benign (Purdon & Clark, 1999; Clark, 2004).  
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Figure 4. Clark’s (2004) cognitive control theory of obsessions 
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However, if the intrusion is misinterpreted as significant, Clark (2004) argues that this 
leads to deliberate efforts to control the thought either by dismissing it or removing it 
from conscious awareness. However, this leads to a failure to control the thoughts. A 
secondary appraisal process then occurs in which the individual evaluates the outcome 
of their control efforts, which can be adaptive or maladaptive. Clark (2004) proposes 
that implicit in the maladaptive appraisals of failed thought control are beliefs that it is 
possible and desirable to achieve complete control over unwanted intrusive thoughts.   
 
Finally, Clark (2004) argues that in OCD failed thought control leads to even greater 
efforts to control unwanted thoughts, particularly as failure in thought control is 
typically misinterpreted as indicating a sign or test, for example „if I can‟t control 
unwanted sexual intrusions, then I might lose control over my sexual behaviour 
(p.145). Together, these cognitive processes lead to greater attention to try to control 
the obsession, which Clark (2004) proposes results in greater cognitive load and 
subsequent poorer perceived control over the obsession, which ensures an increasing 
escalation in the frequency and distress associated with the obsession. Direct 
empirical evidence for the cognitive control theory of obsessions is limited (Clark, 
2004). However, some research shows indirect support for some aspects of the model. 
For example, metacognitive beliefs about the importance of controlling thoughts are 
endorsed more by people with OCD than anxious controls and are strongly associated 
with OC symptoms (OCCWG, 2001, 2003, 2005).  
 
1.4.3 Evidence for the role of attachment and self-concept in the pathogenesis of 
 OCD 
 
1.4.3.1 Attachment and OCD 
Research investigating attachment in OCD is extremely limited, and has typically 
focused on gaining an overall picture of the early attachment relationship by 
measuring recalled parental style, rather than directly measuring the degree of 
attachment security or style. Research using sub-clinical samples has yielded 
consistent results. For example, studies using students and adolescents found that they 
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rated their parental upbringing as more rejecting, overprotective and less emotionally 
warm compared with controls (Ehiobuche, 1988; Klimidis et al. 1992). Aycicegi et al. 
(2002) found that a psychologically manipulative and controlling parental style was 
associated with OCD symptoms and OC personality traits in a non-clinical student 
sample.  
 
However, studies using clinical samples have typically yielded more mixed results. 
Compared with a control group, high levels of parental overprotection were reported 
by members of OCD self-help groups (Hafner, 1988). Using the Parenting Bonding 
Index (PBI; Parker et al., 1979), a self-report measure that assesses an individual‟s 
perception of his or her parents‟ rearing practices up until the age of 16, Chambless et 
al. (1996) compared individuals with a diagnosis of OCD to those with a diagnosis of 
agoraphobia. There was no significant difference between the two groups on the PBI, 
although PBI scores were associated with global measures of distress, anxious 
personality characteristics and poor social adjustment. The authors suggested that the 
results showed that poor parental bonding constitutes a general risk factor for the 
development of anxiety disorders. In support of this, Mancini et al. (2000) found no 
significant correlation between OC symptoms in a sub-clinical sample and the 
parenting styles as measured by the PBI. Similar to Chambless et al. (1996), they 
found that low parental care was a better predictor of trait anxiety and depression than 
obsessivity. 
 
Vogel et al. (1997) found that individuals with depression reported significantly lower 
levels of parental care and higher levels of maternal overprotection than non-
psychiatric controls, whereas there was no difference between individuals diagnosed 
with OCD and controls. However, a weakness of this study was the limited number of 
individuals with OCD compared with those diagnosed with depression. Similarly, 
Turgeon et al. (2002) compared an OCD group with other anxiety disorders such as 
panic disorder with agoraphobia. No differences were found on recalled parental style, 
although both groups recalled their parents as more protective compared to controls.  
However, other studies have found a difference in parenting practices in OCD. For 
example, Alonso et al. (2004) compared OCD patients with non-psychiatric controls 
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and found that the OCD group perceived their fathers as more rejecting than controls. 
No differences were found regarding parental overprotection, although OCD patients 
with hoarding symptoms perceived their parents as being less emotionally warm than 
controls.  
 
Only one study has investigated the link between attachment and OCD directly.   
Myhr et al. (2004) measured recalled parental style and romantic attachment style in 
36 OCD patients, 16 patients diagnosed with depression or dysthymia and 26 healthy 
controls using a self-report measure. Controlling for depression, they found that the 
OCD and depressed groups exhibited higher attachment insecurity than the control 
group. Specifically, the OCD group and depressed group demonstrated more 
relationship anxiety than the control group, but did not differ from each other. In 
addition, the depressed group and unmarried OCD participants reported more 
discomfort with dependence than the control group. Interestingly, attachment 
insecurity in the OCD group was not associated with less caring or more controlling 
parenting styles compared with the control group. A limitation of this study was the 
small numbers in the depressed group. 
 
1.4.3.2 Self-concept and OCD 
It is important to note that Guidano and Liotti (1983) based their model on clinical 
observations of OCD, not empirical evidence. Similarly, Clark (2004) notes that the 
research on whether an uncertain/ambivalent self-concept is relevant to OCD is very 
limited. Doron and Kyrios (2005) highlight the structural aspect of the self-concept in 
producing vulnerability to OCD. They propose that individuals vulnerable to OCD 
hold a self-structure that comprises few domains. It is argued these domains are 
„sensitive‟ due to large discrepancies between perceived competence and the 
importance attributed to those domains. Thus the individual becomes vulnerable to 
stimuli that threatens their feelings of competence in these domains. This combined 
with beliefs concerning the world as dangerous but controllable predisposes the 
individual to experience extreme anxiety when an intrusion they experience relating to 
failure in „sensitive‟ domains of self. Consistent with this, Doron et al. (2006) found 
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that sensitivity in self-domains was related to higher levels of OC-related beliefs and 
higher levels of OC symptoms in a student sample.  
 
Only one study has directly tested whether Guidano and Liotti‟s (1983) concept of 
self-ambivalence is relevant to OCD in a clinical sample. Bhar (2004) developed a 
measure of self-ambivalence and found that compared with non-psychiatric controls, 
individuals diagnosed with OCD scored significantly higher on self-ambivalence, 
after controlling for self-esteem and mood variables. However, this difference was not 
observed between the OCD group and an anxious control group. A strong relationship 
was also found between self-ambivalence and depression. Furthermore, self-
ambivalence was associated with OC-related belief domains, measured in this study 
by the short version of the OBQ, the OBQ-44 (OCCWG, 2003). In support of 
Guidano and Liotti‟s (1983) theory, a regression analysis found that the relationship 
between the self-ambivalence and OC symptoms was mediated by the OBQ-44 
subscales, although no individual subscale completely explained this relationship. As 
self-concept certainty is also found to be important in social phobia (Wilson & Rapee, 
2006), these results suggest that it is the particular kinds of beliefs that an individual 
develops that determines whether an individual experiences social phobia or OCD. 
Thus an uncertain and ambivalent self-concept may represent a general predisposing 
factor rather than a specific vulnerability for OCD (Bhar, 2004). 
 
1.5 The current study 
The current study aims to draw together self-concept theory, attachment theory and 
cognitive theories of OCD to contribute to the understanding of vulnerability to OCD.   
 
1.5.1  Justification for the study 
Conducting a study that investigates attachment and self-concept clarity in OCD is 
important for two reasons. First, research shows that attachment insecurity is 
associated with various forms of psychopathology (Platts et al., 2002). However, only 
one study has investigated attachment in OCD, which suggests that a further study 
would be helpful (Myhr et al., 2004). Second, organisation of the self-concept has 
been shown to be linked with the degree of attachment security. Specifically, greater 
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integration or unity in the structure of the self-concept is associated with higher levels 
of attachment security, which in turn is associated with better psychological 
functioning (Lopez et al., 2002; Kim, 2005). Self-concept clarity is one type of self-
concept structure that emphasises integration, however no research has explored the 
relationship between self-concept clarity and attachment in OCD. Therefore, the 
current study will investigate whether a greater degree of attachment insecurity will be 
associated with less self-concept clarity.  
 
One study has found self-concept clarity to be important in social phobia (Wilson & 
Rapee, 2006), suggesting that this may be a feature of other anxiety disorders. Indeed, 
vulnerability to OCD is theorised to take the form of a dichotomous and confusing 
attachment experience early in life, resulting in an ambivalent and uncertain self-
concept (Guidano & Liotti, 1983; 1985; Guidano, 1987). One study has explored the 
role of self-ambivalence in OCD (Bhar, 2004). However, no research exists that 
investigates self-concept clarity in OCD, a broader construct than ambivalence. 
Therefore the current study will investigate whether individuals who report OC 
symptoms have self-concepts that are characterised by a lack of clarity, compared 
with a group of individuals who do not report mental health problems. 
 
An ambivalent and uncertain self-concept is theorised to lead to misinterpretations of 
intrusive thoughts, which, combined with dysfunctional beliefs about the importance 
of controlling thoughts, is argued to lead to the development of OC symptoms (Clark, 
2004). However, there is currently very limited research that tests these theoretical 
assumptions. Therefore the study will investigate whether people who report OC 
symptoms exhibit higher levels of OC-related beliefs, and whether these beliefs are 
associated with higher levels of self-concept uncertainty.  
 
Cognitive vulnerabilities such as dysfunctional beliefs have been shown to mediate 
the relationship between attachment and psychopathology (Roberts et al., 1996). 
Indeed, Guidano and Liotti (1983) propose that such dysfunctional beliefs mediate the 
relationship between insecure attachment and OCD. However, no research has 
investigated possible mediators of this relationship in OCD. Therefore the current 
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study will explore whether dysfunctional OC-related beliefs mediate the relationship 
between attachment security and OC symptoms. Furthermore, based on previous 
research (Bhar, 2004), it would be expected that dysfunctional OC-related beliefs will 
also mediate the relationship between self-concept clarity and OC symptoms.  
 
1.5.2 Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses can be formulated on the basis of the theories and previous 
research discussed above: 
 
 
1) Individuals who report OC symptoms will have higher levels of OC-related 
beliefs  compared with individuals who do not report mental health difficulties.  
 
2) Individuals who report OC symptoms will have a greater degree of attachment 
insecurity in comparison to individuals who do not report mental health 
difficulties.  
 
3) Individuals who report OC symptoms will exhibit less self-concept clarity in 
comparison to individuals who do not report mental health difficulties.  
 
4) A greater degree of attachment insecurity will be associated with less self-concept 
clarity in individuals who report OC symptoms and in individuals who do not 
report mental health difficulties.  
 
5) A greater degree of OC-related beliefs and symptoms will be associated with less 
self-concept clarity in individuals who report OC symptoms and also in 
individuals who do not report mental health difficulties.  
 
6) OC-related beliefs will mediate the relationship between attachment security and 
degree of OC symptoms in individuals who report OC symptoms. 
 
                                                          
* Beliefs relating to responsibility/threat estimation, perfectionism/certainty and importance/control of thoughts 
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7) OC-related beliefs will mediate the relationship between self-concept clarity and 
degree of OC symptoms in individuals who report OC symptoms. 
 
 
 
2. METHOD 
 
2.1 Design 
The study has adopted a cross-sectional, between groups design. This type of design 
was chosen to allow for the comparison of individuals who reported experiencing OC 
symptoms and individuals who reported no mental health difficulties. The 
independent variable was OC symptoms. The dependent variables were attachment 
security, self-concept clarity, and OC-related beliefs. 
 
2.2 Participants 
The OCD group was recruited through psychological services and community mental 
health teams within three National Health Service (NHS) Trusts within South-East 
England and through charitable organisations within the voluntary sector throughout 
England. The comparison group was recruited through community organisations 
within South East England. 
 
2.2.1 Sample size 
To ensure adequate statistical power to detect any significant differences between the 
groups, a power analysis was carried out. A medium effect size was selected (d = .50). 
The power tables developed by Cohen (1992) indicated that 64 participants in each 
group were needed in order to detect a medium effect size with a significance level of 
.05, and a power value of at least .80, using t tests. Marczyk et al. (2005) recommends 
calculating the statistical power of each planned analyses. Correlational analyses were 
planned, thus 85 participants were needed in each group to detect a medium effect 
with a power value of .80 (Cohen, 1992). Multiple regression was also planned, thus 
84 participants were needed detect a medium effect with a power value of .80 (Cohen, 
1992). It was anticipated that limited resources and time pressures may result in 
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difficulties recruiting 85 participants to each group, thus calculations were also made 
for detecting a large effect size (d = .80). To detect a large effect size 26, 28 and 38 
participants were needed in each group for t tests, correlation and multiple regression 
analyses respectively. Therefore, it was determined that each group should contain at 
least 26 participants, with the aim of achieving a total of 85 participants in each group. 
 
2.2.2 Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
2.2.2.1 OCD group 
To be included in the study, participants were required to be between 18 and 65 years 
of age inclusive. It was originally intended that the entire OCD group would be 
recruited from the NHS. However, discussions with NHS clinicians revealed that 
some difficulty would have been encountered in obtaining appropriate numbers of 
participants. It was therefore decided that recruitment would also take place within 
charitable organisations. Recruitment of the non-NHS group commenced first as 
ethical approval for this type of recruitment was gained prior to ethical approval for 
NHS recruitment. 
 
All participants in the OCD group were included if they scored within the clinical 
range on the total score of the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory–Revised (OCI-R; Foa 
et al., 2002). Participants who were recruited through the NHS were included if they 
had a principal diagnosis of OCD from a psychiatrist. NHS-recruited participants were 
excluded if they were deemed by their mental health professional to have a diagnosis 
of learning disability, psychosis or experience current substance misuse. Three 
participants recruited from non-NHS organisations were excluded as their scores on 
the OCI-R were below the cut off score.  
 
2.2.2.2 Comparison  group 
Comparison group participants were included if they were 18 to 65 years of age 
inclusive. Individuals were included if they reported that they had not previously 
experienced or ever been treated for a mental health problem. Individuals were 
excluded if they were within the clinical range of the Symptom Checklist–90-Revised 
(SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994). Individuals who scored within the clinical range of the 
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total score of the OCI-R or who scored within the moderate or severe range of the 
Beck Depression Inventory-Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck et al., 1996) were excluded. 
In total 14 participants were excluded from the study; seven due to scores being 
within the clinical range on the SCL-90-R, two due to scores being within the clinical 
range on the OCI-R, one due to a moderate BDI-II score, three participants reported 
previous mental health problems, and one participant was above the age cut off.  
 
2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 The Self Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS; Appendix 2) 
The SCCS (Campbell et al., 1996) is a 12 item self-report measure that was chosen as 
it allowed the assessment of self-concept clarity, a structural aspect of the self-
concept. Specifically, the SCCS measures the extent to which self-beliefs are clearly 
and confidently defined, internally consistent and stable. Respondents are required to 
rate their degree of agreement with twelve statements. Examples of items include „my 
beliefs about myself often conflict with one another‟ and „sometimes I think I know 
other people better than I know myself‟. Ratings are given on a five point Likert scale 
ranging from „strongly disagree‟ to „strongly agree‟. Items are summed, following 
appropriate reversals as indicated by Campbell et al. (1996), to form a total score 
reflecting degree of clarity.  The total score ranges from 12 (low clarity) to 60 (high 
clarity). 
 
Campbell et al. (1996) reported good internal consistency for the scale, yielding an 
alpha coefficient of .86. Similarly, high levels of test re-test reliability were reported 
across two samples with four and five month intervals (correlations of .79 and .70 
respectively). In terms of the scale‟s validity, a correlation of .61 was found with 
measures of self-esteem, providing evidence of construct validity. A factor analysis 
found strong evidence of a single, general factor, as expected. SCCS scores were 
found to reliably predict the temporal stability and internal consistency of participants‟ 
self-descriptions, demonstrating the scale‟s criterion validity. The internal consistency 
of the SCCS was tested in the current study using Cronbach‟s alpha. The alpha value 
was found to be .92, showing a good level of internal consistency. 
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2.3.2 The Experiences in Close Relationships – Revised (ECR-R; Appendix 3) 
The ECR-R (Fraley et al., 2000) is a self-report questionnaire that measures adult 
romantic attachment. The ECR-R is a revised version of the original measure, the 
ECR (Brennan et al., 1998). The items of the ECR-R were taken from the same item 
pool as those from the ECR, using item response theory analysis (Fraley et al., 2000). 
The ECR-R was chosen for this study because it is based on a reanalysis of a 323 item 
dataset of all other self-report attachment measures, and is thus argued to provide the 
most appropriate measure of adult romantic attachment (Sibley et al., 2005) 
 
The ECR-R contains 36 items, with two 18-item subscales corresponding to 
attachment related anxiety and avoidance. Respondents are required to indicate how 
they generally experience relationships, and to rate the degree to which they agree or 
disagree with the item statements. Examples of items include „I‟m afraid I will lose 
my partner‟s love‟, for the anxiety subscale, and „I prefer not to be too close to 
romantic partners‟ for the avoidance subscale. Ratings are given on a seven point 
Likert scale ranging from „disagree strongly‟ to „agree strongly‟. The scores for each 
subscale are averaged to provide an attachment related anxiety and avoidance score. 
 
Sibley and Liu (2004) examined the ECR-R‟s internal reliability, factor structure and 
short-term temporal stability. A principal components exploratory factor analysis 
found that the anxiety and avoidance subscales of the ECR-R comprised distinctive 
dimensions with high internal reliabilities (  = 0.95;  = 0.93, respectively). The 
anxiety and avoidance subscales were found to be stable over a six-week period. In a 
further study, Sibley et al. (2005) found that the ECR-R accurately fitted the 
hypothesised two-factor solution representing anxiety and avoidance. Fairchild and 
Finney (2006) also found evidence to generally support a two-factor model and 
reported good internal consistency with both scales yielding alpha coefficients of 
above .90. Cronbach‟s alpha for the current study was comparable to those found in 
previous studies (  = .95 for the avoidance subscale and  = .97 for the anxiety 
subscale). 
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2.3.3 The Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Appendix 4) 
The OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002) is a self-report inventory that is designed to measure the 
symptoms of OCD according to DSM-IV (APA, 1994). The OCI-R is a revised 
version of the 42-item Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (Foa et al., 1998). The OCI-R 
was chosen for this study as it is a diagnostic screening tool, and therefore allowed for 
the identification of participants with OCD using empirically derived cut off scores, 
and can be used with clinical and non-clinical populations. It has the advantage of 
being a brief measure with only 18 items. The OCI-R requires respondents to rate how 
much each item has distressed or bothered them in the last month. Items consist of 
statements regarding various symptoms, for example, „I collect things I don‟t need‟. 
Ratings are given on a five-point Likert scale ranging from „not at all‟ to „extremely‟. 
The scores for individual items are summed to provide a total score and scores on six 
subscales corresponding to washing, checking, ordering, hoarding, neutralising and 
obsessing symptom categories. A total score of 21 or above indicates clinically 
significant symptoms (Foa et al., 2002). 
 
Using a sample of 118 patients with OCD, 146 patients with other anxiety disorders 
and 74 non-anxious individuals, Foa et al. (2002) investigated the reliability and 
validity of the OCI-R. They reported good internal consistency for the total score 
across samples, with alpha coefficients of .81 for the OCD group, .93 for social 
phobia .91 for PTSD group and .89 for the controls. Test-retest reliability was found 
to be good, with significant correlations for the total and subscale scores within the 
OCD group (correlations ranging from .74 to .91) and the control group (ranging from 
.57 to .87). Convergent validity was demonstrated through significant positive 
correlations with other OCD measures for the total score. However, high correlations 
were found between the OCI-R and measures of depression, indicating weaker 
discriminant validity. The authors concluded this finding perhaps reflected high levels 
of depression observed in many people with OCD (Foa et al., 2002). A further study 
using a non-clinical sample found evidence for high internal consistency, adequate 
test re-test reliability and excellent convergent validity (Hajcack et al., 2004).  
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A limitation of the Foa et al. (2002) study is that the results may have been due to 
order or context effects as the data were not collected by administering the OCI-R. 
Instead, the 18 items were extracted from responses to the earlier, 42 item measure. 
To address this, Abramowitz and Deacon (2006) administered the OCI-R to 322 
patients with an anxiety disorder, 167 of which were diagnosed with OCD. They 
found evidence for good convergent and discriminant validity of the measure but 
weak divergent validity, as mild to moderate correlations were observed between four 
of the subscales and measures of depression and trait anxiety. Finally, a recent study 
investigated the OCI-R‟s discriminant validity by comparing scores between an OCD 
group and a group of people diagnosed with generalised anxiety disorder. They found 
that individuals diagnosed with GAD had substantially lower OCI-R total and 
subscale scores than the total OCD sample (Huppert et al., 2007). The internal 
consistency of the OCI-R was assessed in the current study. Cronbach‟s alpha values 
were .95 for the total score, .89 for the washing subscale, .83 for the hoarding 
subscale, .95 for the ordering subscale, .94 for the checking subscale, .91 for the 
neutralising subscale and .94 for the obsessing subscale. 
 
2.3.4 The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire – Short Version (OBQ-44; Appendix 5) 
The OBQ-44 is a self-report measure that assesses enduring, predisposing beliefs that 
may increase risk for OCD (OCCWG, 2003). The OBQ-44 is a shortened version of 
the 87-item version of the OBQ (OCCWG, 2001). The OBQ-44 was chosen for this 
study as it allows measurement of all the belief domains thought to be important in 
OCD. The OCCWG (1997) defined these beliefs domains below: 
 
Overestimation of threat – beliefs reflecting an exaggeration of the probability or 
severity of harm. 
 
Inflated responsibility - the belief that one has the power to bring about or prevent 
subjectively crucial negative outcomes. 
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Perfectionism - the belief that there is a perfect solution to every problem, and that 
doing something perfectly/mistake free is not only possible, but also necessary, and 
that even minor mistakes will have serious consequences. 
 
Intolerance of uncertainty - the belief that one has a poor capacity to cope with 
unpredictable change, that it is difficult to function adequately in ambiguous situations 
and that it is necessary to be certain. 
 
Importance of controlling one’s thoughts - defined as the overvaluation of the 
importance of exerting complete control over intrusive thoughts, images, and 
impulses, and the belief that this is both possible and desirable. 
 
Over-importance of thoughts - the belief that the mere presence of a thought indicates 
it is important. 
 
The OBQ-44 requires respondents to rate their general level of agreement with each 
item. Items consist of statements that reflect the different belief domains. Ratings are 
given on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from „disagree very much‟ to „agree very 
much‟.  Ratings are summed to give scores for each belief domain, or subscale, and a 
total score. A factor analysis of the 87-item version of the OBQ identified three 
factors, and the scale was shortened to 44 items based on item loadings across clinical 
and non-clinical groups (OCCWG, 2005). The OBQ-44 thus comprises three 
subscales. Sixteen items within the inflated responsibility and overestimation of threat 
(RT) subscale, 12 items comprising the importance and control of thoughts (ICT) 
subscale and 16 items comprising the perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty 
subscale (PC). 
 
The OBQ-44 has been shown to have good internal consistency, with high Cronbach 
alpha coefficients, ranging from .89 to .95 for the subscales and the total score  
(OCCWG, 2005). In the same study, the OBQ-44 was found to reliably distinguish 
OC patients from non-clinical controls, however the difference in scores was not 
significant for the PC subscale. Finally, there is evidence of good convergent validity, 
 176 
as the total score correlated significantly with measures of OC symptoms within the 
OCD group, and some evidence of discriminant validity evidenced by a regression 
analyses revealing the OBQ-44 generally predicted OC symptoms in patterns that 
would be expected clinically (OCCWG, 2005). The OBQ-44 showed a good level of 
internal consistency in the current study, with Cronbach alpha‟s of .98 for the total 
score, .97 for the RT subscale, .94 for the ICT subscale and .96 for the PC subscale. 
 
2.3.5 The Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition (BDI-II; Appendix 6) 
The BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) is a self-report measure that assesses current levels of 
mood and various thoughts and behaviours associated with depression. The BDI-II 
was chosen to allow for a relatively quick and reliable assessment of depressive 
symptoms. The BDI-II contains 21 items and respondents are required to indicate their 
response using a four point scale ranging from zero to three. Scores for each item are 
summed to give an overall score for depression. A higher score indicates the presence 
of higher levels of depressive symptomatology. 
 
Beck et al. (1996) found the BDI-II to have high internal consistency, with alpha 
coefficients of .93 for students and .92 for outpatients. The BDI-II was found to have 
good criterion validity, discriminating people with a diagnosis of depression, patients 
with other diagnoses and a non-clinical group, and good convergent validity (Beck et 
al., 1996). Comparable results were shown in a college student sample (Osman et al., 
1997).  
 
2.3.6 The Symptom Checklist-90-Revised (SCL-90-R; Appendix 7) 
The SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994) is a self-report questionnaire designed to assess 
various psychological symptom patterns. The SCL-90-R was chosen as it allows the 
assessment of an individual‟s clinical status, in terms of whether their scores reflect 
„caseness‟, or psychiatric disorder. Respondents are required to rate how much each 
item has distressed or bothered them in the last week. Ratings are given on a five point 
Likert scale ranging from „not at all‟ to „extremely‟. Scores for individual items 
represent nine primary symptom dimensions. These are: somatisation, obsessive- 
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compulsive, interpersonal sensitivity, depression, anxiety, hostility, phobic anxiety, 
paranoid ideation and psychotism. In addition, three global indices can be obtained 
from the scores and reflect the overall level of symptomatology and psychological 
distress. The global indices are the global severity index (GSI), positive symptom 
distress index (PSDI) and positive symptom total (PST). Respondents are considered 
to be within the clinical range if they receive a GSI score greater than or equal to 63, 
or if any two primary dimension scores are greater than or equal to a T score of 63 
(Derogatis, 1994). 
 
The SCL-90-R demonstrates good internal consistency, with alpha coefficients  
between .82 and .90 across the nine symptoms dimensions and coefficients of between 
.68 and .90 for test re-test reliability during a two week period (Derogatis, 1994). In 
addition, the SCL-90-R also demonstrates good convergent and discriminant validity 
(for a review see Derogatis, 1994). 
 
2.3.7 Demographic questionnaire (Appendix 8) 
Information regarding participants‟ age, sex, ethnic group, marital status, 
qualifications, employment status and socio-economic status was collected. Questions 
regarding socio-economic status were derived from the National Statistics Socio-
economic Classification (Office for National Statistics; ONS, 2002). Questions about 
each respondent‟s qualifications, ethnic group and marital status were based on the 
Office for National Statistics‟ census questions (ONS, 2001). For OCD group 
participants, within the demographic section of the questionnaire further information 
was obtained regarding whether participants were receiving treatment for their 
symptoms, type of treatment, and whether there was a familial history of OCD. 
 
2.3.8 Screening questionnaire (Appendix 9) 
The use of an interview schedule such as the Structured Clinical Interview for Axis I 
DSM-IV Disorders (First et al., 1994) was considered for this study to allow the 
identification of psychiatric disorders, including OCD. However, typically interview 
schedules of this kind take 90 minutes or more to administer. As at least 52 
participants were needed, this was not considered to be feasible given the time and 
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resource limitations of the study. Given that participants were to be recruited from 
outside the NHS, and thus a diagnosis of OCD could not be reliably determined, the 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) criteria were used to form a screening measure, as an adjunct to 
the clinical cut off score on the OCI-R.  
 
2.4 Procedure 
2.4.1 Recruitment 
2.4.1.1  NHS OCD group recruitment 
Participants with a diagnosis of OCD were recruited through psychology services and 
community mental health teams across three large NHS Trusts within the South-East. 
Initially clinical psychologists, consultant psychiatrists and team managers were 
approached to explore whether it would be possible to present the research and need 
for participants at a team meeting. The research was then presented at community 
team meetings and at psychology department meetings. The presentation outlined the 
rationale of the study and what was required of clinicians, if they agreed to support the 
research. Each clinician was given an information sheet that described the rationale 
and procedure of the research and a list of the exclusion and inclusion criteria 
(Appendix 10).  
 
Clinicians were asked to identify suitable individuals on their current and most recent 
caseloads. Once identified, clinicians were asked to introduce the study to potential 
participants and give an information sheet to interested individuals (Appendix 11). To 
minimise imposition on clinicians, they were given information packs that included a 
stamped addressed envelope, contact details sheet (Appendix 12) and consent form 
(Appendix 13) to give to potential participants. Interested individuals could then 
return their contact details and consent form to the chief investigator. Alternatively, in 
agreement with the individual, clinicians could pass the person‟s contact details onto 
the chief investigator. In all cases participants were given an information sheet for at 
least twenty-four hours, to consider whether or not they wanted to take part and a 
choice of completing the questionnaire alone at home, or with the support of the chief 
investigator.  
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2.4.1.2 Non-NHS OCD group recruitment 
Recruitment of the non-NHS OCD group took place through OCD and anxiety-related 
charitable organisations. It was felt that this form of recruitment should take place in 
addition to recruiting through the NHS to ensure that adequate numbers of participants 
were reached. Through these organisations, community support groups were identified 
and approached. For groups that operated outside South East England, information 
packs were sent to group organisers to distribute to interested individuals. For support 
groups operating within South East England, the chief investigator presented the 
research at support group meetings (5 in total). At these meetings the purpose and 
format of the research was presented, and information packs given to interested 
individuals. In addition, adverts were placed on the organisations‟ websites which 
asked interested individuals to contact the chief investigator directly (Appendix 14).  
 
2.4.1.3 Comparison group recruitment 
The comparison group were recruited by advertising within community organisations 
such as libraries and community centres (Appendix 15). Community groups such as 
reading and sports groups were approached. Some groups declined to allow 
recruitment for the study, others were agreeable to the chief investigator briefly 
presenting the study at group meetings. Interested participants were invited to take a 
questionnaire pack, which included the questionnaire, participant information sheet 
and consent form. In addition, the study was advertised on various community 
websites in which interested participants were invited to contact the chief investigator. 
All participants in the comparison group completed the questionnaire unaided and 
posted it back to the chief investigator in a stamped addressed envelope. 
 
2.4.2 Contact with the chief investigator 
If the details of potential participants had been passed onto the chief investigator, the 
chief investigator then contacted the individual by sending out an information pack. If 
a potential participant had sent their contact details through the post, and had indicated 
that they wanted the questionnaire sent to them, the questionnaire was sent. If they 
indicated they would like to meet with the chief investigator, the chief investigator 
then contacted the person and made arrangements to meet with them. On meeting 
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potential participants, the study was further explained and any questions were 
answered. It was highlighted that the research was entirely voluntary and that 
participants could withdraw at any time without giving a reason. The level of support 
required in completing the questionnaire was chosen by the participant. No 
participants recruited from the NHS opted to meet with the chief investigator. The 
chief investigator met with a total of four participants recruited via OCD and anxiety 
related charitable organisations to fill out the questionnaire. All opted for the chief 
investigator to read out the questions and fill in the questionnaire. 
 
2.5 Ethical issues 
The project was reviewed by the University of Hertfordshire‟s School of Psychology 
Ethics Committee prior to commencement of the research, to allow early recruitment 
of the comparison group and the non-NHS OCD group (see Appendix 16 for the 
approval letter). Shortly following this, an application was made to a Local Research 
Ethics Committee and the study was approved for recruitment of participants from 
within three NHS Trusts within the geographical area (see Appendix 17 for the 
approval letter). Approval was also obtained from each of the Trust‟s Research and 
Development departments (see Appendix 18 for relevant correspondence). 
 
The main ethical issues pertaining to the study included confidentiality of data, 
obligation to participate and potential distress resulting from taking part. The 
confidentiality issue was managed by informing all participants that all information 
gathered through the study would remain confidential. Only the chief investigator had 
access to information that would identify participants, and participants were informed 
that the chief investigator was bound by patient confidentiality limits as defined by the 
British Psychological Society (2000). All questionnaires were anonymised and 
numerically coded and locked in a secure location separate from any documents that 
may have identified participants, such as consent forms and contact detail sheets. All 
computerised data files were password protected and had no identifying information. 
To minimise any obligation participants may have felt to participate, particularly if 
recruited through clinicians within NHS services, the participant information sheet 
and consent forms clearly highlighted that individuals did not have to take part in the 
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study, that they could withdraw at any time without giving a reason and that their 
decision to take part would in no way affect their future healthcare. 
 
The nature of the study was such that the questionnaire asked about personal feelings 
and experiences as well as thoughts and beliefs specific to OCD sufferers. Because of 
this, there was potential for participants to experience distress as a result of taking 
part. The chief investigator sought to reduce the likelihood of this by making it clear 
that all participants could contact her for further advice and support in the event that 
they experienced distress. The chief investigator‟s contact details were therefore 
placed on the front sheet of the questionnaire and on the participant information sheet. 
In addition, each participant received an information leaflet containing contact details 
of local and national mental health services and charitable organisations (Appendix 
19).  
 
It was planned that in the event that a participant reported experiencing distress as a 
result of taking part, they would be advised by the chief investigator in the first 
instance to contact their local general practitioner (GP). If the participant was 
currently involved in mental health services, they would be advised to contact their 
mental health professional. In addition, information for the participant‟s GP was 
included in the questionnaire pack so that in the event that the participant did 
experience distress as a result of taking part, and visited their GP, the GP would have 
information on the study and what it had entailed (Appendix 20). However, no 
participant reported experiencing distress as a result of filling out the questionnaire. 
Finally, all participants were asked whether they wanted to receive a summary of the 
results, and all participants were sent a debriefing sheet (Appendix 21) with a copy of 
their signed consent form. 
 
 
 
3. RESULTS 
SPSS for Windows was used to analyse the data (SPSS, 2003). First, inclusion into the 
OCD group and the aggregation of the OCD group is discussed. Second, the results of 
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the exploratory data analysis are presented with relevant descriptive statistics, 
including the demographic features of the two groups. Following this, the analyses 
examining group differences are presented and the associated hypotheses discussed. 
The relationships between attachment, self-concept clarity, OC-related beliefs and OC 
symptoms are then presented. Finally, the plausibility of OC-related beliefs as a 
mediating variable is examined. In interpreting the following results, the guidelines 
suggested by Cohen (1988, cited in Sheskin, 2000) were followed with regard to the 
strength of correlations. Specifically, a small effect size is considered not more than 
0.3; a medium effect size is considered not more than 0.5 and a large effect size is 
considered greater than 0.5. 
 
3.1 Inclusion into the OCD group 
It was observed that half the NHS-recruited participants (N = 5), who had a confirmed 
psychiatric diagnosis of OCD, did not fulfil the DSM-IV (APA, 1994) criteria on the 
screening measure for a diagnosis of OCD. As this indicated problems with the 
validity of the screening measure, it was not used to include participants into the OCD 
group. The OCI-R clinical cut off score alone, therefore, was used to include 
participants into the OCD group.  
 
3.2 OCD group aggregation 
As individuals experiencing OCD were recruited from different sources (NHS, N = 
10; non-NHS organisations, N = 34) the data were inspected to identify any  
differences between them demographically (Appendix 22) and on the dependent 
variables. The two groups were similar for age, age of onset, gender, marital status, 
family history of OCD, socio-economic status. As expected, the NHS-recruited group 
contained more individuals who were receiving treatment than the non-NHS recruited 
group (90% and 44.1% respectively). Table 1 shows the levels of depression, OC-
related beliefs and OC symptoms for the NHS and non-NHS recruited groups. 
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Table 1.  Levels of depression, OC-related beliefs and OC symptoms for the NHS-
recruited OCD and non-NHS recruited OCD group 
 
Variable 
NHS-recruited OCD 
group (N = 10) 
Mean (SD) 
Non-NHS recruited OCD 
group (N = 34) 
Mean (SD) 
Total BDI-II score 23.50 (14.01) 28.00 (13.28) 
Total OBQ-44 score 194.00 (61.46) 207.18 (57.62) 
Total OCI-R score 39.20 (14.62) 39.06 (11.48) 
 
 
Although due to the low numbers in the groups t tests could not be performed (Cohen, 
1992), as can be seen from Table 1, there did not appear to be large differences 
between the two groups in terms of levels of depression, OC symptoms and OC-
related beliefs. Therefore the groups were aggregated.  
 
3.3  Exploratory data analysis and descriptive statistics 
Exploratory data analysis was performed in order to examine any distribution 
anomalies and ascertain the appropriate statistical procedures to perform, as 
recommended by Coakes (2005). A total of four missing values were identified in the 
data set, three within the OBQ-44 and one within the SCCS. As recommended by 
Marczyk et al. (2005) these values were replaced with the item group mean. 
 
3.3.1 Descriptive statistics for the comparison and OCD groups 
A total of 78 participants took part in the study: 34 in the comparison group and 44 in 
the OCD group. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the two groups. As this 
table shows, most of the variables exhibited normal distributions with no significant  
skewness or kurtosis. Levines tests indicated that the variances of the two groups were 
unequal thus violating the homogeneity of variance assumption of the independent 
samples t test. However, the t test is argued be robust even when one or more of its 
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assumptions is violated (Sheskin, 2000). Welkowitz et al. (2000) recommend only 
using non-parametric tests when these statistical assumptions are violated and the two 
sample sizes are significantly unequal, for example, the larger sample size is more 
than 1.5 times greater than the smaller sample. This was not the case for this study, 
therefore t tests were used to test for a mean difference between the two groups for 
hypotheses one to three. These analyses are reported with equal variances not 
assumed. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for the comparison (N = 34) and OCD groups (N = 44)
 Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Comparison Group  
Attachment anxiety 
Attachment avoidance 
SCCS total score 
OCI-R total score 
OBQ-44 total score 
OBQ-44 RT subscale 
OBQ-44 ICT subscale 
OBQ-44 PC subscale 
BDI-II total score 
 
2.09 
2.23 
46.29 
5.38 
100.00 
36.97 
20.47 
42.56 
3.76 
 
0.76 
0.80 
7.55 
4.05 
24.16 
11.01 
8.22 
13.92 
3.37 
 
2.03 
2.31 
47.00 
5.00 
104.00 
34.00 
18.50 
43.50 
3.00 
 
1.00 
1.00 
32 
0 
61 
21 
12 
16 
0 
 
4.22 
3.89 
60 
13 
164 
68 
43 
71 
11 
 
0.76 
0.15 
-0.27 
0.30 
0.35 
1.02 
1.26 
-0.02 
0.59 
 
0.66 
-0.69 
-0.69 
-0.95 
0.31 
0.90 
1.03 
-0.88 
-0.94 
OCD Group 
Attachment anxiety 
Attachment avoidance 
SCCS total score 
OCI-R total score 
OBQ-44 total score 
OBQ-44 RT subscale 
OBQ-44 ICT subscale 
OBQ-44 PC subscale 
BDI-II total score 
 
4.09 
3.57 
32.52 
39.09 
204.18 
79.00 
44.32 
80.86 
26.98 
 
1.61 
1.29 
10.22 
12.08 
57.98 
25.14 
19.64 
23.06 
13.42 
 
4.39 
3.67 
33.50 
36.00 
220.00 
86.00 
48.50 
89.00 
24.00 
 
1.00 
1.11 
14 
21 
86 
20 
12 
32 
0 
 
6.61 
5.89 
55 
71 
280 
111 
83 
111 
51 
 
-0.31 
-0.54 
0.08 
0.60 
-0.50 
-0.78 
-0.03 
-0.64 
0.14 
 
-1.11 
-1.06 
-0.62 
-0.17 
-1.01 
-0.46 
-1.18 
-0.90 
-0.86 
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Two univariate outliers were identified by examining the boxplots for each dependent 
variable (Figures 5 to 9). The recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) were 
followed with regards to these outliers. Specifically, the scores were converted into 
standardised scores and were excluded from the analysis if they exceed 3.29. Using 
this method, no scores were identified as significant outliers. As recommended by 
Tabachnick & Fidell (2001), Mahalanobis distance method was conducted to check 
for multivariate outliers. Using this method, no outliers were detected in the data set 
( 2 (9) = 27.88, p <.01). 
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Figure 5. Boxplot showing attachment anxiety for the comparison and control groups 
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Figure 6. Boxplot showing attachment avoidance for the comparison and control 
groups 
Comparison OCD
Group
10
20
30
40
50
60
S
C
C
S
 t
o
ta
l 
s
c
o
re
 
Figure 7. Boxplot showing the total self-concept clarity score for the comparison and 
control groups 
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Figure 8. Boxplot showing the total OCI-R score for the comparison and control 
groups 
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Figure 9. Boxplot showing the total OBQ-44 score for the comparison and control 
groups  
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3.3.2 Demographic features of the comparison and OCD groups 
The demographic features of the two groups were examined and are presented in 
Table 3. The mean age for the comparison group was 39.4 (SD = 12.78) and for the 
OCD group was 37.8 (SD = 12.26). A t test found no group differences for age (t (73) 
= 0.54, p = 0.59).  
 
 
Table 3. Demographic features of the comparison and OCD groups 
 
Demographic 
Variable 
 
Comparison  
group 
N = 34 
OCD  
group 
N = 44 
N (%) N (%) 
Gender                                                       Male 
                                                                Female 
9 (26.5) 
25 (73.5) 
14 (31.8) 
30 (68.2) 
Ethnicity                                      White British 
                                                          White Irish 
                                                         White other 
                                              Mixed white asian 
                                                        Mixed other 
                                                        Asian other 
30 (88.2) 
- 
3 (8.8) 
1 (2.9) 
- 
- 
37 (84.1) 
1 (2.3) 
3 (6.8) 
- 
1 (2.3) 
1 (2.3) 
Marital status                                         Single 
                                                              Married 
                                                         Re-married 
                                                            Separated 
                                                             Divorced 
10 (29.4) 
17 (50.0) 
1 (2.9) 
3 (8.8) 
3 (8.8) 
24 (54.5) 
13 (29.5) 
2 (4.5) 
1 (2.3) 
4 (9.1) 
Qualifications                                          None 
                                                                GCSEs 
                                                              A levels 
                                                         First degree 
                                                     Higher degree 
                                                                  Other 
1 (2.9) 
3 (8.8) 
2 (5.9) 
13 (38.2) 
13 (38.2) 
2 (5.9) 
2 (4.5) 
8 (18.2) 
9 (20.5) 
5 (11.4) 
10 (22.7) 
10 (22.7) 
Employment                                     Employed 
Status                                         Self-employed 
                                                       Unemployed 
                                                               Retired 
                                                               Student 
                                                      On sick leave 
                                Looking after home/family 
25 (73.5) 
5 (14.7) 
- 
4 (11.8) 
- 
- 
- 
18 (43.2) 
2 (4.5) 
4 (9.1) 
5 (11.4) 
3 (6.8) 
10 (22.7) 
1 (2.3) 
Socio-economic      Managerial & professional 
status                         Intermediate occupations              
                Small employers & account workers 
                         Lower supervisory & technical 
                                     Semi-routine & routine 
29 (87.9) 
2 (6.1) 
1 (3.0) 
- 
1 (3.0) 
23 (53.5) 
9 (20.9) 
-- 
6 (14.0) 
5 (11.6) 
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As the majority of participants in the two groups were classed as white (97% in the 
comparison group, 93.2% in the OCD group), no statistical test was required to 
explore differences in ethnicity between the groups. The similarities between the 
groups on other demographic variables were examined further by applying statistical 
techniques. To compare both groups on employment, the data was dichotomised by 
collapsing the categories of employed and self-employed to form the variable 
employed, and collapsing unemployed, retired, student, sick leave and looking after 
home/family categories to form the variable unemployed. There were significantly 
more unemployed individuals in the OCD group ( 2 = 10.96, d.f. = 1, p = .01).  
 
There were no differences between the groups on gender ( 2 = 0.26, d.f. = 1, p = .61). 
To compare the groups on qualifications, the no qualifications and GCSE categories 
were combined to form the category school educated and the first degree and higher 
degree categories were combined to form the category university educated. It was 
found that significantly more individuals in the comparison group were university 
educated ( 2 = 14.26, d.f. = 3, p = .02, Fisher‟s exact test). To compare the groups on 
socio-economic status, the five classes were collapsed to three following 
recommendations by the Office for National Statistics (2005). The results showed that 
the OCD group consisted of significantly more people with lower socio-economic 
status ( 2 = 12.43, d.f. = 2, p = .02). To compare the groups on marital status, the 
separated and divorced categories were combined. No significant differences between 
the groups for marital status ( 2 = 4.93, d.f. = 2, p = .09, Fisher‟s exact test) were 
found. 
 
3.4 Group differences in relation to OC-related beliefs, attachment insecurity 
and self-concept clarity: Testing hypotheses one to three 
 
T-tests were used to test the hypotheses that individuals who report OC symptoms will 
have higher levels of OC-related beliefs (hypothesis one), have a greater degree of 
attachment insecurity (hypothesis two), and exhibit less self-concept clarity 
(hypothesis three), compared with individuals who do not report having mental health 
difficulties. As Table 4 shows, the groups differed significantly on total OC-related 
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belief level, which had the largest effect size, and all of the associated subscales of the 
OBQ-44. Specifically, the OCD group had significantly higher levels of OC-related 
beliefs compared with the comparison group, supporting hypothesis one. In addition, 
the OCD group had a greater degree of attachment anxiety and avoidance compared 
with the comparison group, thus supporting hypothesis two. Finally, the OCD group 
also showed significantly lower levels of self-concept clarity, which supported 
hypothesis three.  
 
 
Table 4. T-test statistics for hypotheses one to three 
 
Hypothesis 
 
Mean difference 
(95% CI) 
T 
(d.f.) 
P value 
(one- 
tailed)* 
Cohen’s 
d 
1. Differences in OC beliefs 
                           
                  Total OBQ-44 score 
 
 
                               RT subscale 
 
 
                              ICT subscale 
 
 
                               PC subscale 
 
 
 
104.18 
(84.84 to 123.53) 
 
42.03 
(33.57 to 50.49) 
 
23.85 
(17.29 to 30.41) 
 
38.31 
(29.90 to 46.71) 
 
 
10.77 
(61) 
 
9.93 
(62) 
 
7.27 
(61) 
 
9.08 
(72) 
 
 
p <.01 
 
 
p <.01 
 
 
p <.01 
 
 
p <.01 
 
 
 
2.35 
 
 
2.16 
 
 
1.58 
 
 
2.01 
2. Differences in attachment 
                            
                   Attachment anxiety 
 
 
               Attachment avoidance 
 
 
1.99 
(1.44 to 2.55) 
 
1.34 
(0.87 to 1.82) 
 
 
7.23 
(64) 
 
5.65 
(73) 
 
 
p <.01 
 
 
p <.01 
 
 
1.59 
 
 
1.25 
3. Differences in self-concept       
clarity                                     
                                                             
SCCS 
                                                 
 
 
-13.77 
(-9.76 to -17.78) 
 
 
-6.84 
(76) 
 
 
 
 
p <.01 
 
 
 
-1.53 
* Bonferroni adjustment was used in light of the increased likelihood of a Type 1 error 
due to multiple comparisons. 
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3.5 Results relating to relationships between OC-related beliefs, attachment 
insecurity, self-concept clarity, OC symptoms and depression: Testing 
hypotheses four and five 
 
3.5.1 Relationship between attachment insecurity and self-concept clarity 
It was hypothesised that a greater degree of attachment insecurity will be associated 
with less self-concept clarity in both the OCD and comparison groups (hypothesis 
four). Scatterplots were used to examine the bivariate distributions of attachment 
anxiety, attachment avoidance and self-concept clarity in the two groups (see Figures 
10 and 11). 
 
3.5.1.1 Attachment anxiety and self-concept clarity 
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Figure 10. Scatterplot to show the association between attachment anxiety and self-concept 
clarity for each group 
 
Figure 10 shows that a linear relationship exists between self-concept clarity and 
attachment anxiety in both groups. Pearson correlations confirmed a significant 
negative relationship between attachment anxiety and self-concept clarity for the OCD 
group (r = -.34; N = 44, p <.05, one-tailed) and the comparison group (r = -.60; N = 
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34, p <.01, one-tailed). To test the significance of this difference, a model was fitted to 
the data containing attachment anxiety as the dependent variable and self-concept 
clarity as the covariate. The F statistic for this interaction was F(1,75) = 12.51; p = 
.01. Therefore the relationship between attachment anxiety and self-concept clarity for 
the comparison group was significantly higher than in the OCD group. 
 
As it was anticipated that depression may be a potential confounder, the correlations 
between depression, attachment anxiety and self-concept clarity were examined. It 
was found that levels of depression were significantly correlated with self-concept 
clarity for the OCD group (r = -.50; N = 44, p <.01) and the comparison group (r = -
.47; N = 34, p <.01). In addition, depression significantly correlated with attachment 
anxiety for the OCD group (r = .59, N = 44, p <.01), but not for the comparison group 
(r = .08, N = 34, p = .33).  
 
As the strength of these correlations reached at least a medium effect size, a partial 
correlation was carried out for the OCD group in order to statistically control for the 
effects of depression. Once the effects of depression were controlled, the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and self-concept clarity in the OCD group no longer 
remained significant (r = -.06; d.f. = 41, p = .70, two-tailed).  
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3.5.1.2 Attachment avoidance and self-concept clarity 
 
10 20 30 40 50 60
SCCS total score
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
A
tt
a
c
h
m
e
n
t 
a
v
o
id
a
n
c
e
Group
Comparison
OCD
 
Figure 11. Scatterplot to show the association between attachment avoidance and 
self-concept clarity for each group 
 
As can be seen from the Figure 11, a linear relationship was found between self-
concept clarity and attachment avoidance in both groups. This relationship was 
significant for the comparison group (r = -.32; N = 34, p <.05, one-tailed) and the 
OCD group (r = -.31, N = 44, p <.05, one-tailed). In addition, levels of depression 
were significantly correlated with attachment avoidance in both the OCD (r = .43, N = 
44, p < .01) and the comparison groups (r = .30; N = 34, p <.05). As the strength of 
these correlations reached at least a medium effect size, a partial correlation was 
carried out for both groups in order to statistically control for the effects of depression. 
Once depression was controlled, the relationship between attachment avoidance and 
self-concept clarity no longer remained significant for either the OCD group (r = -.13, 
d.f. = 41, p = .43, two-tailed) or the comparison group (r = -.21, d.f. = 31, p = .24, 
two-tailed).  
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In summary, no significant relationship was found between self-concept clarity and 
attachment insecurity once depression was controlled, thus the hypothesis that a 
greater degree of attachment insecurity will be associated with less self-concept clarity 
in both groups was not supported. 
 
3.5.2 Relationship between OC symptoms, OC-related beliefs and self-concept 
clarity 
 
It was hypothesised that less self-concept clarity will be associated with a greater 
degree of OC symptoms and OC beliefs in both the comparison and OCD groups 
(hypothesis five). First, scatterplots were used to examine the bivariate distributions of 
OC symptoms (OCI-R total score), OC-related beliefs (OBQ-44 total score) and self-
concept clarity in the two groups (Figures 12 and 13). 
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Figure 12. Scatterplot to show the association between OC symptoms and self-concept 
clarity for each group 
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As can be seen from Figure 12, for the comparison group, higher self-concept clarity 
was associated with lower degree of OC symptoms (r = -.55, N = 34, p <.01, one-
tailed). However, this relationship was found to not be significant for the OCD group, 
(r = -.22, N = 44, p =.08, one-tailed).  
 
In view of the weak correlation between the total OCI-R score and self-concept clarity 
in the OCD group the decision was taken to explore the correlations between OC 
symptoms and self-concept clarity on a subscale level. Exploratory data analysis 
showed two scores to be significant outliers within the OCI-R washing and checking 
subscales in the comparison group, therefore these cases were excluded from analyses 
(see Appendix 23 for OCI-R subscale boxplots). Furthermore, in the comparison 
group, the washing, checking and neutralising subscales of the OCI-R exhibited 
positive skewness and were leptokurtic (see Appendix 24 for descriptive statistics of 
the OCI-R subscales). Therefore non-parametric tests were used.  
 
As expected, a floor effect was observed within the OCI-R subscales for the 
comparison group and thus correlational analyses were not performed for this group. 
As Table 5 shows, the obsessing, hoarding, ordering and neutralising subscale had a 
significant negative relationship with self-concept clarity whereas the washing and 
checking subscales had no significant relationship with self-concept clarity. Therefore 
the hypothesis that less self-concept clarity will be associated with greater degree of 
OC symptoms was partially supported. 
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Table 5.  Spearman correlations between self-concept clarity and OCI-R subscales for the 
OCD group.  
 
OCI-R subscale 
OCD group 
Self-concept clarity 
N = 44 
Obsessing subscale 
Washing subscale 
Checking subscale 
Hoarding subscale 
Ordering subscale 
Neutralising subscale 
-.28* 
.19 n.s.  
.22 n.s. 
-.31* 
-.27* 
-.30* 
     * p < .05, (one-tailed)  
                 
 
3.5.2.2 OC-related beliefs and self-concept clarity 
Scatterplots were used to examine the bivariate distributions of OC-related beliefs 
(OBQ-44 total score) and self-concept clarity in the two groups (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Scatterplot to show the association between OC-related beliefs and self-
concept clarity for each group 
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As Figure 13 shows, higher levels of OC-related beliefs were associated with less self-
concept clarity for the comparison group (r = -.30; N = 34, p <.05, one-tailed) and the 
OCD group (r = -54; N = 44, p <.01, one-tailed). Furthermore, the relationship 
between self-concept clarity and the OBQ-44 subscales was also significant for the 
OCD group, reaching at least a medium effect size (see Table 6). However, only the 
perfectionism/certainty subscale was significantly associated with self-concept clarity 
in the comparison group. 
 
 
Table 6. Pearson correlations between self-concept clarity and OBQ-44 subscales for each 
group 
 
OBQ-44 subscale 
Comparison group 
Self-concept clarity 
N = 34 
OCD group 
Self-concept clarity 
N = 44 
Responsibility/threat estimation (RT) 
Importance/control of thoughts (ICT) 
Perfectionism/certainty (PC) 
-.13 n.s. 
-.07 n.s. 
-.38* 
-.41** 
-.43** 
-.54** 
* p < .05, **  p < .01  (one-tailed) 
 
 
As depression was identified as a potential confounder, the associations between 
levels of depression and the OBQ-44 were examined. As Table 7 shows, for the OCD 
group, higher levels of depression were associated with all OC-related belief subscales 
and the total score. All these subscales, except the PC subscale, had large effect sizes. 
No significant relationships were observed in the comparison group. 
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Table 7. Pearson correlations between BDI-II and OBQ-44 subscales for each group 
 
OBQ-44  
Comparison group 
Depression score 
N = 34 
OCD group 
Depression score 
N = 44 
Responsibility/threat estimation (RT) 
Importance/control of thoughts (ICT) 
Perfectionism/certainty (PC) 
Total score 
.06 n.s. 
.13 n.s. 
.13 n.s. 
.14 n.s. 
.62** 
.56** 
.44** 
.64** 
** p <.01 level (one-tailed) 
 
 
A partial correlation was conducted in order to control for depression. As can be seen 
from Table 8, once depression was controlled for, the relationship between self-
concept clarity and the OBQ-total score and PC subscale remained significant, but the 
RT and ICT subscales did not.  
 
 
Table 8. Partial correlations between self-concept clarity and OBQ-44 subscales for the OCD 
group when depression is controlled  
 
OBQ-44 
OCD group 
Self-concept clarity 
N = 44 
Responsibility/threat estimation (RT) 
Importance/control of thoughts (ICT) 
Perfectionism/certainty (PC) 
Total OBQ score 
-.15 n.s.  
-.22 n.s.  
-.41**  
-.34*  
* p <.05, ** p <.01 
 
 
In summary, the hypothesis that less self-concept clarity will be associated with a 
greater degree of OC symptoms and OC-related beliefs in individuals who report OC 
symptoms and in individuals who do not report mental health difficulties was partially 
supported. 
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3.6  Results relating to hypotheses concerning OC-related belief mediation: 
 Testing hypotheses six and seven 
 
3.6.1  Preliminary analyses 
The results presented so far have demonstrated significant differences between the 
groups on OC-related beliefs, OC symptoms, attachment security and self-concept 
clarity. It was hypothesised that OC-related beliefs will mediate the relationship 
between attachment security and degree of OC symptoms (hypothesis six), and 
between self-concept clarity and OC symptoms (hypothesis seven) in individuals who 
report OC symptoms, therefore the following analyses focused on the OCD group 
alone.  
 
Following the recommendations of Baron and Kenny (1986), the bivariate 
distributions of OC symptoms and OC-related beliefs and symptoms were examined. 
As Figure 14 and 15 shows, there was a significant positive correlation between OC 
symptoms and OC-related beliefs for the OCD group (r = .44; N = 44, p < .01, one-
tailed). 
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Figure 14. Scatterplot to show the association between OC-related beliefs and OC symptoms  
for the OCD group 
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Figure 15. Scatterplot to show the association between self-concept clarity and OC-related  
beliefs for the OCD group 
 
 
Preliminary correlational analyses were conducted to test for a relationship between 
attachment anxiety/avoidance and OC symptoms. As Table 9 shows, significant 
relationships were found between the total OCI-R score and both attachment 
dimensions, whereas only the obsessing and ordering subscale were positively 
associated to attachment anxiety, and only the neutralising subscale was positively 
associated to attachment avoidance. Therefore it was decided that the analysis would 
focus on the total OCI-R score. 
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Table 9.  Spearman correlations between attachment security and OC symptoms for the OCD 
group 
 
OCI-R 
OCD group 
N = 44 
Attachment anxiety Attachment avoidance 
Obsessing subscale 
Washing subscale 
Checking subscale 
Hoarding subscale 
Ordering subscale 
Neutralising subscale 
Total score 
.43** 
.16 n.s. 
-.03 n.s. 
.15 n.s. 
.36** 
.15 n.s. 
.42** 
.11 n.s. 
.07 n.s. 
-.10 n.s. 
.12 n.s. 
.25 n.s. 
.29* 
.31* 
* p <.05 , ** p <.01, (one-tailed) 
 
 
 
 
3.6.2 Path analyses 
Path analysis was used to test whether OC-related beliefs were acting as a mediator 
between attachment and OC symptoms and between self-concept clarity and OC 
symptoms (Maruyama, 1998). Figure 16 depicts the first conceptual path diagram that 
was tested. The path diagram specifies attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance and 
self-concept clarity to produce an indirect effect on OC symptoms via OC-related 
beliefs.  Furthermore, it was explored whether self-concept clarity, attachment anxiety 
and attachment avoidance would produce direct effects on OC symptoms. 
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Figure 16. Conceptual path diagram (model a) relating self-concept clarity, 
attachment security, OC-related beliefs and OC symptoms 
 
 
The path model was tested by conducting two multiple regression analyses. The first 
regression analyses contained OC-related beliefs (OBQ-44 total score) as the 
dependent variable and self-concept clarity, attachment anxiety and attachment 
avoidance as the predictor variables. The second regression analyses contained OC 
symptoms (OCI-R total score) as the dependent variable and OC-related beliefs, self-
concept clarity, attachment anxiety and avoidance as the predictor variables. The 
results are presented in Table 10 and Figure 17.   
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Table 10. Results of the regression analysis for model (a) 
First regression analysis: Full model (N = 44) 
Dependent 
variable 
Predictors Standardised 
ß 
t 
 
p value R² 
OBQ-44 
Total score 
SCCS 
Attachment anxiety 
Attachment avoidance 
-.45 
.30 
-.01 
-3.26 
2.13 
-0.86 
.02 
.04 
.93 
 
.37 
 
Second regression analysis: Full model (N = 44) 
OCI-R  
total score 
SCCS 
Attachment anxiety 
Attachment avoidance 
OBQ-44 total score 
.09 
.18 
.12 
.38 
.53 
1.11 
.79 
2.19 
.60 
.28 
.44 
.03 
 
.25 
Third regression analysis: Trimmed model (N = 44) 
 
OCI-R  
total score 
 
OBQ-44 total score 
 
.44 
 
3.22 
 
.03 
 
.20 
 
 
 
The results of this analysis showed that there were no significant direct effects of self-
concept clarity, attachment anxiety or attachment avoidance on OC symptoms. 
Furthermore, attachment avoidance did not did not have a direct effect on OC-related 
beliefs.  However, self-concept clarity was found to have a significant direct effect 
OC-related beliefs, which in turn had a significant direct effect on OC symptoms. 
Similarly, attachment anxiety had a significant direct effect on OC-related beliefs, 
which in turn had a significant direct effect on OC symptoms. These results suggest 
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 Figure 17. Full path diagram (model a) relating self-concept clarity, attachment security, OC-related beliefs and OC symptoms. 
 The figures next to each path represent the standardised regression coefficients (ß). 
 *p <.05, ** p <.01, dotted lines represent non-significant paths 
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that OC-related beliefs mediate the relationship between self-concept clarity and OC 
symptoms, and attachment anxiety and OC symptoms.  
 
To investigate the impact of removing attachment avoidance from the path diagram, a 
model trimming approach was used in which the reduced model was estimated using a 
further regression analysis. The results of the trimmed model are presented in Table 
10 and Figure 18. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
                                        -.44** 
                                                                                           
                                                                                            .44** 
 
                              .29* 
 
                                                                    
 
 
Figure 18. Trimmed path diagram (model a) relating self-concept clarity, attachment 
anxiety, OC-related beliefs and OC symptoms 
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
   
To calculate the indirect effect of self-concept clarity on OC symptoms and 
attachment anxiety on OC symptoms for this trimmed model, the path coefficients 
were multiplied (Maruyama, 1998). The indirect effect of self-concept clarity on OC 
symptoms (ß = -.19) and attachment anxiety on OC symptoms (ß = .13) were weak 
compared with the direct effect of OC-related beliefs on OC symptoms.  
 
In summary, the hypothesis that OC-related beliefs would mediate the relationship 
between attachment security and OC symptoms was partially supported. The 
Self-concept  
clarity
 
 
Attachment  
anxiety 
 
 
 
OC-related 
beliefs 
(OBQ-44 total 
score) 
 
 
 
OC 
symptoms 
 
 
 207 
hypothesis that OC-related beliefs would mediate the relationship between self-
concept clarity and OC symptoms was fully supported.    
 
Although no hypotheses were formulated regarding the influence of depressed mood, 
as depression was found to be significantly associated with self-concept clarity, 
attachment anxiety/avoidance, OC-related beliefs and OC symptoms, the contribution 
of depression was explored further in a post-hoc analysis. The model that was tested is 
presented in Figure 18. First, it was predicted that OC symptoms would have a direct 
effect on depression. This was based on the assumption that participants in the study 
experienced OCD as their primary problem, with depression secondary to their OCD. 
Second, as self-concept clarity was found not to have a direct effect on OC symptoms, 
but was found to exhibit strong correlations with depression, it was predicted that self-
concept clarity would have a direct effect on depression. Finally, it was predicted that 
attachment anxiety would have a direct effect on depression, as research has shown 
that attachment insecurity is a vulnerability factor for depression rather than the result 
of current negative mood state (Haaga et al., 2002). As attachment avoidance was 
found not to have a direct effect on OC-related beliefs or OC symptoms, it was not 
included in the model. 
 
 
 
                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Conceptual path diagram (model b) relating self-concept clarity, 
attachment security, OC-related beliefs, OC symptoms and depression. 
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A regression analysis was conducted which contained levels of depression as the 
dependent variable and self-concept clarity, attachment anxiety and OC symptoms as 
the predictors. The results are presented in Table 11 and Figure 20.  
 
   
Table 11. Results of the regression analysis for model (b) 
Dependent 
variable 
Predictors Standardised 
ß 
t 
 
p value R² 
BDI-II 
Total score 
SCCS 
Attachment anxiety  
OCI-R total score 
-.31 
.41 
.21 
-2.59 
3.24 
1.76 
.01 
.02 
.09 
 
.49 
 
 
 
 
It was found that OC symptoms had no significant direct effect on levels of 
depression. However, both self-concept clarity and attachment anxiety had significant 
direct effects on depression.  Together, they explained 49% of the variance in levels of 
depression. 
                                     
 209 
   
                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                     -.31* 
                                                                       -.44**                                                                                                                                           
                                                                       
 
                                                                                                    .44**                                             
 
                                                                .29* 
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                             .29*                                          .41** 
                                                                                         
 
 
 
Figure 20. Full path diagram relating self-concept clarity, attachment security, OC-related beliefs, OC symptoms and depression.   
            * p < .05, ** p < .01                                                                                 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Overview of findings 
This study aimed to investigate the relationship between attachment, self-concept 
clarity and OC-related beliefs in OCD. The degree of attachment security, self-
concept clarity and levels of OC-related beliefs in people who reported OC symptoms 
was investigated by comparing them to a group of people who reported not having a 
mental health problem. The hypotheses that individuals who experienced OCD would 
have a greater degree of attachment insecurity, report higher levels of OC-related 
beliefs and have less self-concept clarity than the comparison group were supported.  
 
The relationships between attachment, self-concept clarity and OC-related beliefs 
were then examined. Attachment anxiety was negatively associated with self-concept 
clarity in both groups, indicating that the more self-concept clarity an individual 
exhibited, the less attachment anxiety they were likely to have. However, once levels 
of depression were controlled in the OCD group, attachment anxiety was no longer 
associated with self-concept clarity. Similarly, attachment avoidance was negatively 
associated with self-concept clarity in both groups, indicating that the more self-
concept clarity an individual exhibited, the less attachment avoidance they were likely 
to have. However, once depression was controlled, this relationship was no longer 
significant in both the OCD and comparison groups. Therefore the hypothesis that a 
greater degree of attachment insecurity would be associated with less self-concept 
clarity was not supported. 
 
Contrary to expectations, total levels of OC symptoms were not related to self-concept 
clarity in the OCD group. However, when symptom subscales were examined in the 
OCD group, negative relationships were found between obsessing, hoarding, ordering 
and neutralising symptoms and self-concept clarity. The association between washing 
and checking symptoms and self concept clarity did not reach significance. In 
addition, OC-related beliefs were negatively associated with self-concept clarity in 
both groups, however, on a subscale level, only perfectionism/certainty beliefs were 
negatively associated with self-concept clarity in the comparison group, whereas all 
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subscales exhibited a significant relationship for the OCD group. After taking 
depression into account, only perfectionism/certainty beliefs and the total OC-related 
belief score were found to be associated with self-concept clarity in the OCD group. 
Overall, these results partially supported the fifth hypothesis that less self-concept 
clarity would be associated with a greater degree of OC symptoms and OC-related 
beliefs. 
 
Finally, a path analysis revealed that for the OCD group, self-concept clarity, 
attachment anxiety and avoidance did not have significant direct effects on OC 
symptoms. However, OC-related beliefs mediated the relationship between self-
concept clarity and OC symptoms, in addition to mediating the relationship between 
attachment anxiety and OC symptoms. Moreover, self-concept clarity had a stronger 
direct effect on OC-related beliefs compared with attachment anxiety. These results 
thus supported hypotheses six and seven that OC-related beliefs would mediate the 
relationship between attachment, self-concept clarity and OC symptoms.  
 
In an additional post-hoc analysis, OC symptoms did not show a direct effect on levels 
of depression in the OCD group. However, a direct effect of attachment anxiety on 
depression was found in addition to a direct effect of self-concept clarity on levels of 
depression. This suggests that levels of depression in the OCD group is explained by 
the effect of low levels of self-concept clarity and high levels of attachment anxiety 
rather than OC symptoms. 
 
4.2 The current findings in relation to theoretical issues and previous 
research 
 
4.2.1 Findings in relation to attachment insecurity and self-concept clarity: 
Implications for attachment theory and Guidano and  Liotti’s (1983) model 
of OCD 
 
The finding that people who experienced OCD exhibited a greater degree of 
attachment insecurity compared with individuals who did not report mental health 
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difficulties is consistent with attachment theory and previous research that has found 
insecure attachment to be associated with psychopathology in general (Fonagy et al., 
1996; Mason et al., 2005; Reincke & Rogers, 2001). This study also adds to the 
limited evidence base that has found insecure attachment in people with OCD (Myhr 
et al., 2004). This finding may also lend some support to the theoretical conjectures of 
Guidano and Liotti (1983), who suggest that individuals with OCD have experienced 
a particular early environment which leads to insecure attachment. In this study it was 
also found that the differences between the two groups in attachment anxiety 
exhibited a slightly larger effect size than the between-group differences in attachment 
avoidance, which may suggest that the OCD group experience more anxiety about 
being rejected or abandoned in their relationships. This also fits with Guidano and 
Liotti‟s (1983) theory which emphasises an early attachment environment in which 
the attachment figure‟s behaviour is contradictory, leading to a difficulty in 
developing a coherent and unambiguous set of expectations and beliefs about the self, 
and in particular about the reliability of others, which is indicative of attachment 
anxiety.  
 
However, it must be noted that the assumption of this study was that the internal 
working models formed in early childhood remain stable throughout life, in line with 
the stability/continuity hypothesis of attachment theory (Bowlby, 1977; Cassidy, 
2000). Therefore an individual‟s current degree of romantic attachment security is 
likely to reflect, in part, their degree of early attachment security (Fraley, 2004). 
However, attachment theory also posits that that internal working models can be 
updated (Bowlby, 1973). Furthermore, romantic attachment is likely to reflect a 
multitude of factors not measured in this study such as intimacy (George & West, 
1999). Therefore the results of the study must be considered with caution in relation to 
Guidano and Liotti‟s (1983) model of OCD. However, it can be concluded that the 
findings suggest that people with OCD have more insecure attachments in their 
current relationships, but this may not necessarily mean that this reflects their early 
attachment experience.  
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It was found that the OCD group exhibited lower levels of self-concept clarity 
compared with individuals who did not report mental health difficulties. This is 
consistent with previous research that has found lower self-concept clarity to be 
associated with high neuroticism, higher levels of anxiety, depression and aggression 
in non-clinical samples (Campbell et al., 1996; Smith et al., 1996; Lawrence, 2006), 
and depression, social anxiety and OCD in clinical samples (Bigler et al., 2001; 
Wilson & Rapee, 2006; Bhar, 2004). This finding also provides support for Guidano 
and Liotti‟s (1983) theory that people with OCD have developed a self-concept that is 
characterised by ambivalence and uncertainty. No study has investigated self-concept 
clarity in people with OCD before, although one study has investigated self-
ambivalence, a narrower construct than clarity. The findings of the present study are 
in accordance with this research (Bhar, 2004), thus contributing to evidence that 
indicates people with OCD exhibit self-concepts that are characterised by more 
uncertainty, inconsistency and instability than people who do not have mental health 
problems. 
 
Levels of depression were negatively associated with self-concept clarity in both 
groups suggesting that a negative mood state may impact on the certainty in which 
self-beliefs are held, or vice versa. This is consistent with the literature that has used 
non-clinical samples (Butzer & Kuiper, 2006; Dehart & Pelham, 2007). This also 
suggests that self-concept clarity is related to clinical depression as well as OCD, 
which is also consistent with previous research (Bhar 2004). In addition, self-concept 
certainty has also been found to be important in social phobia (Wilson & Rapee, 
2006). Thus the current study adds to the increasing evidence that self-concept clarity 
is most likely a general characteristic of other mental health difficulties rather than 
being specific to OCD.  
 
Additionally, attachment avoidance did not have either a direct or indirect effect on 
OC symptoms in this study. This is in line with previous research that has found 
attachment avoidance to be less strongly associated with problem coping and distress, 
and not to predict distress when attachment anxiety is controlled (Lopez et al., 2002). 
Similarly, Williams and Riskind (2004) found that attachment anxiety was associated 
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with cognitive vulnerability to anxiety and depression, whereas attachment avoidance 
was only associated with cognitive vulnerability to anxiety. These findings could be 
explained in terms of Bartholomew and Horowitz‟s (1991) description of dismissing 
attachment style, as it is argued that individuals with this particular style will use 
defensive strategies to project an image of self-sufficiency. 
 
No relationship was found between attachment security and self-concept clarity when 
depression was controlled in the OCD group. One interpretation of this is that 
attachment security and the degree of certainty in which self-beliefs are held are in 
fact unrelated constructs that have no mutual influence on each other. However, this is 
contrary to Guidano and Liotti‟s theory (1983) that argues early insecure attachment 
shapes the structure of an individual‟s self-representations. Consistent with this, 
previous research has found a link between romantic attachment and the content and 
structure of the self-concept in non-psychiatric samples, although in these studies 
negative mood was not controlled for (Kim, 2005; Mikulincer, 1995). The current 
study‟s findings could indicate that attachment security exerts influence on self-
representations more in early life rather than in adulthood. However, it must be noted 
that Guidano and Liotti‟s (1983) theory concerns self-ambivalence, a different 
construct to self-concept clarity, which may also account for the difference in 
findings. 
 
Self-concept clarity is a specific organisational component of the self-concept. The 
discrepancy between the current study‟s findings and the theoretical and empirical 
evidence could also be due to that fact that it is the contents of a person‟s self-concept, 
such as self-esteem, rather than the structure of the self-concept that is linked with 
degree of attachment insecurity. Research has found a consistent link between 
attachment and self-esteem, specifically, secure attachment is associated with higher 
self-esteem (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Griffin & Bartholomew, 1994; Bylsma 
et al., 1997). Furthermore, recent research suggests that less fluctuations in self-
esteem, or greater stability, is associated with less attachment anxiety, and this 
relationship is independent of actual level of self-esteem (Foster et al., 2007).  
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4.2.2 Findings in relation to OC-related beliefs and self-concept clarity: 
Implications for Clark’s (2004) cognitive control theory of obsessions 
 
It was found that people who reported OC symptoms exhibited higher levels of OC-
related beliefs compared with people who reported not having a mental health 
problem. This is consistent with the cognitive appraisal model of OCD which argues 
that people with OCD appraise their intrusive thoughts as threatening due to pre-
existing dysfunctional OC-related beliefs (OCCWG, 2003). The finding that 
importance/control of thought beliefs were unrelated to self-concept clarity after 
controlling for depression is contrary to empirical and theoretical expectations. Clark 
(2004) argues that one of the vulnerability factors for OCD is the presence of enduring 
dysfunctional meta-cognitive beliefs, specifically, beliefs about the importance of 
controlling of thoughts. Another vulnerability factor is an uncertain/ambivalent self-
concept. Together these vulnerability factors set the stage for individuals to appraise 
their unwanted thoughts as threatening. Thus according to this model, beliefs 
regarding importance/control of thoughts and self-concept clarity should be related in 
people with OCD. The model is supported by a pattern that has emerged across 
studies which shows that beliefs concerning importance/control of thoughts have a 
more robust relationship with OCD than the other OC-related beliefs (Tolin et al., 
2006). 
 
In contrast, beliefs relating to the perfectionism/certainty were found to be associated 
with self-concept clarity after controlling for depression in this study. One 
interpretation of this finding in relation to Clark‟s (2004) model is that 
perfectionism/certainty beliefs and certainty of self-beliefs have a more important role 
in the development and maintenance of OCD, rather than beliefs regarding the 
importance or control of thoughts. However, previous research has found self-
ambivalence to be correlated to all OC belief domains after controlling for anxiety and 
depression (Bhar, 2004). A less extreme interpretation is that perfectionism/certainty 
beliefs are an equally important factor that predisposes individuals to interpret their 
intrusive thoughts as threatening. In his account of OCD, Clark (2004) does not 
elaborate further as to why an intrusion leads to efforts to eliminate it other than that it 
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represents a contradiction to core values. In light of the current findings, an extension 
of this model could be entertained. An intrusive thought that contradicts a person‟s 
core values is not only experienced as alien to an already fragile self-concept, as Clark 
(2004) argues, but also because it is interpreted by the person as lacking in control 
and/or certainty, for example, of themselves, of events or their future. A sense of lack 
of control/certainty is also likely to reinforce any perfectionism/certainty beliefs that 
are activated in the presence of an intrusion.  
 
It is possible that it is this lack of control together with the contradiction of valued 
aspects of the self that produces a need to gain control and certainty by eliminating the 
thought from consciousness. This is consistent with the view that OCD is 
characterised by a need for control and perfection (Guidano & Liotti, 1983) and that 
anxiety in general is characterised by the appraisal of events as out of one‟s control 
(Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Barlow, 2000). Indeed, in an early study, Beck et al. 
(1987) found evidence for anxiety to be characterised by cognitions with themes of 
uncertainty that were future-orientated. More recent research investigated this by 
presenting non-clinical participants with four scenarios that varied in terms of threat 
level and responsibility. It was found that a lower sense of control predicted higher 
distress and urge to take action, after controlling for threat and responsibility 
appraisals (Moulding et al., in press). However, it must be noted that this 
interpretation of the current study‟s findings is tentative as the total OC-related belief 
score was also associated with self-concept clarity when depression was controlled 
for. As the path analysis only investigated the role of the total level of OC-related 
beliefs, it is not known how each different type of belief domain impacts on OC 
symptoms. 
 
4.2.3 Findings in relation to the relationships between attachment, self-concept 
 clarity and OC-related beliefs 
 
The results show that a more uncertain self-concept in addition to a greater degree of 
attachment insecurity impacts on OC-related beliefs, which in turn has a direct effect 
on OC symptoms. This may suggest that OC-related beliefs develop out of an insecure 
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attachment experience and less certainty about self-beliefs, which then produces OC 
symptoms. This would be consistent with the cognitive appraisal account of OCD that 
argues dysfunctional beliefs underlie the development of OC symptoms (OCCWG, 
2003). However, self-concept clarity was found to have a stronger direct effect on 
OC-related beliefs compared with attachment anxiety. This could suggest that self-
concept clarity has a stronger role in the development of OC-related beliefs. In 
contrast, the findings may indicate that insecure attachment may be a more distal 
vulnerability factor, in line with previous research (Williams & Riskind, 2004). In 
addition, attachment anxiety had a stronger role in influencing depression compared 
with OC-related beliefs. This is perhaps not unexpected given that depression is 
characterised by thought content that centres on significant loss (Beck, 1976), and 
attachment anxiety concerns anxiety and vigilance about rejection by others (Foster et 
al., 2007). 
 
It is of note that self-concept clarity and attachment insecurity accounted for only 37% 
of the variance in OC-related beliefs and that OC-related beliefs only accounted for 
20% of the variance in OC symptoms, indicating that other factors also impact on OC 
cognitions and symptoms. For example, Clark (2004) argues that negative affectivity 
is a key vulnerability factor in OCD, although research investigating whether negative 
affectivity has a direct effect on OC symptoms has been mixed (Sexton et al., 2003; 
Norton et al., 2005). In addition, the role of parenting practices in the development of 
OCD is still not fully understood, although it has been suggested that a childhood 
characterised by strict and rigid codes of conduct and duty may lead to the 
development of particular OC-related beliefs (Salkovskis et al., 1999). 
 
4.2.4 Findings in relation to OCD symptoms 
Interestingly, only particular OC symptoms were related to self-concept clarity in this 
study. Specifically, lower self-concept clarity was most strongly related to a greater 
degree of hoarding and neutralising symptoms and more weakly related to obsessing 
and ordering symptoms, but not related to washing and checking symptoms or the 
total score. The lack of a relationship between the total score and washing and 
checking symptoms could be linked to a limited sample size. However, it may also 
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suggest that individual symptom subscales are more useful in assessing OC symptoms 
rather than total scores, at least with the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002). Indeed, it has been 
previously noted that as individuals typically present with a highly idiosyncratic set of 
OC symptoms, the total OCI-R score may be suppressed by the items that are not 
relevant to an individual‟s symptoms (Abramowitz, et al., in press). This reflects the 
more general argument that OCD is more likely to be a heterogeneous disorder with 
specific symptom subtypes (McKay et al., 2004). 
 
It is possible that this study‟s findings suggest that certain types of OC symptoms are 
characterised more by a lack of clarity in self-concept compared with others. For 
example, hoarding behaviour, which had the strongest negative correlation to self-
concept clarity, may emerge in an attempt to establish a concrete and tangible felt 
sense of security and control that is not experienced internally and/or externally. 
Indeed, research has shown that hoarders consider their possessions to be part of 
themselves and provide a source of security and comfort (Frost & Hartl, 1996; 
Steketee et al., 2003). Consistent with this study, Bhar (2004) found that 
contamination fears and rituals had the weakest relationship to self-ambivalence. In 
contrast, it was shown that self-ambivalence most strongly related to checking 
symptoms. However, comparing these findings with the current study is difficult as 
different measures of OC symptoms were used in each, which may account for the 
difference in findings. However, whether OCD should be understood as defined 
subtypes or more dimensional in nature is currently a controversial issue in the 
literature, and as yet no consensus has been reached (Taylor, 2005).  
 
Finally, OC symptoms did not have a direct effect on levels of depression in OCD. 
Interpreting this result is difficult as no rigorous assessment was conducted to 
determine whether levels of depression were primary or secondary to participants‟ 
OCD, particularly within the non-NHS group. Research suggests that depression is 
more likely to be secondary to OCD (Rasmussen & Eissen, 1992), and is hypothesised 
to be characterised by domestic conflict, prospect of unemployment, loss of self-
esteem and a subsequent pessimistic view of the future (Tallis, 1995). However, little 
is known about whether specific or more general aspects of experiencing OCD lead to 
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secondary depression (Tallis, 1995). Assuming OCD was the primary difficulty of 
participants in this study, the findings suggests that it is the experience of having a 
more uncertain view about themselves and a higher level of attachment insecurity that 
may lead to depression in OCD, rather than the experience of the OC symptoms. 
However, it must be noted that the measure used to assess OC symptoms in this study 
is relatively brief and is weighted more towards measuring compulsions (Foa et al., 
2002). Therefore the results may be specific to these types of symptoms. However, the 
possibility that a more comprehensive measure would show a link between symptoms 
and depression cannot be ruled out.  
 
4.3 Implications for clinical practice 
The current study has shown that people with OCD are more insecurely attached in 
their relationships than people who do not have mental health difficulties, in particular 
anxiety about their relationships with others. This has implications for the therapeutic 
relationship as patients may enter into treatment with expectations that the therapist 
may reject them in some way, or may have difficulties trusting the therapist. If OCD 
patients‟ attachment organisation has been shaped by an early attachment environment 
that was contradictory and contained mixed message of acceptability and rejection as 
Guidano and Liotti (1983) have suggested, the therapist would have to be mindful of 
this. For example, it is possible that patients with high attachment insecurity are 
hypervigilant to subtle verbal and non-verbal cues from the therapist which could be 
interpreted as indicating rejection in some way and could, therefore, adversely affect 
the treatment alliance (Foster et al., 2007).  
  
The finding that OC-related beliefs had a mediational role in the relationship between 
attachment insecurity, self-concept clarity and OC symptoms has important 
implications for clinical practice. Firstly, this suggests that careful assessment of the 
beliefs associated with OC symptoms is necessary to gain a comprehensive 
understanding of an individual‟s symptom experience and thus to guide the 
formulation and treatment process. Secondly, in terms of treatment, this finding 
would support the use of cognitive techniques in the treatment of OCD, which is 
important given that the addition of cognitive techniques is a controversial issue in 
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the field, due to the current evidence that cognitive therapy is no more effective than 
behaviour therapy alone (NICE, 2005). For example, a cognitive approach to OCD 
would include modifying maladaptive appraisals of intrusive thoughts and the beliefs 
that accompany these appraisals. It may also involve a focus on metacognitive 
beliefs, as suggested by Clark‟s (2004) model, rather than an explicit focus on the 
content of maladaptive beliefs. This is consistent with other models that emphasise 
metacognition in the maintenance of emotional disorders. For example, the Self-
Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model argues that metacognitive beliefs,  
such as the belief that thoughts are dangerous and can influence future harm 
outcomes in the case of OCD, guide coping responses to distressing body state or 
intrusive cognitions (Wells & Mattews, 1996; Matthews and Wells, 2000).  
 
This study‟s findings may also contribute to a greater understanding of the difficulties 
observed in behavioural interventions. ERP can be particularly challenging for people 
with OCD as it requires an individual to be exposed to anxiety-evoking material and 
to not engage in the behaviour that they would normally use to reduce their anxiety 
(Steketee, 1993). It has been suggested that treatment refusal and drop out rates in 
ERP may be linked to apprehension and fear about the difficulty and intensity of the 
treatment (Maltby & Tolin, 2003; 2005). It is possible that a chronically unstable, 
inconsistent and uncertain sense of self is also a factor that contributes to this 
apprehension and anxiety for an individual about beginning treatment, particularly if 
beliefs about the need to be certain and perfect in all situations are also held. Thus a 
focus on increasing the stability, consistency and certainty of self-beliefs, at least 
initially, may help to engage individuals in the treatment. Moreover, the findings of 
this study suggests that an intervention of this kind may have an impact on OC-related 
beliefs, which in turn may reduce symptoms. For example, a cognitive approach could 
be adopted in which self-beliefs are identified and the certainty in which they are held 
is rated. Historical evidence for and against each self-belief could then be explored 
and a further certainty rating taken, which could then be compared to the original 
rating.  
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Finally, the findings may have implications for they way in which depression is 
managed in OCD. As a direct link was found between attachment/self-concept clarity 
and depression, but not OC symptoms, this suggests that increasing clarity and 
reducing attachment insecurity may impact on negative mood in OCD, at least, 
negative mood that is assumed to be secondary to the OCD. This is important given 
the high comorbidity rates (Abramowitz, 2004), particularly as research has shown 
that co-morbid depression is the single best predictor of poor quality of life, compared 
with obsessional symptoms and compulsions (Massellis et al., 2003). Furthermore, 
there is evidence to show that patients with co-morbid depression in OCD show less 
improvement after a course of ERP than those without depression (Abramowitz et al., 
2000). Thus it is possible that an initial focus on decreasing self-concept uncertainty 
and increasing attachment security may have an impact on level of depression in 
people with OCD. However, as depression was not directly linked to OC symptoms in 
this study, it is not known whether this would have an effect on OC symptoms per se, 
but it may increase motivation to engage treatment for the OC symptoms.  
 
4.4 Limitations of the study 
4.4.1 Limitations relating to design and analysis 
Difficulties were experienced with recruiting the optimum number of participants, 
which impacted on the sample size and inevitably the statistical power of the study. 
One implication of this is that it may have increased the risk of making a Type II 
error. Secondly, the study was cross-sectional and therefore no firm conclusions can 
be reached regarding the causal status of the constructs investigated. This is 
particularly important to note with regards to the path analyses, which cannot 
determine the causal relations among variables (Maruyama, 1998). The model that 
was tested was unidirectional and did not take into account any probable reciprocal 
effects. For example, it is plausible that depression influences OC symptoms directly, 
or, furthermore, that OC symptoms may influence self-concept clarity. Additionally, 
the model was not meant to be exhaustative, and it is likely that other factors influence 
the observed relationships. For example, a model that also includes self-esteem and 
levels of anxiety could perhaps account for more of the variance in OC-related beliefs 
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and symptoms. Furthermore, due to the limited sample size, the overall fit of the path 
models were not tested using statistical techniques.  
 
4.4.2 Limitations relating to participants and recruitment 
A limitation of the study is that the OCD group consisted of individuals who were 
recruited from non-NHS organisations as well as from the NHS. Ideally, all the 
participants in the OCD group would have been recruited from the NHS, as this would 
have ensured that participants had a confirmed diagnosis of OCD. Although efforts 
were made to develop a screening measure for this study, this was found to have 
questionable validity and was not used. Unfortunately, time limitations prevented the 
use of a standardised interview or the use of a clinician-rated measure such as the 
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Goodman et al., 1989). Thus for the 
majority of the OCD group, a psychiatric diagnosis of OCD could not be reliably 
determined. Equally, due to the use of self-report methods of measurement, it is not 
known whether any participants in the comparison group would have reached the 
criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis. 
 
Furthermore, the cut-off for the total score on the OCI-R was used to distinguish 
participants with OCD, which was found to classify 64% of OCD participants from 
non-anxious controls in the original validation study (Foa et al., 2002). However, in 
that study Foa et al. (2002) also found that the obsessing subscale was better at 
differentiating the two groups, correctly classifying 74% of the participants. The 
decision to use the total score was taken as the obsessing subscale only contains three 
items, and this has previously been citied as a significant shortcoming of the OCI-R 
(Clark, 2004). Despite this, it is possible that the cut off that was used resulted in 
inaccurate classification of the OCD group participants. 
 
The OCD and comparison groups were not matched on demographic variables, and it 
was found that the comparison group consisted of individuals who were from a higher 
socio-economic status, had a higher rate of employment and had higher levels of 
qualifications compared with the OCD group. Therefore the differences in self-
concept clarity and attachment security may have been due to those individuals 
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experiencing a better quality of life with more prospects rather than actual differences 
on these constructs. Furthermore, the individuals in the study were predominantly 
female and white in ethnic origin which limits the generalisability of the findings to 
males and other ethnic groups.  
 
In addition, although the NHS and non-NHS OCD group appeared to be similar on 
many of the demographic variables, over half the non-NHS group were not receiving 
any treatment. Therefore some of the findings, particularly in relation to level of 
depressed mood and OC symptoms, may have reflected this. Anecdotally, participants 
recruited from support groups seemed to share the experience of previous treatment 
failures, thus it is possible that the majority of the OCD group may have consisted 
primarily of individuals with treatment-resistant OCD. Although it is difficult to know 
if this was the case, this may limit the generalisability of the findings.  
 
4.4.3 Limitations relating to measures 
Further methodological limitations include the sole use of self-report measures in this 
study. Given the heterogeneity in OCD, it is possible that the OBQ-44 does not 
capture all the belief domains that are important in the disorder (Taylor et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, the accurate measurement of attachment by self-report is a particularly 
contentious issue in the literature. One difficulty is that internal working models are 
hypothesised to operate at least partially out of conscious awareness (Bowlby, 1980). 
This calls into question the accuracy of assessing adult attachment using self-report 
measures that focus on conscious reports. Moreover, Bowlby (1980) originally 
theorised that the attachment system is activated under certain conditions such as 
unavailability or unresponsiveness of the attachment figure. It has been subsequently 
argued that romantic attachment measures are unlikely to activate the attachment 
system (George & West, 1999). Therefore it is questionable whether these measures 
are in fact assessing the attachment construct as originally defined by Bowlby (1973; 
1977; 1980).  
 
In addition, measuring attachment on a general level at one point in time has been 
criticised as it only enables a limited view of working models, and thus the attachment 
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ratings of participants in this study may not generalise over time or across different 
contexts (Pietromonaco & Barrett, 2000). In addition, some people may defensively 
report they are not anxious when they actually are, thus the conscious beliefs people 
hold may not accurately reflect the underlying attachment organisation (Crowell et al., 
1999). Ideally, the study would have used the AAI (George et al., 1985; cited in 
Fonagy et al., 1996). Using this may have provided more of a direct test of Guidano 
and Liotti‟s (1983) theory that early attachment is important in the development of 
OCD.  
 
A further issue that limits the inferences that can be drawn from the study is that 
levels of anxiety and self-esteem were not measured and therefore not controlled in 
the analyses. Low self-esteem has been observed in people with OCD (Ehntholt et al., 
1999) thus it is possible that the associations between self-concept clarity and OC 
symptoms could be due to low levels of self-esteem, particularly as self-concept 
clarity has been shown to be positively associated with self-esteem (Campbell et al., 
1996; Riketta & Ziegler, 2006; Kernis et al., 2000). Although Campbell et al. (1996) 
argue that self-concept clarity is a relatively stable trait, research has found that self-
concept clarity and self-esteem can fluctuate in response to daily events (DeHart & 
Pelham, 2007; Nezlek & Plesko, 2001). This highlights the possibility that the current 
findings may reflect a person‟s degree of clarity at a particular point in time rather 
than a dispositional characteristic. Finally, the differences in self-concept clarity may 
have been due to a general difficulty in making decisions in the OCD group, which is 
a feature of OCD (Farrell & Barrett, 2006).  
 
4.5 Suggestions for further research 
Further research is needed to advance the understanding of the role that attachment 
plays in the development and maintenance of OCD. For example, qualitative research 
could perhaps investigate the theoretical conjectures of Guidano and Liotti (1983) that 
people with OCD have experienced a specific early attachment environment 
characterised by ambiguous messages of love and rejection. Further research is 
needed to investigate whether techniques other than self-report measures produce 
similar results to this study, which could increase the validity of the findings 
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(Marczyk et al., 2005). For example, interview methods such as the AAI (George et 
al., 1985; cited in Fonagy et al., 1996) and projective tests such as the Adult 
Attachment Projective (George & West, 2001) could be used in addition to priming 
techniques. The AAI (George et al., 1985; cited in Fonagy et al., 1996) maybe a 
particularly important measure to use as it assesses internal working models of 
attachment that operate outside conscious awareness (Maier et al., 2004). This study 
did not attempt to convert the dimensional attachment scores into discrete attachment 
styles as it is argued that this results in a loss of precision and may have obscured 
group differences (Fraley & Waller, 1998). However, future research could investigate 
what types of attachment occur within OCD. For example, it could be argued that 
Guidano and Liotti‟s (1983) description of the early attachment experience in OCD 
corresponds to the preoccupied style of attachment, which is characterised by 
inconsistent messages of love from caregivers. Thus research could explore whether a 
preoccupied attachment style is specifically associated with OCD, compared to other 
attachment styles.  
 
Furthermore, self-concept clarity in OCD could also be a focus of future research. For 
example, studies could aim to compare levels of self-concept clarity across psychiatric 
disorders, including anxiety and depression. This research should also attempt to 
measure self-concept clarity using different methods. For example, Wilson and Rapee 
(2006) used an experimental design to measure self-concept certainty. In addition, 
better understanding is needed of the similarities and differences between self-
ambivalence and clarity. Whether self-concept clarity is a construct that fluctuates 
over time in people with OCD could also be another focus of research. Importantly, 
more empirical evidence is needed to support Clark‟s (2004) argument that self-
concept fragility/uncertainty is a vulnerability factor in OCD. It may be interesting to 
examine the specific relationship between self-concept clarity and intrusive thoughts. 
For example, to explore whether people with OCD who interpret their intrusions as a 
threat to core values also have a sense of a lack of control/certainty, as suggested in 
this study.  
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Ideally future research that investigates attachment, self-concept clarity and OC-
related beliefs would use longitudinal designs to investigate whether these factors 
predispose individuals to developing OCD. In addition, it would be important to 
explore whether increasing self-concept clarity leads to changes in OC-related beliefs, 
as suggested by the findings of this study. This could be done by comparing patients 
on a waiting list for treatment with a group of patients who receive a specific 
intervention focussed on increasing certainty in their self-beliefs. OC-related beliefs 
could be measured before and after the treatment to see whether any decrease in the 
strengths of the beliefs had occurred compared with the control group. Whether an 
intervention of this kind also improves levels of co-morbid depression in OCD could 
also be explored. In addition, research could investigate whether supplementing ERP 
with an intervention focussed on increasing self-concept clarity reduces drop out rates. 
Furthermore, as attachment insecurity was also found to have a direct effect on OC 
beliefs, it would be interesting to investigate whether the therapeutic relationship also 
influences the degree of attachment security OCD patients experience generally in 
their relationships with others.  
 
It would be important for future studies in this area to control for self-esteem, 
difficulties in making decisions and levels of anxiety. In addition, studies with larger 
samples that collect more detailed information on treatment history would be 
necessary to control for potential confounding effects. Studies with larger sample 
sizes are also necessary to test for the reciprocal effects of different variables on OC 
symptoms and beliefs. Future research may also further explore the role that self-
concept clarity and attachment insecurity play in producing depression in OCD. For 
example, it may be interesting to conduct a study in which depression, OCD without 
depression and OCD with co-morbid depression are compared.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study found that individuals who reported OC symptoms had a greater degree of 
attachment insecurity, higher levels of OC-related beliefs and less self-concept clarity 
compared with individuals who reported not having mental health difficulties. In 
addition, the study found that higher levels of OC-related beliefs and in particular 
beliefs relating to perfectionism and certainty were associated with less self-concept 
clarity when levels of depression were statistically controlled. Furthermore, a path 
analysis revealed that the relationship between self-concept clarity and OC symptoms 
was mediated by OC-related beliefs. In addition, OC-related beliefs also mediated the 
relationship between attachment insecurity and OC symptoms. In a post-hoc analysis, 
self-concept clarity and attachment insecurity were found to have a direct effect on 
levels of depression in people who reported experiencing OC symptoms. 
 
The findings of this study need to be treated with caution given the various limitations 
that have been outlined. However, the current findings appear to support Guidano and 
Liotti‟s (1983, 1985) vulnerability model of OCD, and some aspects of Clark‟s (2004) 
theory of obsessions. These theories broadly propose that an inconsistent early 
attachment experience produces an ambivalent/uncertain self-concept, which in turn 
leads to particular dysfunctional beliefs and therefore OC symptoms. Importantly, this 
study has shown that insecure attachment and an uncertain self-concept, which could   
predispose individuals to developing OCD, may be found in people‟s current 
experience of their symptoms. Whether these factors do increase a person‟s risk of 
developing OCD has yet to be established, however, this study represents a first step 
in investigating this.  
 
The findings of this study do have important implications for the ways in which 
clinicians work therapeutically with individuals experiencing OCD. In particular, 
increasing a person‟s certainty about themselves may impact on any unhelpful beliefs 
that contribute to the maintenance of symptoms. The effectiveness of such an 
intervention has yet to demonstrated. However, this study does suggest that whatever 
therapeutic approach is adopted, the possible influence of the way in which a person 
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with OCD experiences their relationships, and how stable, certain and consistent their 
self-beliefs are may aid understanding of arguably one of the most complex and 
debilitating emotional disorders. 
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Appendix 21 
Table to show the demographic variables for the NHS-recruited OCD and non-NHS 
recruited OCD group 
 NHS-recruited 
OCD group 
N = 10 
Non-NHS recruited 
OCD group 
N = 34 
N (%) N (%) 
Mean age 37.70 37.82 
Mean age of onset 21.56 15.13 
Gender                                                Male 
                                                          Female 
4 (40.0) 
6 (60.0) 
10 (29.4) 
24 (70.6) 
Marital status                                   Single 
                                                         Married 
                                                   Re-married 
                                                      Separated 
                                                       Divorced 
5 (50.0) 
3 (30.0) 
1 (10.0) 
- 
1 (10.0) 
19 (55.9) 
10 (29.4) 
1 (2.9) 
1 (2.9) 
3 (8.8) 
Family history of OCD                         No 
                                                               Yes 
5 (50.0) 
5 (50.0) 
22 (64.7) 
12 (35.3) 
Employment                           Unemployed 
                                                     Employed 
                                              Self-employed 
                                                          Retired 
                                                         Student 
                                                     Sick leave 
                          Looking after home/family 
2 (20.0) 
4 (40.0) 
1 (10.0) 
1 (10.0) 
- 
2 (20.0) 
- 
2 (5.9) 
15 (44.1) 
1 (2.9) 
4 (11.8) 
3 (8.8) 
8 (23.5) 
1 (2.9) 
Socio-economic status 
                           Managerial & professional 
                             Intermediate occupations 
Lower supervisory & technical occupations 
            Semi-routine & routine occupations 
 
5 (50.0) 
2 (20.0) 
1 (10.0) 
2 (20.0) 
 
18 (54.5) 
7 (21.2) 
5 (15.2) 
3 (9.1) 
Treatment                                           None 
                                                   Medication 
                                  Psychological therapy 
           Medication & psychological therapy 
1 (10.0) 
4 (40.0) 
1 (10.0) 
4 (40.0) 
19 (55.9) 
9 (26.5) 
3 (8.8) 
3 (8.8) 
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Appendix 22 
OCI-R subscale boxplots for the comparison and OCD groups 
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Appendix 23 
Table to show the descriptive statistics for the OCI-R subscales for both groups 
OCI-R 
Subscale 
Mean SD Median Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Comparison 
group 
Washing 
Checking 
Hoarding 
Ordering 
Obsessing 
Neutralising 
 
 
0.15 
0.97 
1.62 
1.56 
0.91 
0.18 
 
 
0.44 
1.22 
1.56 
1.62 
1.36 
0.39 
 
 
0.00 
1.00 
1.00 
1.00 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
 
2 
5 
5 
5 
4 
1 
 
 
3.16 
1.56 
0.69 
0.41 
1.18 
1.78 
 
 
10.21 
2.83 
-0.52 
-1.31 
-0.14 
1.23 
OCD 
group 
Washing 
Checking 
Hoarding 
Ordering 
Obsessing 
Neutralising 
 
 
5.52 
7.45 
4.91 
7.18 
8.50 
5.52 
 
 
 
4.07 
3.41 
3.43 
3.71 
3.16 
4.53 
 
 
 
5.50 
7.00 
4.00 
8.00 
9.00 
5.50 
 
 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
 
 
12 
12 
11 
12 
12 
12 
 
 
 
0.20 
-0.34 
0.50 
-0.35 
-0.87 
0.10 
 
 
-1.35 
-0.62 
-0.81 
-0.99 
0.47 
-1.56 
 
   
 
271 
 
JOURNAL-READY COPY* 
 
 
ELIZABETH MAY 
 
 
2007 
 
 
4965 words including references, excluding title page and 
tables/figures 
 
 
 
 
* To be submitted to the journal: Behaviour, Research and Therapy as a shorter 
communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
272 
 
 
 
 
Attachment security, self-concept clarity and beliefs in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. 
 
 
Elizabeth May, Barbara Mason & Steve Davies* 
University of Hertfordshire, Hertfordshire, UK 
 
 
*This research was conducted by the first author, under supervision of the second and 
third authors, in fulfilment of the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology at the University 
of Hertfordshire. 
 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
Elizabeth May, Doctor of Clinical Psychology Training Course, University of 
Hertfordshire, Hatfield, Herts, AL10 9AB, Tel: 01707 286 322, Email: 
E.2.May@herts.ac.uk  
 
Acknowledgements: Thank you to Jorg Shultz for his assistance with the statistical 
analysis 
 
 
   
 
273 
Abstract 
Ambivalent self-perceptions and attachment insecurity are seen as important factors in 
the development and maintenance of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Guidano 
& Liotti, 1983; Clark, 2004). The purpose of this study was to examine whether self-
concept clarity (SCC), a broader construct than self-ambivalence, was important in 
OCD. Participants were 44 individuals who reported experiencing OCD and 34 non-
clinical community controls. Participants completed measures of SCC, attachment 
security, OCD symptoms, obsessive-compulsive (OC) beliefs and depression. Results 
showed that the OCD group exhibited significantly less SCC, more attachment 
insecurity and higher levels of OC beliefs. After partialling out depression, only 
general levels of OC beliefs and beliefs relating to perfectionism/certainty were 
negatively associated with SCC. Implications for the cognitive appraisal models of 
OCD and for clinical practice are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 The cognitive appraisal model of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
proposes that symptoms develop because unwanted, intrusive thoughts are interpreted 
as highly significant or threatening, which leads to attempts to control the thought or 
neutralise the distress associated with it (Wells, 1997).  Underlying these faulty 
misinterpretations are predisposing, enduring beliefs concerning inflated 
responsibility, overimportance of thoughts, overestimations of threat, perfectionism, 
intolerance of uncertainty and importance of controlling one‟s thoughts (Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group; OCCWG, 2003). However, the motivational 
factors underlying compulsive behaviours are unclear within the cognitive appraisal 
account (Bhar, 2004). It has been suggested that people are motivated to engage in 
compulsions because the intrusion contradicts perceived valued aspects of themselves 
(Rachman, 1998; Purdon & Clark, 1999). This has led some researchers to explore the 
role of the self-concept in the pathogenesis of OCD. 
 In his cognitive control theory of obsessions, Clark (2004) argues that an 
ambivalent and uncertain self-concept is a key vulnerability factor in OCD. Negative 
affectivity (a personality disposition that increases susceptibility to experience worry, 
anxiety and depression), and pre-existing metacognitive beliefs concerning the 
importance of intrusive thoughts and their control are also important contributors. 
Specifically, Clark (2004) argues that an uncertain, ambivalent self-concept may lead 
to a propensity to misinterpret unwanted intrusive thoughts as a „threat to core 
personal values and ideals‟ (p.139). A central feature of obsessions that distinguishes 
them from other anxious thoughts is their ego-dystonic nature (Purdon & Clark, 
1999). For example, Rachman (1998) noted that the intrusive thoughts that are most 
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likely to be misinterpreted as significant and threatening are those which are contrary 
to or threaten the person‟s system of values. Research shows that people with OCD 
usually evaluate their most upsetting obsessions as more meaningful and as 
contradicting valued aspects of the self to a greater degree than less upsetting ones 
(Rowa, Purdon, Summerfeldt, & Antony, 2005). Clark (2004) argues that it is the ego-
dystonic nature of intrusions and the individual‟s pre-existing ambivalent self-view 
that leads to an appraisal of the intrusion as being contrary to important values or self 
attributes, and therefore as highly significant and threatening. 
 In their vulnerability model, Guidano and Liotti (1983) argue that OCD is 
characterised by self-ambivalence. They suggest that individuals who develop OCD 
have experienced a particular kind of attachment environment characterised by 
ambiguous messages of love and rejection. This produces two distinctly opposite, and 
equally plausible, interpretations of self and reality (Guidano & Liotti, 1983, 1985).  If 
prolonged, this experience has the effect of producing an attitude towards reality and 
the self that simultaneously has opposite valences. Compulsive behaviours emerge as 
a means of unifying these opposing attitudes and perceptions of the self. According to 
this view, self-ambivalence is a higher-order construct which does not lead directly to 
OC symptoms, but enables the development of particular maladaptive beliefs, which 
in turn leads to symptoms (Guidano & Liotti, 1983).  
 Previous research has found a link between insecure attachment and 
psychopathology (Mason, Platts, & Tyson, 2005; Fonagy et al., 1996). However, only 
one study has investigated the link between attachment and OCD directly. Myhr, 
Sookman and Pinard (2004) measured recalled parental style and romantic attachment 
in 36 OCD patients, 16 patients diagnosed with depression or dysthymia and 26 
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healthy controls using a self-report measure. Controlling for depression, they found 
that the OCD and depressed groups exhibited higher attachment insecurity than the 
control group. Specifically, the OCD group and depressed group demonstrated more 
attachment anxiety than the control group, but they did not differ from each other.  
 Only one study has directly tested whether Guidano and Liotti‟s (1983) 
concept of self-ambivalence is relevant to OCD. Bhar (2004) developed a measure of 
self-ambivalence and found that compared with non-psychiatric controls, individuals 
diagnosed with OCD exhibited significantly higher self-ambivalence, after controlling 
for self-esteem and mood. However, this difference was not observed between the 
OCD group and an anxious control group. Using the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-
44 (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 2003), the relationship between self-ambivalence and OC 
symptoms was mediated by all the OC belief domains. However, no individual belief 
domain completely explained this relationship. 
 The present study examined whether individuals with OCD would exhibit 
higher levels of attachment insecurity in romantic relationships, higher levels of OC 
beliefs and lower levels of self-concept clarity (SCC). Self-concept clarity is defined 
as the extent to which the contents of the self-concept are „clearly and confidently 
defined, internally consistent and temporally stable‟ (Campbell et al., 1996, p.141). 
SCC is similar to self-ambivalence. However, clarity is argued to be a broader 
construct as ambivalence is more concerned with the notion of an individual having 
both positive and negative self-beliefs, thus encompassing only a specific facet of 
clarity, that is, inconsistency (Campbell et al., 1996; Riketta & Ziegler, 2006). 
Therefore, based on previous research and theory (Guidano & Liotti, 1983; Bhar, 
2004), it was hypothesised that OC beliefs would mediate the relationship between 
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self-concept clarity and OC symptoms, and mediate the relationship between 
attachment security and OC symptoms.  
 
2. Method 
2.1 Participants 
 Participants included 10 individuals with a psychiatric diagnosis of OCD, 34 
individuals who self-reported OCD symptoms and 34 non-clinical community 
controls. Non-clinical community controls were included if the reported that they had 
not previously experienced or ever been treated for a mental health problem and were 
excluded if they scored within the clinical range on (a) the 90 item Revised Symptom 
Checklist List (SCL-90-R; score of greater than or equal to 63 on the global severity 
index, or if any two primary dimension scores are greater than or equal to a T score of 
63; Derogatis, 1994), (b) the Obsessive Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R; Foa 
et al., 2002, total score of 21 or above) and (c) scored in the mild or moderate range of 
the Beck Depression Inventory – second edition (BDI-II, Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996).  All participants in the OCD group were included if they scored within the 
clinical range on the total score of the OCI-R. Participants with a psychiatric diagnosis 
of OCD were excluded if they had a diagnosis of learning disability, psychosis or 
current substance misuse.  
2.2 Power analysis 
A power analysis was conducted for each planned statistical analysis. This 
revealed that the minimum total number of participants needed to detect a medium 
effect size (d = .50), with a power level of at least .80, using a significance level of .05 
was 170 (Cohen, 1992).  
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2.3 Measures 
2.3.1 Self-Concept Clarity  
 The Self Concept Clarity Scale (SCCS) (Campbell et al., 1996) is a 12 item 
self-report measure that measures the extent to which self-beliefs are clearly and 
confidently defined, internally consistent and stable. Ratings are given on a five point 
Likert scale ranging from „strongly disagree‟ to „strongly agree‟. Items are summed, 
following appropriate reversals as indicated by Campbell et al. (1996), to form a total 
score reflecting degree of clarity.  The total score ranges from 12 (low clarity) to 60 
(high clarity). Campbell et al. (1996) reported good internal consistency of the scale, 
high levels of test re-test reliability good construct validity and criterion validity. 
Cronbach‟s alpha was found to be .92 in this study, showing a good level of internal 
consistency. 
2.3.2 Attachment security 
 The Experiences in Close Relationships-Revised (ECR-R) (Fraley, Waller, & 
Brennan, 2000) is a self-report questionnaire that measures adult romantic attachment. 
The ECR-R contains 36 items, with two 18-item subscales corresponding to 
attachment related anxiety and avoidance. Respondents are required to indicate how 
they generally experience relationships, and to rate the degree to which they agree or 
disagree with the item statements. Ratings are given on a seven point Likert scale 
ranging from „disagree strongly‟ to „agree strongly‟. The scores for each subscale are 
averaged to provide an attachment related anxiety and avoidance score. The ECR-R 
has established psychometric properties (Sibley & Liu, 2004; Fairchild & Finney, 
2006). Cronbach‟s alpha for the current study was comparable to those found in 
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previous studies (  =.95 for the avoidance subscale and  =.97 for the anxiety 
subscale). 
2.3.3 OC symptoms 
 The OCI-R is a self-report inventory that is designed to measure the symptoms 
of  OCD (Foa et al., 2002).  The OCI-R requires respondents to rate how much each 
item has distressed or bothered them in the last month. Items consist of statements 
regarding various symptoms.  Ratings are given on a five-point Likert scale ranging 
from „not at all‟ to „extremely‟.  The scores for individual items are summed to 
provide a total score and scores on six subscales corresponding to washing, checking, 
ordering, hoarding, neutralising and obsessing symptoms. The OCI-R has been shown 
to have good discriminant validity (Huppert et al., 2007), high internal consistency, 
adequate test re-test reliability and excellent convergent validity (Foa et al. 2002; 
Hajcack, Huppert, Simons, & Foa, 2004).  Cronbach‟s alpha values for the subscales 
and total score were found to be robust in this study, ranging from .89 to .95. 
2.3.4 OC beliefs 
 The Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44) is a self-report measure 
that assesses enduring, predisposing beliefs that may increase risk for OCD (OCCWG, 
2003). The OBQ-44 requires respondents to rate their general level of agreement with 
each item. Items consist of statements that reflect different belief domains, and 
correspond to three subscales; responsibility/threat (RT), importance/control of 
thoughts (ICT) and perfectionism/certainty (PC). Ratings are given on a seven-point 
Likert scale ranging from „disagree very much‟ to „agree very much‟.  Ratings are 
summed to give scores for each subscale, and a total score. The OBQ-44 has been 
shown to have good internal consistency, convergent validity and discriminant 
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validity (OCCWG, 2005). The OBQ-44 showed a good level of internal consistency 
in the current study, with Cronbach alpha‟s of .98 for the total score, .97 for the RT 
subscale, .94 for the ICT subscale and .96 for the PC subscale. 
2.3.5 Depression 
 The second edition of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) (Beck et al., 
1996) is a self-report measure that assesses current levels of mood and various 
thoughts and behaviours associated with depression. The BDI-II contains 21 items and 
respondents are required to indicate their response using a four point scale. Scores for 
each item are summed to give an overall score for depression. A higher score indicates 
the presence of greater levels of depressive symptomatology. Beck et al. (1996) found 
the BDI-II to have high internal consistency, with evidence of good criterion and 
convergent validity. Comparable results were shown in a college student sample 
(Osman et al., 1997).  
2.3.6 General psychopathology 
 The SCL-90-R (Derogatis, 1994) is self-report questionnaire designed to 
assess various psychological symptom patterns. Respondents are required to rate how 
much each item has distressed or bothered them in the last week.  Ratings are given on 
a five point Likert scale ranging from „not at all‟ to „extremely‟.  Scores for individual 
items represent nine primary symptom dimensions.  In addition, three global indices 
can be obtained from the scores and reflect the overall level of symptomatology and 
psychological distress. The SCL-90-R demonstrates good internal consistency, 
convergent and discriminant validity (Derogatis, 1994). 
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2.4 Procedure 
 Approval for the recruitment of participants for this study was gained from a 
Local Research Ethics Committee. OCD group participants were recruited from 
psychological services and community mental health teams within local National 
Health Service Trusts or from charitable organisations within the voluntary sector. 
Non-clinical controls were recruited through community organisations. All 
participants received a questionnaire pack with instructions and were required to send 
back the questionnaire in a pre-paid envelope. Four of the OCD group participants 
chose to meet with the researcher to fill out the questionnaire. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on various demographic variables for 
the groups.  
 
---------------------------------Table 1 to be placed here------------------------------------ 
 
Between group comparisons were made using t tests for continuous variables and 2 
for categorical variables. As can be seen, the OCD group was characterised by 
significantly more individuals who were unemployed, had lower socio-economic 
status and less qualifications. 
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3.2 Independent t tests 
 Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations for both groups on the 
dependent variables, results of the t tests and the between group effect sizes (Cohens 
d).  
 
----------------------------------Table 2 to be placed here------------------------------------- 
 
 
As can be seen from the table, the OCD group reported significantly higher 
attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance, higher levels of OC beliefs, on the total 
score and all of the subscales, and lower SCC. The largest between group effect size 
was for the total score on the OBQ-44. 
3.3 Correlational analyses 
 To explore the associations among SCC and the other variables, correlational 
analyses were performed, the results of which are presented in Table 3.  
 
----------------------------Table 3 to be placed here------------------------------------- 
 
Once the effects of depression were partialled out, only the total OBQ-44 score and 
the perfectionism/certainty subscale had a significant negative relationship with SCC 
in the OCD group. Correlational analyses on a subscale level (Table 4) revealed that 
the obsessing, hoarding, ordering and neutralising subscales had significant negative 
relationships with SCC whereas the washing and checking subscales did not.  
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-------------------------Table 4 to be placed here---------------------------------------- 
 
 
3.4 Path analyses 
 A path analysis was conducted to examine whether OC beliefs mediated the 
relationship between attachment and OC symptoms, and the relationship between 
SCC and OC symptoms (Maruyama, 1998). The path model was tested by conducting 
two multiple regression analyses in which OC beliefs and OC symptoms were entered 
as the dependent variables respectively. Table 5 and Figure 1 shows the results.  
 
-------------------------------Table 5 to be placed here----------------------------------- 
 
-------------------------------Figure 1 to be placed here------------------------------------ 
 
There were no significant direct paths from SCC to OC symptoms or attachment 
anxiety to OC symptoms. Attachment avoidance exhibited no direct or indirect effects 
on OC symptoms. However, SCC was found to have a significant direct effect on OC 
beliefs, which in turn had a direct effect on OC symptoms. Similarly, attachment 
anxiety showed a significant direct effect on OC beliefs, which in turn had a direct 
effect on OC symptoms. This suggests that OC beliefs mediate the relationship 
between SCC and OC symptoms, and attachment anxiety and OC symptoms. 
Together, SCC, attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance explained 37% of the 
variance in OC beliefs. 
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 As attachment avoidance exhibited no significant effects, a model trimming 
approach was used in which the reduced model was estimated using a further 
regression analysis. The results of the trimmed model are presented in Table 5 and 
Figure 2.  
 
------------------------------------Figure 2 to be placed here-------------------------------- 
 
To calculate the indirect effect of SCC on OC symptoms and attachment anxiety on 
OC symptoms for this trimmed model, the path coefficients were multiplied. The 
indirect effect of SCC on OC symptoms (ß = -.19) and attachment anxiety on OC 
symptoms (ß = .13) were weak compared with the direct effect of OC beliefs on OC 
symptoms, further supporting the hypothesis that OC beliefs mediate the relationship 
between attachment anxiety and OC symptoms and between SCC and OC symptoms.    
 
4. Discussion 
 This study examined the relationship between attachment, SCC and OC beliefs 
in OCD. The finding that people who experienced OCD exhibited a greater degree of 
attachment insecurity compared with individuals who did not report mental health 
difficulties is consistent previous research that has found insecure attachment in 
people with OCD (Myhr et al., 2004). This finding may also lend some support to the 
theoretical conjectures of Guidano and Liotti (1983), who suggest that individuals 
with OCD have experienced a particular early environment which leads to insecure 
attachment. It must be noted that the assumption of this study was that an individual‟s 
current degree of romantic attachment security is likely to reflect, in part, their degree 
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of early attachment security, in line with the stability/continuity hypothesis of 
attachment theory (Bowlby, 1977). However, attachment theory also posits that that 
internal working models can be updated (Bowlby, 1973). Thus, the results of the study 
must be considered with caution in relation to Guidano and Liotti‟s (1983) model of 
OCD. It can be concluded that the findings suggest that people with OCD have more 
insecure attachments in their current relationships, but this may not necessarily mean 
that this reflects their early attachment experience. 
Consistent with the cognitive appraisal model of OCD (OCCWG, 2003) and 
previous research (OCCWG, 2005; Bhar, 2004), individuals with OCD had higher 
levels of OC beliefs generally and on different belief domains. Beliefs relating to  
perfectionism/certainty were associated with SCC after controlling for depression, not 
importance/control of thought beliefs as predicted by Clark‟s (2004) model. Clark 
(2004) does not elaborate on why an intrusion leads to efforts to eliminate it other than 
that it represents a contradiction to core values. In light of the current findings, an 
extension of this model could be that a thought that contradicts valued aspects of the 
self is not only experienced as alien to an already fragile self-concept, as Clark (2004) 
argues, but also because it is interpreted by the person as lacking in control and/or 
certainty, for example, of themselves, of events or the future. This is consistent with 
the view that OCD is characterised by a need for control and perfection (Guidano & 
Liotti, 1983) and that anxiety in general is characterised by the appraisal of events as 
out of one‟s control (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Barlow, 2000).  This interpretation of 
the findings remains tentative as the total belief domains score was also associated 
with SCC when depression was controlled and the path analysis did not investigate the 
role of each belief domain in influencing OC symptoms. 
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 The OCD group exhibited lower levels of SCC compared with individuals who 
did not report mental health difficulties. This finding provides support for Guidano 
and Liotti‟s (1983) theory that people with OCD have developed a self-concept that is 
characterised by ambivalence and uncertainty. This is consistent with previous 
research that has found lower SCC to be associated with high neuroticism, higher 
levels of anxiety and depression in non-clinical samples (Campbell et al., 1996; Smith, 
Wethington, & Zhan, 1996), and depression in clinical samples (Bigler, Neimeyer, & 
Brown, 2001). The findings of the current study are also in accordance with previous 
research that has investigated self-ambivalence in OCD (Bhar, 2004). 
 The pattern of results concerning OC belief mediation suggest that a more 
uncertain self-concept and a greater degree of insecurity in relationships impacts on 
OC beliefs, which in turn has a direct effect on OC symptoms. This is in line with a 
previous study that found OC beliefs mediated the relationship between self-
ambivalence and OCD (Bhar, 2004).  This is also consistent with the idea of an 
uncertain self-concept predisposing an individual to OCD through the mediating 
effect of certain dysfunctional beliefs (Guidano & Liotti, 1985) and that insecure 
attachment leads to maladaptive affect regulation and cognitive processing (Lopez & 
Brennan, 2000). However, SCC, attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance 
accounted for only 37% of the variance in OC beliefs, and OC beliefs only accounted 
for 20% of the variance in OC symptoms, indicating that other factors also impact on 
OC cognitions and symptoms. For example, Clark (2004) argues that negative 
affectivity is a key vulnerability factor in OCD, although research investigating 
whether negative affectivity has a direct effect on OC symptoms has been mixed 
(Sexton et al., 2003; Norton et al., 2005).  
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 Interestingly, only particular OC symptoms were related to SCC in this study. 
Specifically, lower SCC was most strongly related to a greater degree of hoarding and 
neutralising symptoms and more weakly related to obsessing and ordering symptoms, 
but not related to washing and checking symptoms or the total score. The lack of a 
relationship between the total score and washing and checking symptoms could be 
linked to a limited sample size. However, it may also suggest that individual symptom 
subscales are more useful in assessing OC symptoms rather than total scores, at least 
with the OCI-R (Foa et al., 2002). It has been noted previously that as individuals 
typically present with a highly idiosyncratic set of OC symptoms, the total OCI-R 
score may be suppressed by the items that are not relevant to an individual‟s 
symptoms (Abramowitz, Storch, Keeley, & Cordell, in press). 
 However, it is possible that the findings suggest that certain types of OC 
symptoms are characterised more by a lack of clarity in self-concept compared with 
others. For example, hoarding behaviour, which had the strongest negative correlation 
to self-concept clarity, may emerge as a means of an individual trying to establish a 
felt sense of security and control that is not experienced both internally and externally. 
Indeed, research has shown that hoarders consider their possessions to be part of 
themselves and provide a source of security and comfort (Frost & Hartl, 1996; 
Steketee, Frost & Kyrios, 2003).  
 The study had several limitations in design and execution.  The sample size 
was small and thus limits the power of the study. Individuals in the study were 
predominantly female and white in ethnic origin, and the control group consisted of 
individuals who were from a higher socio-economic status, had a higher rate of 
employment and had more qualifications compared with the OCD group, which limits 
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the generalisabilty of the findings. In addition, for the majority of the OCD group, 
psychiatric diagnosis of OCD could not be reliably determined. The study was cross-
sectional and therefore no firm conclusions can be reached regarding the causal status 
of the constructs investigated. A further issue is that levels of anxiety and self-esteem 
were not measured and therefore not controlled in the analyses. Low self-esteem has 
been observed in people with OCD (Ehntholt, Salkovskis & Rimes, 1999) thus it is 
possible that the associations between SCC and OC symptoms could be due to low 
levels of self-esteem, particularly as SCC has been shown to be positively associated 
with self-esteem (Campbell et al., 1996). Further methodological limitations include 
the issue of the sole use of self-report measurement methods. Finally, the differences 
in self-concept clarity may have been due to a general difficulty in making decisions 
in the OCD group, which is a feature of OCD (Farrell & Barrett, 2006).  
 This study has a number of implications for clinical practice. As beliefs were 
found to have a mediational role, careful assessment of these beliefs may be necessary 
to gain a comprehensive understanding of an individual‟s symptoms. Treatment 
refusal and drop out rates in exposure/response prevention for OCD may be linked to 
apprehension and fear about the difficulty and intensity of the treatment (Maltby & 
Tolin, 2003; 2005). It is possible that a chronically unstable, inconsistent and 
uncertain sense of self is also a factor that contributes to this apprehension and 
anxiety, particularly if beliefs about the need to be certain and perfect in all situations 
are also held. Thus a focus on increasing the stability, consistency and certainty of 
self-beliefs, at least initially, may help to engage individuals in the treatment. In 
particular, the findings of this study suggests that an intervention of this kind may 
have an impact on OC-related beliefs, which in turn may reduce symptoms. 
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 This study represents the first empirical investigation of SCC and attachment 
in OCD, thus further research is needed to examine whether the observed findings can 
be replicated in studies with larger samples that use diagnostic assessments. Ideally 
future research would use longitudinal designs to investigate whether these factors 
predispose individuals to developing OCD. It would be important for future studies to 
control for self-esteem, difficulties in making decisions and levels of anxiety. In 
addition, it would be important to explore whether increasing self-concept clarity 
leads to changes in OC-related beliefs, as suggested by the findings of this study. 
Finally, further research is needed to advance an understanding of the role that 
attachment plays in the development and maintenance of OCD. For example, 
qualitative research could investigate the theoretical conjectures of Guidano and Liotti 
(1983) that people with OCD have experienced an early attachment environment 
characterised by ambiguous messages of love and rejection. 
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Table 1.  Demographic features of the OCD and control groups 
 
       OCD   Control  Analysis 
       group    group   (t or Χ²) 
 
Mean (SD) age (years)    37.8 (12.3)  39.4 (12.8)  0.54 
Number females (%)     30 (68.2)  25 (73.5)  0.26 
Number Caucasian (%)    41 (93.2)  33 (97.0)   --- 
Number single (%)     24 (54.5)  10 (29.4)  4.93¹ 
Number employed     18 (43.2)  25 (73.5)  10.96** 
Number managerial/professional    23 (53.5)  29 (87.9)  12.43* 
Number University educated    15 (34.1)  26 (76.4)   14.26*¹ 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, ¹Fisher‟s exact test 
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Table 2. Means (Standard deviations) for each variable in the OCD and control groups 
 
Variable    OCD group   Control group   t-test of  Effect 
       (N = 44)       (N = 34)             the difference¹ (d.f.)  size 
ECR-R Anxiety   4.09 (1.61)   2.09 (0.76)   7.23* (64)  1.59   
ECR-R Avoidance   3.57 (1.29)   2.23 (0.80)   5.65* (73)  1.25 
SCCS     32.52 (10.22)   46.29 (7.55)   -6.84* (76)            -1.53 
OBQ-44 total    204.18 (57.98)  100.00 (24.16)  10.77* (61)  2.35 
OBQ-44 RT    79.00 (25.14)   36.97 (11.01)   9.93* (62)  2.16 
OBQ-44 PC    80.86 (23.06)   42.56 (13.92)   9.08* (72)  2.01 
OBQ-44 ICT    44.32 (19.64)   20.47 (8.22)   7.27* (61)  1.58 
 
¹Bonferroni adjustment was used in light of the increased likelihood of a Type 1 error due to multiple comparisons. 
*p < .01 
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Table 3. Zero order and partial correlations among the SCCS and ECR-R, OBQ-44 and OCI-R 
 
                             Zero order correlations    Partial correlations¹ 
                  OCD             Control                         OCD 
                  group                          group                          group 
                    
ECR-R Anxiety     -.34*   -.60**   -.06    
ECR-R avoidance     -.31*   -.32*   -.13 
 
OBQ-44 Total      -.54**   -.30*   -.34* 
OBQ-44 RT      -.41**   -.13   -.15 
OBQ-44 PC      -.54**   -.38*   -.41** 
OBQ-44 ICT      -.43**   -.07   -.22 
OCI-R       -.22   -.55**     --- 
 
¹Partialling out the total BDI-II score 
p < .05 (one tailed), ** p < .01 (one tailed)  
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Table 4. Zero order correlations among the SCCS and OCI-R subscales for the OCD group 
 
OCI-R subscale  Zero order correlations   
Obsessing    -.28* 
Washing    .19 
Checking    .22 
Hoarding    -.31* 
Ordering    -.27* 
Neutralising    -.30*                         
                    
* p < .05 (one tailed) 
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Table 5.  Results of the regression analysis  
 
 
   First regression analysis: Full model (N = 44) 
 
Dependent        Predictors         Standardised        t              p    R² 
Variable          B                     value 
 
OBQ-44 ECR-R anxiety     .30      2.13         .04 
total  ECR-R avoidance     -.01     -0.86         .93  .37 
score  SCCS       -.45     -3.26         .02 
 
   Second regression analysis: Full model (N = 44) 
OCI-R  ECR-R anxiety    .18     1.11         .28 
total   ECR-R avoidance    .12     .79        .44 .25 
score  SCCS      .09     .53        .60 
  OBQ-44 total score    .382     .19        .03 
Third regression analysis: Trimmed model (N = 44) 
OCI-R   
total  OBQ-44 total score     .44     3.22        .03 .20 
score 
 
   
 
300 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
                                                                                                                               .09 
                                                                                               -.45** 
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Figure 1. Full path diagram relating self concept clarity, attachment security, OC beliefs and OC symptoms. The figures next to each 
path represent the standardised regression coefficients (ß).  
 * p < .05, ** p < .01, dotted lines represent insignificant paths 
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 Figure 2.  Trimmed path model relating self concept clarity, attachment anxiety, OC beliefs and OC symptoms 
* p < .05, ** p < .01  
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